People :
Author : Diego Abad De Santillán
Text :
[1] Note to the reader: the author uses the first person plural throughout this entire book, with a few exceptions, to refer to himself, his texts and his actions. I have retained this usage in this translation. The reader must discern from the context, however, when Santillán is talking about himself, and when he is talking about his close circle of friends, or the FAI, or the “libertarian movement”, or even the Spanish people (Translator’s note).
[2] Not to mention other works, we sincerely ask ourselves just what kind of opinion can be formed by the English readers of the Duchess of Atholl’s book, Searchlight on Spain (Katharine Marjory Stewart-Murray, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 364 p.), with a print run of hundreds of thousands of copies, which was written for the most part on the basis of information obtained from the communists and from the Negrín Government’s pro-communist staff members. The book often refers to us, but whereas the author had interviewed the leading figures of every party, she did not think it was necessary to get any first-hand information concerning our conduct and our aspirations. [This footnote and all the following footnotes are the author’s, unless otherwise indicated—Translator’s supplemental note.]
[3] We said this with reference to most people, but not everyone. One of the sources of the policy of resistance was due to the utter incapacity of the Government of the Republic to render accounts of its financial status, as we shall see below.
[4] We did, however, encounter examples of real Spaniards among those whom we defeated in the early days of the war, men who knew how to die with the same fortitude displayed by Padilla and Maldonado when they died at the hands of Charles V, or as Riego, Mariana Pineda and Torrijos, when they died at the hands of Ferdinand VII, or as Fermín Galán and García Hernández when they died at the hands of Alfonso XIII: men who fought and died for a cause that they believed was the salvation of Spain. We recognized many of the enemies who were condemned by our Tribunals as real brothers of ours, while we viewed many of those who were on our side, who claimed to support our ideas, with mistrust and repulsion. Such people caused us to call for the repeal of the death penalty only a few months after July 19, and we may have been the only such voices raised above the storm in all of Spain; but we were certain that we were not the only ones to think and to feel that way. What advantage accrued to Spain by killing its best sons on both sides, since on both sides of the barricades they were convinced that they were rallying behind the flag that represented what was best for the well-being and prosperity of the country? See the testimonial we wrote with respect to our opposition to the death penalty and imprisonment in the appendix to the English translation of our book, After the Revolution (New York, 1937).
[5] A. Fernández de los Ríos, Estudio histórico de las luchas políticas en la España del siglo XIX [Historical Study of Political Struggles in 19th Century Spain], Vol. I, p. 153, Madrid, 1880.
[6] Jacinto Toryho, La independencia de España [The Independence of Spain], Barcelona, 1938.
[7] El pacto C.N.T.-U.G.T [The CNT-UGT Pact]. Introduction by D. A. de Santillán, ETYL, Barcelona, 1938, 160 p. An anthology of historical antecedents, recollections and documents.
[8] The original copy of a text recounting these events that we had written in collaboration with Juanel and M. Villar, and with the help of magnificent elements who performed feats of bravery at the time, among others, Máximo Franco and Angel Santamaria, two heroes whose names must not be forgotten, has since been misplaced and lost.
[9] D. A. de Santillán, Los anarquistas y la insurrección de octubre [The Anarchists and the October Insurrection], published in various languages, December 1934. The memoirs of Diego Hidalgo, who was the Minister of War at the time, provide some interesting details concerning these events.
[10] We have described the horrors that followed the victory of the Madrid Government in our book, La represión de Octubre: Documentos sobre la barbarie de nuestra civilización [The Repression of October: Documents on the Barbarism of Our Civilization], Barcelona, 1935 (various editions).
[11] C. Berneri, Mussolini a la conquista de las Baleares [Mussolini: Towards the Conquest of the Balearic Islands] (1937).
[12] Details concerning these preparations of the military conspiracy may be found in Robert Brasillach and Maurice Bardéche, Histoire de la guerre d’Espagne, Plon, Paris; The Duchess of Atholl: Searchlight on Spain, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1938; Geneviève Tabouis, Blackmail or War, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1938; and J. Toryho, La independencia nacional, Barcelona, 1938.
[13] On the first anniversary of the July events an anthology of texts that depicted the struggle in various cities and regions of Spain was published: De Julio a Julio [From July to July], Ediciones Tierra y Libertad, Barcelona, 1937. The pamphlet, “Como se enfrentó al fascismo en toda España” [How Fascism Was Confronted Throughout Spain] (Buenos Aires, July 1938), was based on extracts from this book compiled at the initiative of Fragua Social of Valencia.
