The political and military conditions preceding Franco’s final offensive in Catalonia—documents and reflections

Assured of his increasingly more preponderant and clearly demonstrated military superiority, aware of our internal weakness due to war-weariness, an anti-Spanish and anti-popular policy, and an excess of sacrifices without any comprehensible purpose, Franco announced, months in advance, the offensive against Catalonia, which had been the improvised stronghold of the war effort and the constructive and exemplary focal point of the revolution.

It was supposed to be the final offensive to bring an end to the conflagration, which had already lasted thirty months, during which all our initial advantages had been lost thanks to the intervention of Russia and its methods in so-called Republican Spain. In this offensive, Franco took into account not only the overwhelming superiority of his armament, artillery and air force, but also the dismal morale of our troops and the people in our rearguard. The fall of Catalonia, where the army’s best units had been shattered under other political, economic and moral circumstances, was an operation of the type executed by the totalitarian powers against Austria on March 12, 1938, against the Sudetenland on October 1, 1938, and then against Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, 1939, against the territory of Memel, and against Albania. The enemy’s propaganda broke down all the moral resources that might have underpinned any resistance and, when the troops of conquest and occupation arrived, they hardly needed to fire a single shot.

We had the presentiment, and we expressed it unambiguously, that the occupation of Catalonia, considering the state of moral collapse of the army and the rearguard of Republican Spain, would be a military walk in the park. We still had the forces, although we lacked the help of essential armaments, to mount significant resistance in a war of movement, to blunt the enemy advance, stop the enemy troops at the abundant natural strong points and wear down the enemy forces in fruitless attacks for months. Man is still the heart of war, and man had been destroyed by Stalinist policy, up to the point where he did not want to fight and instead chose to accept the bitter fate of emigration and the curse of defeat. The only organization that enjoyed increasing popular support and prestige and that remained incorruptible in the face of the new masters was the FAI, but all the parties and organizations had joined together to render any action by the FAI impossible, which is the opposite of what happened in the enemy zone with the Falange, which was much less numerous and battle-tested, but was always considered to be an indispensable factor in the war against us.

More than eight months before the offensive began, we offered the Government a plan for organizing the defense of Barcelona within a radius of fifty kilometers, ignoring the lines of defense and resistance planned by the Central General Staff. Colonel Claudin, one of the commanders of the coastal defenses, taking into consideration the terrain and the few natural access points to the capital of Catalonia, proposed defensive fortifications that would begin in El Perelló, continue to Bruchs, and end near Manresa. He envisioned that they would be constructed by volunteers and that the walls, trenches, machine gun emplacements, artillery batteries, etc., would also be manned by volunteers. We were committed to completing the preparations for this Maginot Line of Barcelona within a few months; all we needed was the necessary authorization and the materials for the fortifications. All the rest would have been based on voluntary labor. General Asensio was also involved, along with Colonel Pérez Farraz and other political and military leaders. We participated in the delegation that was received by the President of the Generalitat, Luis Companys, to explain the project to him and to suggest that he seek from the Central Government the organizational means, for Catalonia itself, in the form that we thought necessary, for the defense of Barcelona, with the direct contribution of the men who were most capable of influencing Catalonian public opinion.

Our offer, perhaps because it was ours, and because Negrín was working under orders to prevent us from initiating any major projects, was not accepted by the Central Government or its instruments and we had to content ourselves with standing there with our hands in our pockets, announcing the collapse of the front if the state of affairs that prevailed among the combatants was not urgently addressed and radically remedied. We had already witnessed the collapse of the fronts in the East and in Estremadura as a consequence of Russian leadership of the war and we did not have to claim to be prophets when we maintained that these same causes were still at work, and that they must continue to produce the same results.

If our initiative had been presented to the Governments of the Republic and of Catalonia by other hands, let us say, if it had been presented by men from a certain political party, it would have been taken seriously, probably, but we had obtained the support for our proposal of certain military officers and civilian figures, to whom we really wanted to assure a somewhat dignified denouement to this war and whom we did not want to see implicated in Negrín’s feast of Sardanapalus. That is why every door was closed in our faces.

The population was exhausted, and the government’s confusion and incompetence could hardly be concealed by the censorship, the persecutions of dissenters, the strident clichés emitted by the press and the radio, and the rogue’s gallery of the parties and organizations. Russian dominance, however, was widely felt to be an intolerable burden. The systematic looting of the wealth of Spain was evident and it had to be covered up. Catalonia’s textiles were the main object of Russian greed. From the beginning of Russia’s intervention it always had its eyes on this great treasure.

Whole factories were also shipped off to Russia, with specialized machinery, etc., not to mention the appropriation of the commercial secrets of several industries, for which a network of spies was created from the very first moments of Russia’s intervention to penetrate every vital sector of the economy, as was the case in the army, in the navy and in the air force….[50] No decision was made without Russian knowledge and without the Russians giving the green light. It was the same in the economy, in finance and in international diplomacy as it was in the military.

Favored by the blackmail of Stalinist aid, which was not really aid at all, but a scandalous robbery of our finances and our economy by the Russian trade delegates, the Spanish communists, numerically insignificant, and just as insignificant in terms of quality, once the July movement broke out,[51] gradually attracted to their ranks all those who had no place in the other parties and organizations due to their dubious past, and imposed their dominance in every sphere of public life. As for spontaneous popular support, they had none at all.

If, for our part, we would have been at a loss if we had to choose between the victory of Franco or the victory of Stalin, the politically indifferent population preferred the victory of Franco, in the vague hope that they would be treated better under Franco, and that at least the suffering would be no worse and that the persecutions and tortures would not be more ruthless.

And because of the hatred of the Russian domination that they had to endure in Republican Spain, the fact that, on the other side, Italian and German domination were neither more gentle nor essentially different with respect to the their procedures and aspirations was underestimated.

The people were spiritually alienated from the war, they did not know why they were fighting, they saw the bacchanalia of the new privileged classes, and they could not conceive that things could be worse on the other side of the trenches. And without the active support of the people the war was lost, irremediably lost. The faith—the absurd faith—in the support of the so-called democratic powers, repeatedly invoked by those who were instrumental in handing Spain over to Russian domination, was never seriously believed by anyone, after all the declarations and press releases of the famous Non-Intervention Committee. Thus, if our alliance with Russia had not fundamentally transformed our situation with regard to the acquisition of arms and food, and if the democracies were resolved upon abandoning us, we only had one card left to play: that of the people, forgotten in the dirty game of the war and republican and communist diplomacy. The people always have the resources when they passionately desire something. And they could have discovered the means to thwart the advance of the enemy armies without relying on any of the factors that distinguish modern warfare. How? With the very same methods used, among others, on July 19. Barcelona alone had the power, and more than enough, in the form in which it could have fought, to consume the armies of Franco and to render all his arsenals useless.

In order to be able to count on the people as an active factor in the conflict, however, a change of government was necessary in the civilian domain, and especially the removal of Dr. Negrín and his servant for foreign policy, Alvarez del Vayo, agents of Russia, dictators taking orders from the communists, and in the military domain it was necessary to impose an in-depth reorganization of the command structure, to carry out a review of the personnel of the combat forces, to use leaders and officers who had been passed over for promotion and persecuted despite their anti-fascist histories and their abilities, and to suppress the crimes that were constantly being perpetrated in the ranks of the army for the purpose of ensuring the ascendancy of a certain party….

We were unable to obtain the implementation of any of our proposals, because of the cowardice of some, and because of the complicity of others with the orgy of corruption, upon which the foundations of the Government of Victory rested.

