December 1936

By December the Spanish Civil War had begun to move into what Camillo Berneri described as its ‘third phase’: “Henceforth, the development of the internal situation is subject in the main to foreign factors. These are the Hitlerians and the antifascist émigrés of Germany and Austria, the Italian fascists and antifascists, the Bolshevik Russians and White Russians, the French Communists and the Irish Catholics — who are getting to grips with one another on the Madrid front. The relationships between the forces are in the process of changing — militarily and politically. The Civil War is in the process of taking on a faster rhythm, an even broader field of action, a more decided character, while the Russian intervention assures the hegemony of the socialist-communist forces which up to now were completely dominated by the anarchist forces. I have said and I repeat: the Civil War can be won in the military arena, but the triumph of the political and social revolution is threatened. The problems of the future in Spain are indissolubly linked to the international developments of the Civil War.”[76]

December saw the Caballero government launch its assault on the militias. With Durruti dead (the one man around whom opposition might have focused), and the higher committees and other ‘notable’ militants in favor of militarization there was likely to be little resistance. The first move came on 2 December when a ten-man Delegate Defense Junta was set up under the chairmanship of General Miaja to organize the defense of Madrid. The Defense Junta had a nominal anarchist presence with only two delegates, the rest were mainly communists and socialists.

On 4 December, anarchist ministers, García Oliver and Federica Montseny addressed a meeting in Valencia to generate support among the rank-and-file for the proposed militarization. García Oliver had this to say:

‘No matter what may be the [workers’] organizations to which they belong, they must employ the same methods the enemy uses in order to win. Above all, discipline and unity. With discipline and efficient military organization we shall undoubtedly win.’

Federica Montseny added her pennyworth:

‘Recently I spent several days in Catalonia and I realized something very important … Those who do not feel the war at first hand are living in a revolutionary cloud cuckoo land. They hold the industries and workshops in their hands, they have eradicated the bourgeois, they live peacefully and in a factory, instead of one bourgeois, there are seven or eight. This is intolerable …’

In fact, the workers were not quite the bourgeois shirkers Montseny made them out to be. Peirats quotes a report by the Investigation Section of Puebla de Hijar in Aragón who issued an appeal for 1000 volunteers to defend Madrid and 6000 workers came to offer themselves.

At the same time, Solidaridad Obrera was having second thoughts about winning over the petty bourgeoisie by its policy of respecting small businesses, small industry and ‘modest’ property owners. That particular strategy had been won hands down by the Communist Party. An editorial of 3 December observed:

‘This modest bourgeois social stratum, which at the start of the social revolution felt itself threatened, heaved a sigh of relief when it realized that we would respect its interests. Secure in the knowledge that we were no threat, it devoted itself peacefully to the pursuits of its small businesses. And how has the bourgeoisie repaid our generosity? Certainly in the case of those concerned with the sale and distribution of food, we have to say … very poorly. Should things continue on their present course, it will be necessary to adopt more vigorous measures capable of putting an end to the abuses and wayward practices which have been indulged in…’ [77]

The lack of military activity on the Aragón front provided the PCE with an excuse for escalating the attack on the anarchists through the columns of its paper, Mundo Obrero. That the militias had been consistently deprived of arms and ammunition and obstructed at every turn was conveniently ignored.

On 12 December the Militias delegation on the Defense Junta announced the ‘indispensable necessity for the efficiency of the war to create a regular army, keeping in mind the government’s decree on militarization of the militias …’. … and have resolved to:

“…organize all militia units and battalions from the different organizations into regular battalions and brigades. Consequently, all forces currently in Madrid, in the various barracks as incomplete battalions or remnants of other battalions are to be reorganized by the Militias Command into units of full strength, these being the only units which shall be acknowledged in the matters of payment and rationing. Those which refuse to comply with said conditions being denied the services of the paymaster’s office and service corps — Cosmos.’ [78]

The news of the militarization decrees shocked the rank and file of the anarchist movement and the left wing socialists. Miguel García García, organizer of the Madrid and Pérez Carballo battalions, later recalled how he heard the news:

‘We were stunned. García Oliver, Federica Montseny. Had they agreed to this? We could not believe it. We sent for information from our Regional Committee. None of our movement agrees with it. But it’s for unity. They think it will impress the Russians. You know what a mania they have for authority. They will never trust a people without a disciplined army, you know how they worship the state — they are, after all, Marxists — But then we have to rely on them for arms.’