[14] Perhaps the Local Federation of Barcelona was too strict. The facts are as follows: this comrade, from Velilla del Ebro, had been denounced on account of his ideas and his activities by a married couple in his hometown and he had been tortured, persecuted and imprisoned repeatedly. When the movement of July 19 broke out, he discovered that this couple was in Barcelona and he decided that he would not stop short of taking vengeance on them. This couple even had CNT membership cards at the time.
[15] Concerning the general outlines of the new economy ruled by the manual workers, white collar employes and technicians of each industry, see our book, El organismo económico de la revolución. Como vivimos y como podríamos vivir en España [The Economic Institutions of the Revolution. How We Live and How We Will Live in Spain], Barcelona, 1936, 3rd ed., 1938 [originally written in 1935, this book was translated into English and published under the title, After the Revolution: Economic Reconstruction in Spain Today, Greenberg, New York, 1937—Translator’s supplemental note]. The Extended Plenum on economic questions held in Valencia in January 1938 by the institutions of the CNT filled in the details of the general outlines concerning economic organization that we had envisaged in that book.
[16] Augustin Souchy has written some books summarizing his visits to the agrarian collectives: Colectivizaciones. La obra constructiva de la revolución española [The Collectives. The Constructive Work of the Spanish Revolution], Barcelona, 1937; and Entre los campesinos de Aragón: el comunismo libertario en las comarcas liberadas [Among the Peasants of Aragon: Libertarian Communism in the Liberated Counties], Valencia, 1937. [English translations of both of these books are available at the website of Libcom.org—translator’s note.]
[17] One of the big metal workshops of Barcelona, run by the Unitary Trade Union of the Metal Industry, devoted to the manufacture of machine guns and bombs and mortars of every caliber, had already prepared the plans and a large part of its equipment for the the conversion of the factory, on the day after the end of the war, to the manufacture of tractors for agriculture. And there were thousands of such initiatives, affecting every industry, whose purpose was to draft plans, to be implemented immediately after the war, or within a few years after the war, for an economic and industrial resurgence of Spain capable of situating it among the great European Powers. The loss of the war frustrated these hopes. Franco won the game, but he lost the Spanish people and slammed the door on their magnificent awakening.
[18] After Caballero was forced to resign from the Government, in his first and last public speech, on October 17, 1937, he revealed many tragic details concerning the behind-the-scenes maneuvers and treachery of the communists. When he was Minister of War, he was accused by the communists of not sending the arms that he possessed to the soldiers on the front. At the peak of this derogatory campaign, the Minister of War had twenty-seven rifles. Was he supposed to publicly proclaim the fact that the Minister of War had twenty-seven rifles in order to respond to a campaign to discredit him? It was during that period that, at the instigation of the Russians, a venomous propaganda campaign was unleashed concerning the lack of activity of our forces on the Aragon Front. Were we supposed to declare, so that the enemy would be informed of our status, that our front was paralyzed because it hardly had a single cartridge?
[19] The Commission of War Industries of Catalonia drafted a (confidential) Report d’actuació [Progress Report], a thick mimeographed volume, dated October 1937. In a brief introduction, Tarradellas, its president, says: “Catalonian industry, over the last fourteen months, has performed a veritable wonder of labor and profound intelligence, and Catalonia will forever be in the debt of all the workers who, with their enthusiasm, their hard work and often with the sacrifice of their own lives, endeavored to help our brothers who are fighting at the front….” Luis Companys, the President of the Generalitat, summarized the most important information from this report in his polemical letter dated December 13, 1937, sent to Indalecio Prieto. A small volume has been published in Buenos Aires by the Servicio de Propaganda España [Spanish Propaganda Service]: From Companys to Prieto: Documents on the War Industries of Catalonia (91 p.), with information derived from the confidential report and other primary source documents.
[20] “Informe sobre las comisiones de compras, la subsecretaría de armamento y el despilfarro escandalosa de las finanzas de la República. Por la creación del ministerio de armamento” [Report on the Purchasing Commissions, the Undersecretariat of Military Production and the Scandalous Waste of the Finances of the Republic. An Appeal for the Creation of a Ministry of Military Production], Barcelona, September 1938. Presented to the National Plenum of the Libertarian Movement.
[21] Cómo y por qué salí del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Intrigas de los rusos en España [How and Why I Resigned as Minister of Defense. Russian Intrigues in Spain], Paris, 1939.