We even considered the use of force, the possibilities of a frontal assault, and we evaluated the arms at our disposal; but we understood that, in view of the close connection of most of the leaders of the parties and organizations with the policy of Dr. Negrín, whom they considered to be the providential man of the resistance, we would not have been able rely on unanimous support and we would have lost the battle, uselessly augmenting the number of victims. If we had been successful in achieving the necessary agreement of all the sectors of the libertarian movement with our theses, the events that took place in the Central Zone and in Levante after the fall of Catalonia would have taken place in Catalonia itself, due to the initiative and under the responsibility of the FAI, the only Spanish type of organization that had refused to work in the service of foreign powers, and the only organization that represented an authentic connection with the sentiments of the people.

We, who had been life-long internationalists, were the only representatives of the independence of Spain, the only sincere defenders of the formula: Spain for the Spaniards!

If we have to point to one change that we underwent as a result of the war, it is perhaps the fact that we were no longer the doctrinaire anti-patriots that we were in the past, but the only real patriots, ready to sacrifice everything for the future of Spain. And while our views were changing in this sense, those who had always been nationalists were not thinking about anything but how to stash away money in foreign countries for after the defeat, and most of all the famous preachers of resistance until victory….

Even if only to serve the truth, it is necessary for us to state what our position was at that time, and what we did, during a war that was born from our battles against the military uprising. If history must judge us, and in this case, right now, this means the history written by the winners, then let it judge us for our deeds and our words, but not for a solidarity that we never felt for the Government to which Franco owed his victory.

We want history to respond to what we did, whether for good or for ill, and to our intentions, which were of the best, but separately from the Government of the Republic and the Russian agents. We were neither Republicans nor did we remain silent in the face of communist domination. Circumstances obliged us to establish contacts with people whose goals were opposed to ours and whose conduct deserved the firing squad, but we have preserved our identity and we have not lost our way, even when we lacked the material force to serve Spain more effectively.

On December 7, 1938, the Government of Victory convoked a meeting of the Popular Front in one of the sumptuous palaces of Pedralbes. In attendance were Mije and La Pasionaria for the Communist Party, Cordero and Lamoneda for the Socialist Party, Rodríguez Vega and Amaro del Rosal for the UGT, Mariano Vázquez and Horacio Prieto for the CNT, Baeza Medina for the Republican Left, Mateo Silva for the Republican Union, and Herrera and Santillán for the FAI, who submitted the following confidential report to the Regional Federations of the FAI:

Negrín began by stating that the purpose of the meeting was simply to inform the parties and organizations of the Popular Front of the current situation. At first—or so he said—he thought of convoking a joint meeting of the National Popular Front and the Popular Front of Catalonia; but for a lack of a meeting hall large enough to accommodate so many people, he decided to convoke them separately. This will oblige him to repeat the statements that he was going to make at this meeting when he would meet later with the Popular Front of Catalonia.

He provided explanations concerning the operations in the Ebro region, beginning with the month of June, when they were first conceived and implemented. He indicated the causes that lay behind these operations—the need to stop the enemy’s offensive and to divert some of the enemy’s forces from their irresistible advance towards Sagunto and Valencia, which posed a serious threat to that zone, although fully aware of all the risks that this entailed and which were already reckoned with in advance. He expressed his view that the Ebro campaign had exceed all expectations, and that thanks to the fortitude of our soldiers and to the strength acquired by our army with its discipline and good organization, we have inflicted an enormous setback on the enemy and we have also gained precious time that has allowed the international diplomatic climate to improve. He therefore believes that it was a meritorious operation, deserving of everyone’s respect, and that even though we suffered quite a few casualties, they were fewer than the casualties we inflicted on the enemy. And besides, our casualties, including dead, missing and wounded, would be compensated for by the prisoners we took.

Then he refers to the terrible distress occasioned when it became imperative to consider withdrawing our troops to our side of the Ebro. He says that this had been planned long before it was carried out, which proves the capacity of our spirit of resistance. He points out that organizations and parties, in expressions of their good will, have submitted proposals for future military operations and proposed revisions of existing plans, etc., all of which are very valuable suggestions that have been implemented as much as possible, and that one of these proposals urgently called for recognizing the need to organize our withdrawal before a disaster takes place. He reports that the withdrawal was a marvelous achievement, carried out with such extreme subtlety and precision that even he was surprised, especially in view of the fact that he had already reluctantly accepted the prospect that the withdrawal would be very costly in terms of men and materiel, when in fact it took place without any considerable losses.

He then speaks at length about the situation of the enemy, pointing out that the situation is very critical in the rebel zone, since there is an increasing level of discontent in the enemy’s rearguard, the enemy regime is losing credibility internationally, and its economy is plagued by severe shortages. All these factors forced the enemy to prepare a major offensive that will allow for a few military victories with which the enemy’s all-too-compromised credibility can be reinforced. It seems that the enemy’s forces are on the verge of unleashing a major offensive, which is indicated by the enormous stockpiles of men and materiel at certain locations. He says that, since this offensive will be an operation lavishly supplied with men and firepower, it will necessarily produce a momentary wavering among our ranks. He says that of course it will not be very serious, since the requisite measures are being taken to prevent a catastrophe. He thinks that we will yield some ground, but that we will not lose any vital positions, and the offensive will not have any unfavorable consequences if we are all forewarned and ready to stand fast.

Under these circumstances, he considers the preservation of morale in the Army and in the rearguard to be indispensable. The Army has provided sufficient proofs of its morale and its ability, with respect to both defense and attack. The rearguard has also demonstrated that it, too, has been working hard, and that it knows how to endure all kinds of privations with stoicism. At these critical moments, however, all the anti-fascist sectors must devote their efforts to maintaining unity of action and of will, setting aside their disputes and particular aspirations.

He points out that with respect to food supplies, while we have lived through some very difficult times, it seems that we have turned the corner and that we are now on our way to overcoming these problems. Although they cannot be considered to be completely resolved, we can say that they are being considerably improved. We must therefore do everything possible to uphold morale at the front and in the rearguard, both of which are necessary, since the morale of each considerably influences the other. For all of these reasons, he wants the parties and organizations that control opinion to keep in mind, discreetly, of course, what might happen, so that there are no excessive and unfounded panics….

Then he said that he did not have enough food for everyone at the meeting and that since he could not invite us to dinner, he invited us to have a glass of champagne in an adjoining reception area.

This is the summary of what Negrín said in his meeting with the parties and organizations of the Popular Front. This meeting was strictly and exclusively for the purpose of providing information. It was not considered to be an appropriate venue for representatives of the sectors of the Popular Front to ask questions or to challenge or even support Dr. Negrín’s policies, as was demonstrated by the silence observed by all of them. Negrín did not ask anyone to support the Government’s policy, and therefore no one could give him their support. As a significant fact regarding our conduct as a delegation, we shall mention that, immediately after leaving the meeting hall on our way to the reception lounge, we decided to absent ourselves without either taking advantage of the free alcohol or participating in the various knots of conversations that were forming. Correctly but without warmth we took our leave of the Head of State, and Santillán and I made a hasty exit. At the door to the courtyard I noticed that Negrín had come halfway down the stairs behind us and was talking to Santillán before he turned back to go upstairs, thus giving him another chance to bid us farewell. The rest of the representatives of the parties and organizations remained upstairs in the reception lounge, and we were unaware of whether, in our absence, any other questions were addressed.

As Negrín was speaking, one word fought violently to burst from our lips: Fraud! Everything he said was a lie. A lie about the small number of casualties incurred at the Battle of the Ebro, for it cost us approximately 70,000 men, including those taken prisoner, killed or wounded, and an enormous amount of heavy and light weaponry, which could not be replaced. It is true that the campaign did slow down the enemy’s advance towards Valencia, but only at the cost of wasting the best chances to continue the defense of the Catalonian zone. It was a lie about the disciplined army, it was a lie about the stoic resignation of the rearguard, it was a lie about our improved international position and it was a lie about the critical situation of the enemy. His tall tales did not convince us at all, although we were able to confirm that the representatives of the other parties and organizations gave signs of being satisfied and proud. A few days after the meeting we even saw internal bulletins disseminated by some of the organizations that were represented at the meeting in which Negrín’s arguments and assessments were passed off as their own. We had never before seen such a case of voluntary servitude.

