SECTION VI.

How is the Right of Property acquired.

The right of property, in material wealth, is acquired, in the first instance, in one of these two ways, viz.: first, by simply taking possession of natural wealth, or the productions of nature; and, secondly, by the artificial production of other wealth. Each of these ways will be considered separately.

1. The natural wealth of the world belongs to those who first take possession of it. The right of property, in any article of natural wealth, is first acquired by simply taking possession of it.

Thus a man, walking in the wilderness, picks up a nut, a stick, or a diamond, which he sees lying on the ground before him. He thereby makes it his property—his own. It is thenceforth his, against all the world. No other human being, nor any number of human beings, have any right, on the ground of property, to take it from him, without his consent. They are all bound to acknowledge it to be his, and not theirs.

It is in this way that all natural wealth is first made property. And any, and all natural wealth whatsoever, that can be possessed, becomes property in consequence, and solely in consequence, of one's simply taking possession of it.

There is no limit, fixed by the law of nature, to the amount of property one may acquire by simply taking possession of natural wealth, not already possessed, except the limit fixed by his power or ability to take such possession, without doing violence to the person or property of others. So much natural wealth, remaining unpossessed, as any one can take possession of first, becomes absolutely his property.*

This mode of acquiring property, by taking possession of the productions of nature, is a just mode. Nobody is wronged—that is, nobody is deprived of any thing that is his own—when one man takes possession of a production of nature, which lies exposed, and unpossessed by any one. The first comer has the same right, and all the right, to take possession of it, and make it his own, that any subsequent comer can have. No subsequent comer can show any right to it, different in its nature, from that, which the first comer exercises, in taking the possession. The wealth of nature, thus taken, and made property, was provided for the use of mankind. The only way, in which it can be made useful to mankind, is by their taking possession of it individually, and thus making it private property. Until it is made property, no one can have the right to apply it to the satisfaction of his own, or any other person's, wants, or desires. The first comer's wants and desires are as sacred in their nature, and the presumption is that they are as necessary to be supplied, as those of the second comer will be. They, therefore, furnish to him as good an authority for taking possession of the wealth of nature, as those of the second comer will furnish to him. They may chance to be either less, or more, violent, in degree; but whether less, or more, (if that were important to his comparative right,) the first comer cannot know. It is enough for him, that his own wants and desires have their origin in his own human-nature, in the same way that those of the second comer will have theirs. And such wants and desires are a sufficient warrant for him to take whatever nature has spread before him for their gratification, unless it have been already appropriated by some other person.

After he has taken possession of it, it is his, by an additional right, such as no other person can have. He has bestowed his labor upon it—the labor, at least, of taking it into his possession; and this labor will be lost to him, if he be deprived of the commodity he has taken possession of. It is of no importance how slight that labor may have been, though it be but the labor of a moment, as in picking up a pebble from the ground, or plucking a fruit from a tree. Even that labor, trifling as it is, is more than any other one has bestowed upon it. And it is enough for him, that that was his labor, and not another man's. He can now show a better right to the thing he has taken possession of, than any other man can. He had an equal right with any other man before; now he has a superior one, for he has expended his labor upon it, and no other person has done the like.

It cannot be said that the first comer is bound to leave something to supply the wants of the second. This argument would be just as good against the right of the second comer, the third, the fourth, and so on indefinitely, as it is against the right of the first; for it might, with the same reason, be said of each of these, that he was bound to leave something for those who should come after him. The rule, therefore, is, that each one may take enough to supply his own wants, if he can find the wherewith, unappropriated. And the history of the race proves that under this rule, the last man's wants are better supplied than were those of the first, owing to the fact of the last man's having the skill and means of creating more wealth for himself, than the first one had. He has also the benefit of all the accumulations, which his predecessors have left him. The first man is a hungry, shivering savage, with all the wealth of nature around him. The last man revels in all the luxuries, which art, science, and nature, working in concert, can furnish him.

Moreover, the wealth of nature is inexhaustible. The first comer can, at best, take possession of but an infinitesimal portion of the whole; not even so much, probably, as would fall to his share, if the whole were equally divided among the inhabitants of the globe. And this is another reason why a second comer cannot complain of the portion taken by the first.

There are still two other reasons why the first comer does no wrong to his successors, by taking possession of whatever natural wealth he can find, for the gratification of his wants. One of these reasons is, that when the wealth taken is of a perishable nature, as the fruit of a vine or tree, for example, it is liable to perish without ministering to the wants of any one, unless the first comer appropriate it to the satisfaction of his own. The other reason is, that when the wealth taken, is of a permanent nature, as land, for example, then the first comer, by taking possession of it—that is, by bestowing useful labor upon it—makes it more capable of contributing to the wants of mankind, than it would have been if left in its natural state. It is of course right that he should enjoy, during his life, the fruits of his own labor, in the increased value of the land he has improved; and when he dies, he leaves the land in a better condition for those who come after him, than it would have been in, if he had not expended his labor upon it.

Finally, the wealth of nature can be made available for the supply of men's wants, only by men's taking possession of portions of it individually, and making such portions their own. A man must take possession of the natural fruits of the earth, and thus make them his property, before he can apply them to the sustenance of his body. He must take possession of land, and thus make it his property, before he can raise a crop from it, or fit it for his residence. If the first comer have no right to take possession of the earth, or its fruits, for the supply of his wants, the second comer certainly can have no such right. The doctrine, therefore, that the first comer has no natural right to take possession of the wealth of nature, make it his property, and apply to his uses, is a doctrine that would doom the entire race to starvation, while all the wealth of nature remained unused, and unenjoyed around them.