[22] Rudolph Rocker, in Extranjeros en España [Foreigners in Spain] (Ediciones “Imán”, 1938, 177 p.), discusses the foreign intervention in Spain and its obvious purpose of crushing the will of the Spanish people.
[23] Augustin Souchy, La verdad sobre los sucesos de la retaguardia leal. Los acontecimientos de Cataluña [The Truth about What Happened on the Home Front in Loyalist Spain. The Events in Catalonia], Buenos Aires, June 1937, 64 p.; Informe presentado por el Comité Nacional de la C.N.T. sobre lo ocurrido en Cataluña [Report Presented by the National Committee of the CNT Concerning the Events in Catalonia], Valencia, May 13, 1937; General Krivitzky, “Stalin’s Hand in Spain”, The Saturday Evening Post, Philadelphia, June 15, 1938.
[24] “Negrín tried to downplay the importance of these incidents. But then comrade Zugazagoitía exclaimed, in an outburst of sincerity, ‘Don Juan, let’s face the facts. Our comrades are being assassinated at the fronts because they do not want to join the communist party’.” (I. Prieto, Cómo y por qué salí del Ministerio de Defensa nacional, p. 31).
[25] This is one of the explanations given for the creation of the international brigades by Krivitzky, former Red Army general and chief of Soviet secret services in the West.
[26] Address to the National Plenum of Regional Committees of the Libertarian Movement: “On the need to reaffirm our revolutionary identity and to refuse to support government policies that are necessarily fatal to the war and the revolution”, by the Peninsular Committee of the FAI, September 1938.
[27] “Report on the interference of partisan politics in affairs relating to public order and on irregularities in the police forces”, by the Peninsular Committee of the FAI, September 1938, Appendix.
[28] The result was surely the same as when Prieto ordered the arrest of “Negus”, a charismatic communist, a major in the army, who traveled all over the loyalist zone, paying visits to the various army staff headquarters to incite them to revolt against Prieto. The Communist Party defended their man, all the charges leveled against him by the Minister of Defense were proven to be true, but the order to arrest him was nonetheless never carried out. See Prieto’s report, Cómo y por qué salí del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Intrigas de los rusos en España [How and Why I Resigned as Minister of Defense. Russian Intrigues in Spain], p. 23.
[29] Antonio Bahamonde and Sánchez de Castro, Un año con Queipo. Memorias de un nacionalista [One Year with Queipo. Recollections of a Nationalist], Buenos Aires, 1938; Ruíz Vilaplana, Doy Fe … Un año de actuación en la España nacionalista [My Testimony … One Year of Activity in Nationalist Spain].
[30] The congress organized by the Ressemblement universal pour la paix, attended by a large Spanish delegation, in May or June 1938, despite the fact that its members knew in advance that it was merely a communist front organization.
[31] An attempt similar to our attempt (to persuade the Popular Front to hold the government to account) was made by Araquistaín in the Permanent Deputation to the Cortes, meeting in Paris on April 1, 1939, after the fall of the Republic. Araquistaín proposed “that any collaboration between the Permanent Deputation and the ostensible Negrín Government should be preceded by an audit performed by a Commission that will be appointed for that purpose, so that this Government will render an account of its management.”
[32] Peninsular Committee of the F.A.I., “Informe sobre la necesidad de reafirmar nuestra personalidad revolucionaria y de negar nuestro concurso a una obra de gobierno necesariamente fatal para la guerra y para la revolución” [Report on the Need to Reaffirm Our Revolutionary Identity and to Refuse to Lend Our Support to a Government Policy that Is Necessarily Fatal for the War and for the Revolution], Barcelona, September 1938. The title of the report provides a good indication of its contents.
[33] “Observaciones críticas a la dirección de la guerra y algunas indicaciones fundamentales para continuarla con más éxito. Informe que presenta el Comité peninsular de la F.A.I. al Gobierno de la república” [Critical observations concerning the conduct of the war and some basic advice about how it may be conducted more successfully. Report presented by the Peninsular Committee of the FAI to the Government of the Republic], Barcelona, August 20, 1938, 24 p.
[34] I was referring here, above all, to the operation whose purpose was to cut the rebel zone of Spain into two parts, which was to have been launched from Estremadura, and was planned during Largo Caballero’s term as Minister of War. This plan, and the contingencies to which it gave rise, would provide enough material for a whole book. The fall of Largo Caballero was mainly due to the prospects for success of this planned campaign, for which the Russians denied the use of the air force that they controlled.