As for military materiel, we had ten bombers, we lacked artillery, since the artillery pieces sent to us by the Russians, which were more than fifty caliber, were so defective that the weapons were rendered inoperative after they were fired a few times. Enormous quantities of rifles and machine guns had been lost in the Battle of the Ebro.[52]

No one will ever know how much was lost, since one of the purchasing agents for the army, the gynecologist Otero, a man who was a calamity for the Republic, was the Undersecretary of the Commission on Armaments and Munitions, and almost all the purchasing operations passed through his hands.

On the day after the meeting convoked by Negrín, the Popular Front met to find a way to effectively help the Government face the next offensive. We had been trying for several months to bring about an in-depth reassessment of the question of the conduct of the war and the moral decomposition of the army. We finally succeeded in getting these deaf volunteers from the Popular Front, that Moscow-style mystification in which we had become implicated against our better judgment, to resolve to debate one of our proposals. What follows is the text of an internal bulletin sent to the regional organizations of the FAI:[53]

After certain procedural formalities were dispatched, it was resolved with respect to the declared incompatibility of the Popular Front of Guadalajara with the Communist Party and with the Governor of that province, Cazorla, that each party or organization should compile first-hand reports to complete the information we have already received which is not conclusive enough for reaching a decision on this matter.

With regard to the food supply policy proposed for study by the CNT delegation, the Secretary reports that the Director General of Food Supply has not yet responded to the note that was sent to him in connection with the CNT proposal and therefore this point will be deferred to the agenda of the next meeting.

The next topic for debate was the FAI’s proposal on military policy and the problem of the activities of parties and organizations in the army.

This is a summary of our speech:

Our army, like many other aspects of our national life, is suffering from the excessive enthusiasm of the neophytes of the parties that have been constituted since July 19, 1936. Every new adept of a doctrine naturally has a tendency towards the abuse of his zeal and the exaggerated expression of his sectarianism, without regard for and even with an Olympian scorn for whatever has not been passed through the screen of his organization or party.

In addition to the aggressive and intolerant psychology of the neophyte, under the current circumstances, we must also take into account the very dubious backgrounds of the members of certain parties that are not very discriminating in their recruitment standards, trusting more to quantity than to quality.

If we were to examine the membership rolls of each one of the parties and organizations that are represented here, we would uncover more than a few surprises, and it would not be hard to reach the conclusion that, under the cover of many nominally anti-fascist membership cards, the representatives of Franco have free rein to ply their trade. For its part, the FAI would not hesitate to open up its membership lists and to thank in advance anyone who could reveal the activity within its ranks of any individuals from suspicious backgrounds; we can confidently state, however, that the immense majority of our members, almost all of whom are of authentically proletarian origin, were militants long before July 19.

Another phenomenon that has been the focus of much of our attention with regard to the policy that has directed our war effort during the last two years, is the considerable number of professional military officers of the highest technical qualifications with verified anti-fascist convictions who have been passed over for promotions or persecuted.

The commanding positions in the army are often occupied by newcomers of unknown origin who are mostly lacking all the technical experience required for performing their missions. We can confidently state that the most prestigious military officers, the ones that are most loyal to the Republic, the ones who possess the best training, those who could do the most to help our war effort, are passed over for promotions, left without commands, and even persecuted, when they are not just assassinated.[54] We are referring, without the need to name any names, to certain cases involving shootings that have taken place.

Everyone knows that our shortage of high level commanding officers is considerable. However, we have command-level infantry officers and general staff-level officers who are currently without any assignments and have been passed over for promotions who are truly outstanding figures in our militia, from the lowest level junior officers to the highest level staff officers. If you want us to mention some names, we will not hesitate to do so in order to prove the truth of what we are saying.

One of the great masters of Spanish artillery is now walking the streets of Barcelona. His activity, beginning on July 19, is unequaled and his technical qualifications as well as his anti-fascist credentials are matters of general knowledge. He has two life sentences to his credit, one for his activity against the monarchy, and the other for the events of October 1934. This man has even offered to serve as the commander of an artillery battery as a simple captain, since he has not resigned himself to remaining in the rearguard instead of contributing everything he can until the very end to the war effort. His generous offer has been refused.

Let us tell the story of one of the most famous pilots of Spanish aviation. Without his intervention, it is quite possible that the Republic never would have existed, and this is not even taking into account his participation in the battle against the rebels on July 19. This pilot, a colonel, has also volunteered, in his case to serve as a mere lieutenant in command of an infantry platoon, and he received the response from the General Staff that there were no vacancies in our Army. This is a man with a long history of military and civic achievements and now he is walking the streets of the current capital of the Republic, despondent, and without any hope of placing his knowledge and his name at the service of the war effort. Yet all kinds of people are being used in the air force, whose backgrounds and identities were not subjected to very much scrutiny. One of the high-level positions in the air force is occupied by one of the pilots who machine-gunned the Asturian workers in 1934, and his role in that feat of pre-fascism earned him the medal of military merit.

Only a few days ago, the captain who served as the adjutant to Undersecretary of the Air Force Camacho defected to the enemy in a Republican fighter plane, and his revelations concerning the Republican air force that have been broadcast on the radio from Teruel are far from having been refuted. The contrast between the glorious figure of the air force to whom we referred above and events like the defection of Captain Carrasco and other incidents like it that are taking place daily, cannot be a factor that enhances morale in the ranks of the soldiers or on the home front of loyalist Spain. Let us recall, with respect to this question, that we have on several occasions expressed the suspicions we harbored concerning the conduct of certain men, including Captain Carrasco, who joined the victorious movement in Barcelona on July 20, whereas on the 19^ththey had rendered homage to General Goded, who arrived from Mallorca to assume command over the revolt.

Facts of this kind, together with the promotions policy that is currently in effect, entail an enormous threat to the unity of the Army and a successful conclusion to the war. We must not forget that the Army of the monarchy was decomposed and demoralized by extraordinary promotions; if we are now committing the same mistakes as the monarchy, we will not be able to avoid the same guaranteed results. We would also like to refer to other aspects that have been repeated too often for them to possibly go unnoticed: the assassinations of elements from certain sectors, for example, primarily from the libertarian sector, at the front. We do not want to accuse any particular party of having committed these crimes.

We are convinced that these crimes must be repudiated by everyone, without exception; but there is the coincidence that the victims are almost always soldiers and officers from the CNT and the FAI, while the assassins are often working behind the cover of the membership card of the Communist Party. We are convinced that these people are following the orders of the generals from their faction and that they are executing their plans. This is why we think that the Popular Front must take these revelations into consideration and take measures to bring an immediate end to these incidents in order to avoid consequences that all of us will later have reason to regret.

We shall discuss only one incident, the most recent one that has come to our attention. But we could provide documentation for hundreds of similar cases.