For all these reasons, and probably for still others that might be given, the simple taking possession of the wealth of nature, is a just and natural, as it is a necessary, mode of acquiring the right of property in such wealth.

2. The other mode, in which the right of property is acquired, is by the creation, or production, of wealth, by labor.

The wealth created by labor, is the rightful property of the creator, or producer. This proposition is so self-evident as hardly to admit of being made more clear; for if the creator, or producer, of wealth, be not its rightful proprietor, surely no one else can be; and such wealth must perish unused.

The material wealth, created by labor, is created by bestowing labor upon the productions of nature, and thus adding to their value. For example—a man bestows his labor upon a block of marble, and converts it into a statue; or upon a piece of wood and iron, and converts them into a plow; or upon wool, or cotton, and converts it into a garment. The additional value thus given to the stone, wood, iron, wool, and cotton, is a creation of new wealth, by labor. And if the laborer own the stone, wood, iron, wool, and cotton, on which he bestows his labor, he is the rightful owner of the additional value which his labor gives to those articles. But if he be not the owner of the articles, on which he bestows his labor, he is not the owner of the additional value he has given to them; but gives or sells his labor to the owner of the articles on which he labors.

Having thus seen the principles, on which the right of property is acquired in material wealth, let us now take the same principles, and see how they will apply to the acquisition of the right of property in ideas, or intellectual wealth.

1. If ideas be considered as productions of nature, or as things existing in nature, and which men merely discover, or take possession of, then he who does discover, or first take possession of, an idea, thereby becomes its lawful and rightful proprietor; on the same principle that he, who first takes possession of any material production of nature, thereby makes himself its rightful owner.* And the first possessor of the idea, has the same right, either to keep that idea solely for his own use, or enjoyment, or to give, or sell it to other men, that the first possessor of any material commodity has, to keep it for his own use, or to give, or sell it, to other men.

2. If ideas be considered, not as productions of nature, or as things existing in nature, and merely discovered by man, but as entirely new wealth, created by his labor—the labor of his mind—then the right of property in them belongs to him, whose labor created them; on the same principle that any other wealth, created by human labor, belongs rightfully, as property, to its creator, or producer.

It cannot be truly said that there is any intrinsic difference in the two cases; that material wealth is created by physical labor, and ideas only by intellectual labor; and that this difference, in the mode of creation, or production, makes a difference in the rights of the creators, or producers, to the products of their respective labors. Any article of wealth, which a man creates or produces, by the exercise of any one portion of his wealth-producing faculties, is as clearly his rightful property, as is any other article of wealth, which he creates or produces, by any other portion of his wealth-producing faculties. If his mind produces wealth, that wealth is as rightfully his property, as is the wealth that is produced by his hands. This proposition is self-evident, if the fact of creation, or production, by labor, be what gives the creator or producer a right to the wealth he creates, or produces.

But, secondly, there is no real foundation for the assertion, or rather for the distinction assumed, that material wealth is produced by physical labor, and that ideas are produced by intellectual labor. All that labor, which we are in the habit of calling physical labor, is in reality performed wholly by the mind, will, or spirit, which uses the bones and muscles merely as tools. Bones and muscles perform no labor of themselves; they move, in labor, only as they are moved by the mind, will, or spirit. It is, therefore, as much the mind, will, or spirit, that lifts a stone, or fells a tree, or digs a field, as it is the mind, will, or spirit, that produces an idea. There is, therefore, no such thing as the physical labor of men, independently of their intellectual labor. Their intellectual powers merely use their physical organs, as tools, in performing what we call physical labor. And the physical organs have no more merit in the production of material wealth, than have the saws, hammers, axes, hoes, spades, or any other tools, which the mind of man uses in the production of wealth.

All wealth, therefore, whether material or intellectual, which men produce, or create, by their labor, is, in reality, produced or created by the labor of their minds, wills, or spirits, and by them alone. A man's rights, therefore, to the intellectual products of his labor, necessarily stand on the same basis with his rights to the material products of his labor. If he have the right to the latter, on the ground of production, he has the same right to the former, for the same reason; since both kinds of wealth are alike the productions of his intellectual or spiritual powers.

The fact, that the mind uses the physical organs in the production of material wealth, can make no distinction between such wealth, and ideas—for the mind also uses a material organ, (the brain,) in the production of ideas; just as, in the production of material wealth, it uses both brain and bone.

So far, therefore, as a man's right to wealth, has its origin in his production or creation of that wealth by his labor, it is impossible to establish a distinction between his right to material, and his right to intellectual, wealth; between his right to a house that he has erected, and his right to an idea that he has produced.

If there be any possible ground of distinction, his right is even stronger to the idea, than to the house; for the house was constructed out of that general stock of materials, which nature had provided for, and offered to, the whole human race, and which one human being had as much natural right to take possession of, as another; while the idea is a pure creation of his own faculties, accomplished without abstracting, from any common stock of natural wealth, any thing whatever, which the rest of the world could, in any way, claim, as belonging to them, in common with him.