[35] Manzana, a captain in an artillery unit, Durruti’s adjutant from the very first day of the revolt, who later replaced Durruti in Aragon, sent us the following note concerning the commissariat: “In the technical-advisory aspect it plays no role at all, since its members can hardly participate in any debates about an operation if they do not understand the meaning of operational orders, nor do they have the least knowledge of tactics, logistics, strategy, fortification, firing lines, etc. […] In the current phase of the war, I would prefer a competently operated field gun or an adequately manned fighter plane to a good commissar, and it is less costly to obtain someone who is good at the former jobs than the latter.” (September 1938)
[36] With respect to the Russian military advisers, Captain Manzana wrote, in a letter to us: “I have the impression, at least from the ones that I have dealt with, that they are just as incompetent as advisers as they are bad military officers. You need only take a look at the current disposition of our lines and the failure of all the offensives that these advisers have planned and directed.” (September 1938)
[37] In our discussions with several Spanish military pilots concerning the fact that our air force still remained in the hands of the Russians or their stooges, and the ineffectiveness of a military weapon that was being used to such decisive advantage by the enemy, we reached the conclusion that the Republican air force was being preserved above all for the eventual emergency evacuation of high level government and military personnel. A statement has been attributed to President Azaña whose authenticity we cannot confirm. Denouncing the negrinista policy of resistance, Azaña said: “I think that the time for extreme and futile heroism has passed. I am, however, ready for a new Numantia, but … without airplanes.”
[38] At one of the meetings of the National Popular Front, the supreme institution of negrinista policy, on a certain occasion when we opposed a new military draft we proved that the majority of those who were such enthusiastic supporters of sending more human cannon fodder to the front were themselves eligible for military duty and had found some way to have themselves declared indispensable for serving in the rearguard. Indispensable for aiding and abetting the policy of defeat.
[39] A very similar operation, initiated by General Asensio, was launched a few months later, although without the means and the preparations suggested by our report. Asensio later wrote to us: “I agree with the general outlines of your proposals to win the war, but not with regard to the details, which must be the responsibility of the person who is charged with executing the overall plan. Their general orientation is acceptable and I think they are of fundamental interest.”
[40] “Report on the conduct of the war and the rectifications demanded by its results”, presented by the Peninsular Committee of the FAI at the Plenum of Regional Committees of the libertarian movement, Barcelona, September 1938, 17 p.
[41] General Krivitzky’s revelations concerning Stalin’s policy in Spain shed some light on the reasons behind militarization, the creation of the International Brigades, and the whole bureaucratic and military mess inspired by the Russian emissaries. (The Saturday Evening Post, April 15, 1939, Philadelphia)
[42] Among hundreds of cases, we shall cite the names of two twenty year old men, members of the 66th Mixed Brigade, Felipe de Mingo Pérez, from the CNT Food Workers Trade Union of Madrid, and Antonio García Menéndez, from the UGT in Madrid, both of whom had been volunteer combatants since the very beginning of the movement. They were shot on December 14, 1937 in Chinchon.
[43] Vain illusions. After almost fifteen days of exhausting discussions, the policy of the Government of Victory was barely mentioned in a few paragraphs of the resolutions that were adopted out of boredom. A few minor concessions to our viewpoints on paper did not lead to any practical modifications in practice. Those who who claimed to represent the great Spanish trade union have successfully kept it chained to the triumphal chariot of Dr. Negrín, even after the defeat.
[44] Taking advantage of a 24-hour informal truce, some soldiers from the 31st Mixed Brigade went to Madrid for a few hours to visit their families on January 2, 1938. When they returned to their units they were arrested, their heads were shaved and they were forced to march down the main street of El Vellón (near Madrid) wearing signs around their necks announcing their offense, escorted by armed soldiers. The people of the town were outraged, and two men who protested against this disgraceful spectacle, which was so unworthy of the so-called republican regime, said that the offensive signs should be hung around the necks of those who ordered their use. For this crime, the two men were arrested and immediately shot by a firing squad, without any legal formalities. One of them was known as “El Chato”, a member of the Construction Workers Trade Union of the CNT, and the other was named Pedro Calvo, who was a member of the Metal Workers Trade Union of the UGT. They died with their fists in the air, shouting “Viva la República!”
[45] Having lost all our documentation, there is very little in the way of concrete data that we can provide with regard to the superlative accomplishments of the agrarian collectives in Aragon, concerning their experiences and the results they obtained. These enterprises are beyond all praise, and even if there were no other reasons to justify our strangled revolution, they alone would be enough, and they will survive in the memories of those who experienced them.