A lieutenant, with whom we are personally acquainted and who joined the militia as a volunteer in August 1936, was arrested in Barcelona. The charge is irrelevant. After spending some time in a barracks in this city, where a famous boxer was in charge of interrogations, he was transferred to Pons with a group of soldiers. There, they were all told that they were being released and that they were to rejoin their original units. This lieutenant was serving with the 153^rdBrigade, while the soldiers were members of the 26^thDivision. They were advised to observe principles of good behavior, discipline and obedience, to avoid falling prey to the infractions for which they had been arrested. They were loaded onto a truck, which was followed by a staff car with the escort of a communist leader, a former member of the Civil Guard. When the truck came to a certain point it stopped, and they were told that they should follow a certain path they were shown and that they would find their respective units. They had hardly turned their backs when they heard the roar of machine guns being fired from the staff car that had followed the truck. The lieutenant immediately thought that they were being assassinated and he threw himself on the ground as soon as he heard the first shots. He hit the ground just in time, because two of the soldiers who were with him were gunned down right next to him and the others, six or eight of them, also fell within a few meters. The assassins emerged from the car to make sure that their victims were dead but they did not notice that one of them, the lieutenant, was not even wounded. Once they were done, they got back into their car and drove away while the man who fortunately lived to tell us the tale was able to make his way back to Barcelona on foot, from Mollerusa, where the executions took place. And he is still in Barcelona, without any intention whatsoever of returning to the front, where our men have to be more wary of the allies on their flanks than of the enemies on the other side of the trenches. He is willing to speak to the Popular Front, in case the Popular Front wants to examine this specific incident that we are bringing to its attention as an indication of an endemic state in the ranks of the Republican army.

In our recent meeting with him, Negrín told us that our successes are due more to the moral force that inspires us than to weapons and materiel, which we lack. We agree, and that is why we are suggesting that the necessary conditions should be imposed for this morale to be preserved and to prevent this force from being dismembered, thus leading to a very dangerous collapse in the face of the imminent enemy offensive he warned us about.

In every country and in every war, when military disasters take place, an automatic combing-out of the military commands is implemented. This has a well-demonstrated psychological effect and instills the soldiers with hope, in the assumption that the new commanders would have to be better than the old ones. It is precisely our war that displays the contrary phenomenon. The more military disasters a staff officer or high level commander has under his belt, the more promotions and medals he is awarded. We shall not avail ourselves of this opportunity to go into details about the quality of certain high level military commanders, but we shall only point out that the fact that they have retained their positions does not benefit the quest to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

And we must point out that it is precisely our organization, without any right of asylum beyond the borders of Spain, that has the greatest interest in making sure that this war does not end in a catastrophe. We know that our place is here, that we must not desert our post, and due to the number of our militants in the ranks of the army and in the workplaces on the home front, we believe we have every right to demand that the basic conditions upon which the foundations of our fighting spirit must be based have to be taken into account.

To summarize: We are proposing that the excesses of the party neophytes be stopped immediately, excesses that often give the impression that they are working on behalf of the enemy, with similar abuses and procedures.

Second, we demand the employment, depending on their abilities, of the military officers who have been unjustly passed over for promotion, and the examination of the activities of those who have been appointed to high level positions of responsibility without the technical and political prerequisites for these positions.

We also demand the immediate cessation of the assassinations that are taking place at the front and a purge of the officers who presently occupy high level positions, which would instill the soldiers with the hope that their new leaders will do better and be more successful than the old ones.

We shall conclude by saying that, without these conditions and under the current circumstances prevailing in our Army, we do not predict anything good coming from the offensive Negrín told us about and which would appear to be the final campaign….

The delegation from the CNT then addressed the meeting to say that the Popular Front had to take into account, and bring to the attention of the Government, the matter of the assassinations, as well as the use of the officers who could be identified as lacking proper employment. With respect to the number of such officers, it might be as large as the FAI delegation says it is or it might be smaller, but the truth is that there are in fact officers who have been passed over for promotions and this situation is not justifiable unless there is some overriding cause for it.

The CNT delegation also referred to the counterproductive policy regarding promotions, which has stirred up a lot of resentment and anger. But one cannot speak of the responsibility of the Government in this case, any more than in the case of the assassinations or the officers passed over for assignments, and the delegation suggested the formation of a commission representing all the political and trade union forces that would intervene to ensure that all promotions are granted fairly and are not inspired by extreme party interests.

The delegation of the Republican Left insists above all on testifying to the veracity of the claims regarding the proselytism of the Communist Party in the Army and to the dangers it entails. Direct reference is made to the case of the commander in chief of the CRIM Number 16, a colonel Pedro Las Heras, a republican, against whom a veritable conspiracy was mobilized to remove him from his position. The delegation also told the story of the significance of colonel Díaz Sandino and of how a man of his political and military background was passed over for promotion. The socialist delegation expressed its views on the role of the Popular Front and recommended moderation, and offered some minor objections and clarifications.

A lively debate then took place concerning our reports and proposals, especially with respect to our references to General Hidalgo de Cisneros, an officer who rose up from the ranks of the Quartermaster’s Corps and is now a regular army general, which is an unacceptable promotion, since he was not even a sergeant in the infantry. In tactical regulations, a simple infantry sergeant can take command of a major unit when there are no other Army officers available, but a General from the Quartermaster’s Corps cannot do the same.

The delegation of the UGT declares that their trade union federation has no knowledge of any of its members having been assassinated at the front, and expresses its doubts about the veracity of our revelations.

We once again insist, in the name of the FAI, on calling attention to the arbitrariness and the dangers of the promotions policy. With regard to the assassinations, we only want the Popular Front to assume responsibility for conducting an inquiry into the cases that we can present to it in order to determine whether their perpetrators were merely party fanatics or whether they were acting under orders from their superiors or from instructions directly from the enemy. We reminded the Popular Front that the tolerant attitude of the victims might one day come to an end[55] and then we could not be held accountable for what might happen. Not so long ago, with the help of the civil and military authorities of Catalonia, the Employers Association unleashed the pistoleros of the so-called Free Trade Unions who claimed many casualties among the most active militants of our movement in Barcelona. Then our patience reached its limit and it was resolved, after the assassination of Salvador Seguí, that these instruments who had earned the gratitude of Martínez Anido and Arlegui had to be decisively confronted. The battle lasted only a few weeks and ended with the overthrow of the hired assassins from their ephemeral reign in Barcelona.

It might have taken some time, but sooner or later the result would have been direct action against the Russians and their allies, until their extermination from Spain, or else the annihilation of the anarchists. The blind governmentalism of certain elements who had allowed themselves to be enthralled by the brass and ribbons of the military high command, would soon enough be left behind by the masses of followers who were kept in line by the directives of their leading committees only at the cost of significant efforts. What later took place in Madrid, with the Defense Council, would have inevitably also taken place in Catalonia if the war were to have lasted a few more months.

We do not want to turn anti-fascist unity into a fratricidal massacre. But we must make it understood that we are not willing to tolerate any more assassinations, and in this respect the victims’ affiliations are immaterial. Our attitude would be the same if those who are killed in this way are republicans, socialists or our own comrades.

Finally, it was agreed that at the next meeting certain matters would be dealt with in detail, including a declaration against the rampant proselytism in the Army, signed by all the parties and organizations.

The delegation of the CNT emphasized the fact that it does not consider that the discussion of these problems implies an encroachment on the sphere of government responsibilities; that it is the mission of all the parties and organizations to reinforce the government and no restraints are placed on the government when it is informed about certain affairs that might otherwise have escaped its notice.

The communist representatives admit that there might have been some abuses perpetrated by over-zealous neophytes and assert that it is necessary for the Popular Front to restrict its efforts to lending its support to the Government without encroaching on its jurisdiction. They regretted that the delegation of the FAI had made such unfriendly references to the case of Hidalgo de Cisneros, and denied that that their Party effectively dominates the Army.

Such were the most important points addressed at the meeting…. Instead of paying heed to the seriousness of our revelations, the parties and organizations of the so-called Popular Front found it more convenient to agree that no action would be taken to implement our proposals and that the latter should be sabotaged, always diverting the discussions from the main point. Our desperation, and our insistence on calling attention to the responsibility they would incur by doing so, were of little avail. We came to the realization that all of them were fully aware of what would happen, since we do not want to deny to the representatives with whom we consistently clashed the minumum of intelligence necessary to understand the outcome of Negrín’s policy. But we were unable to perceive just what advantage they thought they could derive from the disaster towards which we were proceeding with greater speed than one would have thought desirable.