Militarization was to prove the most salient move in the recuperative process of the state. For the PCE and their right wing socialist and republican allies their eagerness to bring the militia units under a unified command did not just stern from a desire to improve the military capability of the army, as the anarchists were only too aware. It was, rather, intended to strengthen the position of central government-at the expense of the popular organs controlled by trade union militants. The communists, who welcomed and actively sought militarization, formed the first contingent of the Popular Army with the Fifth Regiment. Because of the preferential treatment it received in terms of access to new Russian military supplies and the esteem in which it was held by the high command this quickly became the Fifth Army Corps commanded by Russian military and political advisers. A similar sequence of events took place within the police, security and intelligence services where the special advisers from the Russian GPU/NKVD soon took over. With the influence of Soviet military aid behind them, by the end of the year the PCE had become an important contender for political power.

The PCE’s strategy, pursued under the tight reins of their Comintern advisers was, first and foremost, to create the conditions favorable for the long term strategic goals of the USSR. The Popular Front concept itself had been Comintern policy from August 1935. By helping antifascist governments to power throughout Europe the Soviet Union hoped to contain German expansionist aims in the east. The Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which devised this policy asserted that one of the immediate tasks to be assumed by communists everywhere was to bind the peasantry and urban petite bourgeoisie with a broad popular antifascist front. When the Civil War unleashed a social revolution, the Soviet Union, to avoid alienating the western powers, declared itself the defender of the liberal bourgeoisie and ‘property’ rights. The Soviet Union, therefore, found itself in direct conflict with the far-reaching social transformation the people, inspired by the ideas initiated by the anarchists and left-socialists. Fernando Claudín describes PCE and Soviet policy as involving ‘nothing less than pushing the proletarian revolution back within the bourgeois democratic grounds from which it “should” never have escaped.’[79] This demanded total control over central government in Madrid and the Catalan Generalidad and the neutralizing of the revolutionary forces of the CNT and FAI, the left wing socialists of the UGT and the dissident Marxists of the POUM. To effect this policy Stalin appointed two key men to co-ordinate the restoration of bourgeois political, military and economic institutions: Marcel Rosenberg, Soviet ambassador to the central government, and Antonov-Ovseenko, consul general to the Generalidad.

Pravda of 17 December 1936 left no doubt as to what Comintern policy in Spain was to be:

‘As for Catalonia, the purging of Trotskyist and anarcho-syndicalist elements has begun; this work will be carried out with the same energy with which it was done in the USSR.’

The purging ‘having begun’ referred, no doubt, to the accusation made by the Soviet consul, Antonov-Ovseenko, that the POUM newspaper, La Batalla, had ‘sold out’ to international fascism, presumably because of its sustained criticism of the Soviet Union[80] and the role of Soviet advisers whom it claimed were molding Spanish foreign policy. The accusation of being pro-fascist or, rather, anti-Soviet, did much to undermine the dissident Marxist organization politically and provoked the first major split in the Generalidad since September. The POUM, which carried considerable influence within the UGT in Catalonia, was maneuvered out of the Generalidad following a crisis provoked by the PSUC with the backing of the petite bourgeois parties of the Acción Catalana, Estat Catalá and the Esquerra Republicana. The new ‘nonparty government’ swept to office on 15 December on the back of the artful slogan ‘First and foremost, win the war, the guarantor of the revolution’ was to be the grave digger of the revolution. The PSUC was to emerge triumphant from its first trial of strength with its weakest of enemies; the CNT was to be next in line.

Pressure was stepped up a few days later with the declaration of war on ‘uncontrollable elements’ by the communist Barcelona police commissioner, Eusebio Rodríguez Salas, newly appointed by the communist Councilor for Internal Security, Artemio Aiguadé.