In accordance with the resolutions that were adopted, we sent to the National Popular Front, in the name of the FAI, the following clarifications:

In order to comply with the resolution adopted at the most recent meeting of the Popular Front, we shall summarize some of our views in order to cooperate more closely in the labors of the Government, noting the defects that have come to our attention with respect to the conduct of the war:

1. An investigation should be conducted by the Popular Front, which will submit its results to the Government, of the excesses, abuses and acts of coercion associated with proselytism, so that, in compliance with the prevailing laws and the decrees issued by the National Ministry of Defense, and even in accordance with the Thirteen Points of the Negrín Government, the army will be purged of all party activity. The application of the sanctions that these party-based acts of violence and coercion deserve will be left to the discretion of the Government.

2. An investigation should be conducted by the Popular Front of specific cases involving the assassinations of soldiers and officers of the People’s Army and the results should be placed at the disposal of the pertinent authorities.

3. The Government of the Republic should be notified of the names of some of the command-level officers of the Army who have an outstanding record spanning many years due to their technical abilities and who are irreproachable from the point of view of their anti-fascist convictions, who have been passed over for promotions or assignments or who have been posted to serve in positions that are incompatible with their abilities and their service records.
   Among those names, the FAI mentions the following (the names of 1 general, 10 colonels, 9 lieutenant colonels, 7 majors and several captains follows. And we added the following comments to the list):
   We mention only those who are, in their respective specialties, legitimate authorities in the Army and whose backgrounds require no discussion, because they are so well-known. Some of them occupy subordinate positions that are totally unrelated to their skills; others have absolutely no assignments at all.

4. Before the upcoming enemy offensive, and as a way to raise the morale of the soldiers and the population on the home front, we should proceed to suggest to the Government the salutary effects of a reevaluation of the high level commanding personnel of the Army, for the following reasons:

Because they have spent almost two years experiencing military setbacks and because they have not inspired the necessary confidence in the combatants (the case of General Rojo);

For their exaggerated party-centered focus, characteristic of every neophyte in an organization or a party (the case of the Undersecretary of the Army, Colonel Antonio P. Cordon);

Because of their suspect backgrounds and also on account of more recent events that induce mistrust (the case of the former Undersecretary of the Air Force, Colonel Camacho, the commander in chief of the Central-Southern sector, who was decorated for his achievements as a fighter pilot in October 1934 in operations against the Asturian workers, and whose adjutant just defected to the enemy with valuable plans and reports concerning our air force capabilities).

While our best and most loyal pilots are idle or occupy positions beneath their skill levels and their ranks, the air force in the Northern Sector is commanded by a person who is neither a bombardier nor a pilot, Reyes; the Undersecretary of the Air Force is Colonel Núñez Maza, who was a captain when the movement began in July 1936, and the Quartermaster’s Corps Colonel Luna is the Chief of Staff of the Air Force High Command, a captain when the movement began, whose behavior in Asturias left much to be desired.

We also have, for example, a lieutenant colonel Quintana, who holds three positions. This is the same person who, a few days before the movement began in July 1936, went to Mallorca with Major Fanjul, the brother of the general shot with Goded, and he met with Goded there. Another person with three positions is the Commander in Chief of the Army in the Madrid Region, who rendered homage to Goded on July 19 at the Naval Air Station of Barcelona, along with Captain Carrasco.

We shall not mention the large number of officers who have not been promoted since the movement began, not even by way of the kinds of promotions that reward mere loyalty to the regime.

Without a review of the high-level commands and the personnel of the general staffs, our main force, the force of morale, cannot constitute the barrier that we all desire against the forces of the invasion.

We are not seeking to transform the Popular Front into an executive organ, but we do want it to help clarify for the government certain situations that might lead us to more difficult and conclusive events….

Such was the tone of the FAI’s address to the Popular Front, the political nexus that claimed to support the Government.

The first response to our presentation was the press campaign to praise the achievements of those whom we referred to as deserving, at the very least, to be removed from their positions. And behind closed doors, the lackeys of Dr. Negrín savored their victory over our views. We were defeated because, in the name of the movement itself, common cause was made with our enemies on this side of the barricades, who were no less evil than the enemies on the other side; but the suffocation of our demands in the network of complicities upon which the Government was based is not evidence of our having been entirely wrong.

We reproduce these documents, and many others that we will not even mention could also be reproduced if the need were to arise, so that each person can bear his share of responsibility for his part in the shameful loss of the war.

We also called for the appointment of a Commander in Chief of the Armies of the Republic, since this was the first war fought by Spain without a responsible leader for two and a half years. We offered examples from all our wars; we brought forth as evidence the tactical regulations for the use of Large Units, etc., so that any doubts about the need to satisfy our petition should be dispelled. Everyone responded positively to our suggestions, they all understood that we would have conducted the war differently, but they thought that everything was just fine the way it was, and that by staying the course we would achieve victory.

If Franco were to have wanted to weaken our forces, and to dismember them, demoralize them and pave the way for his victory, he could not have found better instruments than the leading institutions of the parties and organizations of Republican Spain. These institutions made it possible for a government as opposed to the people and to Spain as the Negrín Government to remain in office. To each his own! The victors should reward all their servants, within or without the so-called nationalist ranks. The war lasted so long because it was not possible to win it before the people were weakened and demoralized by men like Prieto and Negrín and their numerous satellites.

Discouraged and embittered, we ended up for the millionth time being drowned in the sterility of the Popular Front when it came to doing anything but applauding the Government and crushing the voice of criticism of the discontented.

Throughout the whole time that we expressed such views, some of the illustrious representatives of the parties and organizations of Republican Spain whispered the word, defeatism. We were defeatists because we wanted to abolish the obvious conditions of imminent defeat? But if we did not use the Popular Front, where were we supposed to bring our discontent, our truth, if the press was subjected to communist censorship, and the wall of restrictions on all freedom of expression and criticism was impenetrable? Should we have resorted once again to clandestine mimeographed leaflets? Should we have returned to our old conspiratorial ways of the past? That was the only solution that remained to us.

In the history of Spain there is no record of such servility towards tyranny as was displayed towards the Negrín Government. One could find a few weak resemblances in history, in the epoch of Ferdinand VII, but that was a phenomenon of a different kind. It would be hard to find a comparable case of corruption and voluntary servitide, even hundreds of years ago, in our history.

News from the front brought daily confirmations of our fears and predictions. The demoralization of the Army was complete. The only units that maintained any discipline and any will to resist, for reasons far removed from the government propaganda, or precisely because of the fact that in these units the propaganda and the corrosive activities of the Government could not operate, were those in which our comrades were more or less totally dominant.

Our uncertainty about the military situation was shared by those who did not want to allow themselves to be bought off by the masters of the moment, the agents of the sinister plans of Stalin. We tried to encourage them to seek honorable solutions, but they did not want to accept the ones that we proposed, a change of Government and a profound purge of the military commands and the directive positions in the Army and the administration. All in vain!

As our reward for what we tried to do to save Spain from the tragic and shameful end that was rapidly approaching, the agents of Moscow took the heroic measure of dispatching General Asensio to Washington, ordered arrests that could not be carried out without arousing serious dissent, and decreed several assassinations that could not be executed quickly enough before the collapse of the Stalinist military and police gangster state, and because they would not have been so easy, anyway, and above all because they would have had repercussions involving unforeseen consequences. The assassination of Andrés Nin and the moral effects of that crime saved many lives.

Since the Popular Front was completely deaf to even the least objection against the Negrín Government, and since all other avenues of publicity were also closed to us, we resolved to direct an appeal to the President of the Republic, Manuel Azaña. We could not appeal to the legislature, which had surrendered, like the parties and organizations, to the policy of Moscow; we could not use any representative of the Government to express our dissent, because there was no such person; we could not use the press, or propaganda, to speak to the people and to tell them the truth about what was going on in the war and in the world. At least the President of the Republic should know that we were not part of the chorus of adulation and servility, and that we disavowed all responsibility for our imminent defeat.

With García Birlan and Federica Montseny we visited Azaña at the beginning of December. It was the first time that we had presented, in the name of the FAI, our views on policy to the chief of State. We had decided to break with our tradition of total abstention in view of the grave situation faced by Spain.

Here is a summary of our appeal to Azaña:

In the general political order: Formation of a real Spanish Government, one that does not bear, in fact and in law, the stigma of its dependence on Russia, insofar as our present Government is composed of men who are exempt from any accountability for their administration that is both disastrous and irresponsible.

A transparent policy of financial solvency, to buoy the confidence and morale of the civilian population and the front, as opposed to the secret, one-man policy that now prevails.

In the military order: Appointment of a Commander in Chief of the Armies of the Republic.

Employment of the military officers who have been passed over for promotions, refused commissions and persecuted for not submitting to the dictatorship of the Communist Party, and a purging of the military command structure.

A combing-out of the high level command centers in the Army, the air force and the navy, due to the discredit into which they have fallen after two consecutive years of defeat and confusion.

Suppression of all party politics in the army.

Incorporation of the bloated forces of public order, sorted according to their conscription classes, into the units of the regular Army.

Restructuring of the administration of the war industries, in order to increase output.

International policy: implement an independent foreign policy so that it does not appear that Republican Spain is a mere instrument of Soviet diplomacy.

There was more, but those were the main points of our appeal. If they were not complied with, we would renounce any responsibility for the inevitable downfall.

The President of the Republic, who was on this occasion much more voluble than usual, expressed his complete agreement with our views, and explained how he had been trying to influence the course of events in the direction of our proposals.[56] He reminded us that, as we were also aware, constitutionally he had no other recourse than to abide by the decisions of the legislature or the parties and organizations that participated in the Government. The legislative branch of the government [Las Cortes] had repeatedly expressed its unanimous support for Negrín and for his policy, and as for the Popular Front, we constituted its only dissenting voice, since the other parties and organizations, when we had appealed to them to support our proposals, displayed their complete approval of the Prime Minister. What could we do?

Legally, that was the case. Any responsibility that Azaña may have had for the continued existence of the Negrín Government had to be shared by the men who claimed to represent the opinion and the will of the Spanish people in the legislature or in the Popular Front. Everyone in Spain, however, was sick and tired of the Negrín Government and its communist and pro-communist military, financial and police team. Yet we were the only ones who dared to express this sentiment, this authentic sentiment of the people, in the name of an organization. Poor democratic structure, a useless mechanism of action that cannot avoid using the methods of the dictatorships!

A gesture of support for our proposals from Azaña would have had an immense impact, even during that final period, when the enemy offensive that our irresponsible government had assured us that it could repel was imminent.

We warned Azaña that, based on our knowledge of conditions at the front, the situation of the troops, the discontent among the officers, the prevailing disorder and incompetence, and the declining morale of the population on the home front, we were obliged to declare that the enemy offensive would not be repulsed and that the war was virtually over, without an immediate change of Government, of procedures, and of objectives.

If our proposals were to have been implemented, we still had the resources and reserves, more than any other political or trade union force, to have a serious impact on events, but this would only be possible with a different government, with other political procedures, with other war aims.

Negrín was notified within hours of our interview with Azaña, and of our proposals. But he should not have been worried, because our independence, our sense of dignity, and our resistance to corruption, were fully counteracted by the attitude of all the other parties and organizations that were yoked to his victorious chariot. We were sure that we were the only ones who could still galvanize the will of the working class and peasant masses, because of both the quantity and the quality of our militants, and because everyone knew that we had not been contaminated by the negrinista policy.

Besides, we have always had the reputation of teaching by example, while we could point to the outrageous fact that almost all the preachers of resistance until victory were men who were eligible for conscription, but who were exempted from having to serve in the military in exchange for their unconditional support for Dr. Negrín, men who had furthermore worn out their welcome with the masses because of their blunders, their repeated failures, and by their infantile folly, if we should attribute this feature to folly rather than to plain unvarnished treason as the motive for their conduct.

Of our basic proposals, the points that we thought were indispensable to contain the enemy offensive, none were implemented. The government would not budge an inch. It was the only thing that was immobile in Republican Spain, where the Republic itself was sinking right before our eyes.

An appearance of détente was contrived with respect to the autonomous governments of Catalonia and Euzkadi, according to reports in the press, after banquets with the respective representatives of these tendencies. To satisfy some people, the Commissariat of Religion was created, masses were celebrated, and religious burials were allowed. Others were supposed to be content with the return of Quero Morales, who had resigned during the last crisis, to the office of Undersecretary of State. Agreement obtained from above, between the summits of power, therefore seemed to be complete. The Negrín Government was a strong Government, supported by the official positions of the parties, the trade union organizations, and the autonomous Governments. In this choir only our poor voice was lacking, which represented something more than an organization of struggle and ideas, it represented Spain, the Spain of labor and of the war, the people’s Spain, with which none of the other parties and organizations concurred.

So, did we just cross our arms, shut ourselves up in an ivory tower, and remain passive in the face of so much infamy and so much tragedy? No. We returned once again to our mission, to offer a proposal to the Government, on December 7, on our own account, as combatants independent of the existing military mechanism whose virtues we did not recognize despite the futile praise lavished on it by the journalists and the politicians of the pro-government faction.

We told the Government, among other things:

We consider that it is necessary, in view of our inferior position with respect to military equipment, to save the human material that we still have, which is incomparable as a mass of fighters, but finite, and to look for a way to fight man to man….

After the Battle of the Ebro, whose consequences did not escape our notice, and in view of the international situation, we think that one of the most effective ways of waging an offensive struggle against the invasion consists in coordinated action, supported by every available means, in the so-called rebel zone, that is, Spanish-style war [guerra a la española]….

The FAI has not spared nor will it spare any efforts with respect to the war on national and international fascism. It is largely due to the efforts of the FAI that this war ever began at all, due to its defensive participation in the crushing of the rebellion in Catalonia, and the FAI was also responsible for the first organized resistance mobilized in loyalist Spain, without weapons or financial resources….

Because of our knowledge of the country, due to the fact that many of our comrades are still involved in active or passive resistance in the rebel zone, we believe that we are in an incomparable position to organize a battlefront behind enemy lines with incalculable consequences as a factor of decomposition in the other zone and of active revolt against the invasion. We are absolutely certain that in this respect we are the only force that can carry out effective action….

Then we set forth a detailed plan of action to wage war behind the enemy’s lines, where we proposed to infiltrate thousands of our battle-tested men, and solicited the blessings and the material support of the Government for this enterprise.

The Chief of Staff of the Central Front, General Rojo, gave our proposal a favorable review from the point of view of military efficacy, but Negrín notified us through his servant Zugazagoitia that everything that we had proposed was already being implemented, at the initiative of the Government, and that we should notify him in advance of any steps we might take in this direction.

We knew that this was a lie, we knew how the official republican propaganda directed at Franco’s zone was being conducted and where its budget was squandered, we knew that certain intelligence services had been created that did nothing but lodge their men in fancy French hotels and send reports from France about what was being said in the press.

We had kept in touch with Franco’s zone, not the way the Basques did, in complicity with the enemy authorities, but by taking all kinds of risks, crossing the double borders of the republican and nationalist frontiers. Our agents worked in Zaragoza, in Pamplona, everywhere. What we wanted to do was to amplify this infiltration, with more resources, with a more far-reaching strategy, seeking out likely contacts and carrying out actions in small groups of guerrillas.