The communist-inspired smear campaign that the POUM was working with and on behalf of international fascism was the first phase in a strategy of disinformation aimed at weakening the considerable influence of the POUM within the UGT. It was soon to extend its parameters to include the CNT. The fears and prejudices of the middle class were played on incessantly. The divisive and pro-governmental position of the higher committees of the CNT and FAI badly affected working class solidarity and the advances made by the revolution in the industrial, agricultural and service sectors began to falter as they became increasingly subjected to harassment and political and economic blackmail. The organizational structure of the CNT became more and more enmeshed in the recuperative maneuvers of the more experienced power brokers among the liberal and Marxist politicians. The PSUC, which now controlled the Catalan Ministry of supply through Juan Comorera, artificially contrived a shortage of flour in Barcelona by refusing the CNT Councilor for Supplies the necessary foreign exchange he required. Blame was ascribed to the CNT Supply Committees, which had operating in every district of the city, and the ‘ineptitude’ of his CNT predecessor. For the first time bread became a scarce commodity. The arrival of Russian ships loaded with food supplies — ‘a gift from the workers and peasants of Russia’ (in fact paid for by Spanish gold) — gave a tremendous boost to communist influence and provided the opportunity for massive enthusiastically pro-soviet demonstrations on the streets of the capital. Inexorably, against this background of confusion, hunger and tension, the influence of the anarchist revolutionaries decreased while the PCE and its bourgeois allies were able to present themselves more forcefully as the defenders of middle class values and liberal democracy; the military stalemate and social disintegration was, they claimed, a direct result of ‘the uncontrollables’ who served the interests of international fascism. The bodies of CNT militants, ‘uncontrollables’, began to turn up on the streets of the capital.

The growing tensions together with the militarization decrees created tremendous confusion and rancor among the volunteer militiamen at the front. Stormy confrontations took place between the fighting men and delegations from the higher committees sent to impose militarization. On 22 December alone, 96 men of the Iron Column — which had made its position on militarization clear at the CNT Regional Congress in Valencia the previous month — left the front and were posted as deserters by the War Committee.

On 24 December the new Catalan Commissioner of Police, Eusebio Rodríguez Salas, was appointed by the communist councilor for Public Order, Artemio Aiguadé. With this appointment the counter-revolutionary preparations were complete. Later that day General Miaja issued orders that from 15.00 hours all checkpoints in the approaches to the capital were to be withdrawn until the reorganization of the Rearguard Militia into brigades had been completed; that only regular forces under the control of the Ministry of War were permitted to bear arms; that any armed bodies who attempted mount checkpoints or guards on public buildings, barracks, etc., would be liable to the appropriate punishment under military law; that all matters concerning public order could only be dealt with by the properly constituted authorities. Any infringements which occurred were to be dealt with summarily by the judicial authorities.

Two days later, on the 26^th, communist Defense Junta delegate, Pablo Yagüe, was shot when he refused to hand over his identity papers to a CNT militia unit in a Madrid suburb and drove through the checkpoint.

On 28 December the newspapers carried the following story:

“Valencia: the Gaceta has published an Interior Ministry decree establishing a National Security Council under the chairmanship of the Minister of the Interior… Two councilors will represent the UGT, two representing the CNT, plus another five councilors, one from each political party and organization affiliated to the Antifascist Front; a commander from the Security Corps; a representative from the ranks of the Security Corps, etc.

‘The functions of the National Council ... include the choice of uniform, weaponry and future training, the staffing of units of the Corps, their arming and the distribution of personnel, etc. …

‘In each provincial capital there is to be a Provincial Security Council comprising one representative from each union grouping and chaired by the civil governor and, in the case of inter-provincial councils, by a special government delegate. The Security Corps alone will be entrusted with functions relating to the maintenance of public order and vigilance …

‘The corps of the National Republican Guard, security, Assault Guards, with Investigation and Rearguard Militias are hereby dissolved…

‘Should they so desire, all suspended personnel shall apply within 15 days for entry into the Security Corps, specifying the branch or section of which they seek membership. Such applications are to be forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior for a decision, having first submitted them to provincial and national councils for vetting. — Cosmos′.[81]

With this decree the popular organs of the revolution were to be legislated out of existence. Having met with concession after concession from the higher committees of the CNT and FAI and a deferential rank-and-file anxious to defend antifascist unity at all costs, the bourgeois politicians knew it was now time to ‘go for broke’.