Together with a few high level military commanders and some political figures who opposed, as we did, the Negrín Government, we evaluated the possible extent of this kind of action behind the nationalist lines, which might perhaps have been able to turn into an independent movement against the Italian and German invasion, but also against the Russian invasion, under the banner that we had ourselves raised: Spain for the Spaniards!

Properly speaking, our intention, we must confess, did not consist in giving the palm of victory to a regime that did not deserve our defense and which concluded in a bacchanal of rich gangsters, but in situating our men on an independent terrain of action, against both sides, but at the side of the Spanish people and in defense of their interests and their fate.

Instead of accepting our suggestions, the Government resolved to call up two more conscription classes. We were opposed to this, and once again we stood alone. We pointed out that with the categories that had already been mobilized, if their personnel were utilized rationally, there were more than enough men to defend the reduced front that remained to us. We pointed out that in the air force, with ten bombers and about fifty or sixty fighter planes, there were 60,000 men. And concerning its quality, the following facts provide eloquent testimony: when a request was circulated among the air force’s seven thousand officers and noncommissioned officers for volunteers to join the army, only one lieutenant, one captain and one colonel answered the call. An enormous number of conscripts have been granted refuge in the carabineros, the Assault Guards and other useless home front units. We said that this noxious apparatus should be used for the war in its current form and then any other conscription classes can be called up as needed.

We calculated that more than one hundred thousand men could be extracted from these forces of public order and from the treasury police, without undermining the necessary functions of these institutions. We were preaching in the desert!

In our total isolation, we had the impression that we were surrounded by enemies rather than by allies.

Those leaders of parties and organizations who were always in absolute agreement, and above all when it was a matter of confronting our critical observations—were they working together for defeat? Were they sincere in their supine attitude towards the government? Or was it simply a matter of personal idiocy or psychological and moral defects caused by the positions they held? Were we the ones who were wrong? Was it possible that we, and a handful of isolated military officers and political figures, were the sole exceptions? The general opinion is one of the criteria for truth, say the Catholic philosophers.

As we encountered one setback after another in our hopeless battle with the gang of Russian agents, testimonials of support began to arrive from the front. They were not numerous, but they were significant and they encouraged us to continue on the road that bore the signs of the only road of resistance and dignity. But the leadership mechanisms of the parties and organizations were blind and deaf to the idea of such changes. A coup d’état? It would necessarily come to that if the war lasted much longer, due to the work of the clandestine nuclei that we had begun to organize in every unit, and due to the growing discontent among some military commanders who were not taken in by muscovitism. At the time, however, the main positions of command were held by unconditional supporters of Stalin, or docile and weak characters, and our units, which were systematically integrated into a Greater Unity, were tactically dependent for the most part on communist formations.

The enemy offensive began on December 23, advancing against all our positions on the front. The attack was crudely staged. The intention was to discover which sectors of the front would resist and which would fold. Wherever the defending forces were predominantly libertarian, in the Northern Zone, for example, their combative spirit was admirable and the enemy’s opportunities for advance were few and far between. In those areas, Franco’s offensive was stopped and contained. The former Durruti Column, one of whose flanks was covered by carabineros who fell back before the enemy assault during the first few days of the offensive, suffered five thousand casualties, but held its positions and preserved its honor. On the other hand, the section of the front defended by the famous Red Army of the Ebro, whose commanding officers were communists to a man, under the command of the so-called colonel Modesto and lieutenant colonel Lister, totally collapsed. It was through this sector that the enemy’s advance was concentrated. The great hope of the Stalinist dictatorship in Spain, the Army Group of the Ebro, did nothing but retreat in forced marches toward the French border, which necessitated reinforcements for the Northern Sector.

The Government and its high command saw that all their calculations had proven wrong. Or perhaps that all of their calculations were working out exactly as planned?

They proposed that battalions of volunteers should be formed to man machine gun emplacements as a last-ditch effort to contain the enemy’s advance, and our participation was solicited. With morale the way it was? With the regular army in flight? We should hand ourselves over to an incompetent, if not frankly treasonous, government? We clearly stated our views: we have no confidence in the government, we have no faith in the high command of the army, since our comrades were still being assassinated. If the government were to offer us the necessary guarantees, if we were to be allowed to appoint the military commanders ourselves, and if these forces were to be used under our direct control, then we would provide volunteer battalions. Without these guarantees, no, and there would be no such volunteers.

Our position was greeted with a clamor of fake indignation on the part of all the parties and organizations. Demand guarantees from the government? What you have to do is shut up and follow orders.

But it was because we did not shut and follow orders on July 19, 1936, that we surged into the streets. And we were the same people we were then.

These volunteer units were tested without our participation, and they failed, as we had predicted. In view of this setback, ten more conscription classes were called up, amid enormous confusion. Only an insignificant number of the conscripts showed up at the draft centers, despite the use of terror.

We then decided to form volunteer battalions on our own account, as the Iberian Anarchist Federation. Then we would see just how much they would act in accordance with or against the government. We had resolved to staff these units exclusively with our own commanders and not to let them lead us wherever they wanted, with our eyes closed. What we wanted was to have at our disposal a properly organized and responsible force, to meet any eventualities that might arise. Even at this very late stage of the war we were hamstrung to some extent by some of our own friends who, in the name of the CNT, still blindly followed the directives of the government and devoted themselves to the task of sending human meat to the slaughterhouse, while we, for our part, thought that we had to save as many comrades as we could and that the government was an obstacle that stood in the way of an effective war strategy and that it had to be disobeyed and overthrown.

We proposed, at a joint meeting with the CNT and the Libertarian Youth, the formation of a Defense Council, but our initiative was rejected. With Negrín until victory!

Only a truly popular decision could save the situation. But everyone was afraid of the people, more afraid of the people than they were of Franco, and the final tragedy now seemed inevitable.

The enemy advance was chalking up more and more spectacular gains with each passing day. No force opposed its forward progress. On January 5 Borjas Blancas fell, on the 14^th Valls, on the 15^th Reus and Tarragon….

When the headquarters of Sarabia’s General Staff was moved to Matadepera, north of Tarrasa, in mid-January, we saw one of our presentiments fulfilled, but it was one that we did not dare to express. The government abandoned the struggle, because it had abandoned the industrial zone of Catalonia, it abandoned Barcelona. The war was given up for lost.

At that point we refused to engage in any dialogue with the lackeys and sinecurists of the Negrín Government. We also refused to attend any more meetings of the Popular Front. But in private gatherings and meetings of the FAI we discussed the military situation. Barcelona had been abandoned by the Government … of Victory. We explained why. Some friends, still inclined to expect miracles from the mysterious magical powers of the man of resistance and still getting their information from official sources, directed inquiries to the government offices in Barcelona to discover whether or not this was true. Their concerns were placated with fine words. Abandon Barcelona? Nonsense! They were told that we were hallucinating, that we were defeatists, that we should be shot. The same as always. Resistance was possible, the situation was grave, but not desperate. And so the wheels began to turn. Vapid articles in the press, vague addresses broadcast on the radio, proclamations, declarations, lies that were not even white lies. Just bureaucracy.

Manresa fell on January 24. When the enemy forces arrived at Tarrasa we feared that they might break through from Granollers to Mataró, and surround Barcelona. The celebrated Government of Victory and its entourage of tens of thousands of arriviste civil servants fled towards the border on the 25^th. The brave González Peña heroically took up a position four kilometers from France.

The FAI held a meeting at midnight on January 25. In Barcelona, no one remained but us and those who, still fooled by the assurances issued by the Government only a few hours before, did not know that the Negrín gang had already fled the city.

We reported on the gravity of the situation and on its possibilities.

The enemy forces had proceeded along the coast from Garraf and were now in Casteldefels. They could be in Barcelona, if they wanted to, by morning. Nothing stood in their way.

Enemy units were also advancing along the highway from Martorell and would soon be on the outskirts of Tibidabo, not to mention the danger that they could cut off the escape routes towards the North by taking the salient between Granollers and Mataró.

Means for resistance? As we had often pointed out, the army created in the Gaceta did not exist in reality. The forces of public order were neutralized by panic, in some cases, and by enemy propaganda, in others. Those who felt that they were tainted with complicity with the Republican cause had also already fled from the city. We had to rely only on our own forces and those that we could improvise in the heat of the struggle that would soon begin in the streets of Barcelona, if we were prepared to resist.

We had no artillery, and the ammunition had been transported towards the North about two weeks earlier. The defense of a city is militarily simple and safe enough, if these conditions are met: the useless civilian population is evacuated, women, children and the elderly; the existence of food and other supplies to withstand a siege; and an abundance of ammunition.

With one and a half million people in the city, without enough food for more than fifteen days, without artillery, with hardly any weapons or ammunition—is it worth the price of offering more sacrifices? Should the FAI assume the responsibility for prolonging on its own account a resistance that could no longer decide the war in our favor and would instead be interpreted and used in exile by the traitors in our government as an unexpected political windfall?

No, in these conditions in which we had been abandoned, we must not contribute to producing even one more victim for this war. We could destroy factories, we could burn down half the city. For what purpose? We denied ourselves a futile vengeance whose consequences would have made things worse for those who remained in the city.

Our report, even though no one expected anything new, produced dismay. It seemed incredible that the prospect that we had been announcing as inevitable for almost two years unless there was a radical change in national and international policies, was now a palpable reality.

In one last outburst of hope, emissaries departed from the meeting and went off in various directions to see if any of our reports could be verified, especially the one about the proximity of Franco’s troops. It was all true! The leaders of the parties and organizations, who had as recently as a few hours before been proclaiming the slogans of resistance until victory, resisted all night long without sleeping, but their resistance proceeded in the direction of Gerona as their first rest stop….

At midnight we received a phone call from General Asensio. The war was lost, but the end could not have been more shameful. What were we thinking of doing? Could he count on our help to set an example with our own sacrifice, and thus save the honor of Barcelona? If he could count on us, he would demand that the fugitive government hand over command over the city.

We hesitated. Resistance was useless. The small amount of ammunition and the scarce supplies of food that the heroes of resistance of the Government of Victory had left us, would last only so long. And then, nothing. We were not immune to the human factor and we felt a wave of combativity and heroism sweep over us at the very moment when the masses would expect the FAI to assume responsibility for the defense of Barcelona, but this would have to be done, naturally, in revolt against the government that had fled the city. We did not care whether we lived or died. This was a quite generalized state of mind. If we used to run to the bomb shelters, now we viewed the arrival of the Italian bombers with indifference and everyone just went on his way amid the sirens and the explosions. For us, the mainspring of our will to live had ended with a defeat that we did not deserve.

“Yes, General Asensio, you can count on us.”

If he would assume command over the garrison and obtain some weapons and munitions, but above all, some of the materiel that had been transported towards the North, we would stay in Barcelona. He would personally deliver those munitions on the morning of January 26 if we answered in the affirmative. If our answer was “no”, then he, too, would head for the border.

On the morning of the 26^th, the bombers would not let us get a minute’s rest; you could not tell when the sirens were sounding and when they stopped. The DECA had withdrawn. All activity and all traffic had come to a standstill in Barcelona. Those who were in the streets were looking for vehicles to facilitate their departure following the same route as their brave government. We heard nothing from Asensio. He had refused to take command over the city, even after it was abandoned!

Naturally, we could have assumed command ourselves; no one would have stopped us, much less lieutenant colonel Carlos Romero, who was ostensibly the military commander of the city, but who only had less than a battalion at his disposal. On the night of January 24–25 almost all the most well known leaders of our organization left the city. Only the people remained, in part happy to see the war come to an end, but in part terrified by the reality of a situation that they had not foreseen until the very last moment. In crucial moments like these, hours, or even minutes, are decisive. Even on the 25^th of January, it was still possible to organize the defense of the city. On the 26^th, any idea of organizing such a defense was shattered by generalized indifference towards any attempt to do so, including ours. The enemy forces did not enter Barcelona on the 26^th, because the rebel leaders thought that it was better to allow the city to be evacuated.

We calculated that we had just enough time to pass through the neighboring towns, that were largely ignored, where excellent comrades might suddenly be surrounded. So we traveled through these towns. A few hours after passing through Granollers, half-destroyed by Italo-German bombing, Franco’s troops arrived and at the same time they entered Barcelona without firing a single shot.

Such were the rewards of Russian policy in Spain.

While Franco’s armies were occupying Barcelona, the cheerful Prime Minister of the government of victory was declaring to the foreign press: “The Republic currently has perfectly organized fighting men, and war materiel in abundance…. Today I can assure you, categorically, that we shall find a way out of this situation.”

And Negrín’s cynicism was parroted by that poor cabinet Minister, Alvarez del Vayo, Litvinov’s secretary, who published the following statement in the foreign press on January 28: “The government is absolutely determined to continue the struggle.”

Numantines with airplanes!

Do you want us to talk about the shameful incidents, the crimes, the new attempts at blackmail that took place while an entire people was in motion, on foot, or in cars or trucks, in boats and ships, gripped with panic and frantically attempting to reach the French border, displaying a spectacle such that history cannot duplicate? Just imagine at least 600,000 people flooding all the open roads to France at the same time.

During that terrible exodus we meditated on the fruitlessness of the sacrifice of so many precious lives since July 19, 1936, on the fronts for thirty months, and on the downfall of a way of life of faith and struggle. Not only had the war come to an end; a world of noble hopes of well-being and justice for all had also come to an end.

We can’t help but recall the spectacle of another mass exodus, two years before, that was also heading for the border. It was at nightfall one day at the end of September [1936], if our memory is accurate. The enemy battleship “Canarias” was shelling the coastline of the Bay of Rosas. The local authorities were afraid that the the rebels might land troops there and they notified us of their concerns, calling for help. They also saw other warships in the vicinity.

At that unforgettable Central Committee of the Militias of Catalonia, the true institution of the people’s war and revolution, we resolved to raise the alarm and to notify the most important population centers that they should be on alert, that they should carefully monitor the coasts, that they should set up checkpoints on the streets and highways, that they should organize militia convoys. Those who had no other weapons occupied all the strategic locations in Catalonia with nothing but hand grenades.

In view of the magnitude of the mobilization we thought we could contain the resulting avalanche, but this was impossible, for while some towns succeeded in getting the armed population to remain in a state of alert, taking positions oriented towards the coast, and awaiting orders, in most cases the convoys of militiamen spontaneously drove off towards Rosas in search of the enemy. All the way from Tortosa to Rosas the roads were filled with people’s forces determined to fight to the death if necessary. There were towns, like Sallent, that presented us with 500 men armed with rifles, machine guns, mortars and hand grenades, organized in a small motorized column.

At that time, the machinations of the Russian agents were already a factor as they worked to undermine our influence among the people, accusing us of every crime. The spectacle of that memorable night of mobilization in response to the shelling of Rosas made them understand that their time had not yet come. The working class and peasant people of Catalonia in arms still had to be contended with, and these people were prepared to make any sacrifice, should we give them the signal, to assure a new social order of justice for all. The Russian agents decided that the situation was more favorable in May 1937.

After two years of communist and republican rule, the exodus only became greater, but this time not towards the enemy as in September 1936, but towards the border where the promised land was imagined to lie, deceived by the idea that once they were in France the horrors, the nuisances and the privations of a war whose goals they did not understand would come to an end, and the people who had endured the war with blood and tears would finally find peace.