[46] In a previous report we presented to an earlier Plenum of Regional Committees of the libertarian movement, we referred specifically to this aspect of the inadvisability of contributing our support to help sustain a government that was necessarily fatal for the war effort and for the revolution.
[47] It was because we were viewed as a factor of secondary importance that October 1934 turned into a disaster; because it was thought that the war could be fought without us, without our enthusiastic support and regardless of our suggestions and observations, the war led straight to catastrophe. There are politicians, governments and methods that are used up in action. And the Negrín government was more than just worn out when it was born, it was rotten. What we knew as a result of a close examination of the situation, was discerned by the people, who considered the Negrín team to be a team of thieves of the public treasury, responsible for a policy of irrational and irresponsible murders. In any event, even for the continuation of their senseless policy, they would have to get rid of these men who were outstanding only for their lack of seriousness, their lack of good sense, their ineptitude, and their nouveau riche spending sprees. But the political orientation, in its international as well as its domestic dimensions, would also have to be changed, and to carry out this change men of a different kind of character, a different tradition and a different kind of prestige were nececessary.
[48] In the Boletín del militante of the Peninsular Committee of the FAI, we have insisted on various occasions on this serious fact of the absence of any reserve forces. Events would soon definitively demonstrate that our fears were to be confirmed to the letter and would even be surpassed in reality.
[49] Prieto eventually came to view Russian meddling as a nuisance, and it was claimed that he was responsible for certain proposals to oppose this pernicious interference. This does not exempt him from responsibility for having made Russian predominance possible because of his inveterate hatred for Largo Caballero, for Catalonia, and for anyone and anything that did not obey him.
[50] One example, among many others: that of the cigarette paper factories. Everyone knows that Spanish cigarette paper, from Levante and Catalonia, had a secure place in the world market. The Russians, when the Spanish paper factories had to be closed because of a lack of raw materials, offered to provide the raw materials, and also offered the workers and technicians of these factories large wage increases and special access to food and other goods if they would work overtime to produce cigarette papers for export to Russia. In this way Russia began to assume the role of the main customer for this product and Russian industrial technicians were in a position to transfer this specialized production to Russia, even shipping the machines to Russia on several occasions. When Spain once again resumes its manufacture of cigarette papers, it will have to face some previously unknown competition: that of Russia.
[51] During the July Days in Barcelona, we are told of the appearance of a real novelty: someone had seen a communist on the street, a former member of the CNT Metal Workers Trade Union.
[52] On one occasion, Jiménez de la Beraza, a colonel in the artillery section of the army and the heart and soul of the war industries of Catalonia, was summoned to a meeting with the Undersecretary of Armaments and Munitions to investigate the scarce yields of our artillery, which was rendered inoperable after having been fired a few times. Some spoke of the low quality of the gunpowder, others of sabotage being practiced by the gunners, etc. Colonel Jiménez de la Beraza maintained that the cause of the defects in question was the fact that those who purchased such materiel had not been shot.
[53] Peninsular Committee of the FAI, Circular No. 57 (Confidential), September 19, 1938, Barcelona.
[54] Jacinto Toryho, The Independence of Spain, Barcelona, 1938; see the chapter entitled, “Republican officers who are not supported by the Government”, pp. 144–149.
[55] In response to this situation, defensive affinity groups were beginning to be formed in all the units of the Army on the Catalonian front and they did not take long to go into action against the monopolist policy of the Russian agents. Although we could not count on the unanimous support of the libertarian movement, some of whose superior committees proudly displayed the most closed-minded governmentalism, we encouraged the formation of these clandestine nuclei, so that the defense of our soldiers and officers against the enemy on our flanks should be a coordinated effort and should not respond to momentary urges for revenge, without the proper preparation, as was the case in the 153rd Brigade, where the Stalinist commissar Rigabert was killed, triggering a massive and spectacular wave of repression.
[56] “It was many months ago that a government Minister, the Prime Minister himself, who is not exactly a Talleyrand when it comes to political talent, but who is at least like him with respect to his almost morbid love for political exhibitionism, announced that all of Spain could be lost, but that they, Negrín and his team of brilliant statesmen, would continue to govern Spain from France. And now they want to fulfill that prediction. Only such a hypnotic, almost pathological, fascination with power could explain how, at a particular moment in the year 1938 when Azaña even thought of changing government policy and therefore the Government itself, Negrín, with the insolence of a big baby, of someone who is basically weak and without character, but who by way of an effort of simulation wants to appear to be a real dangerous tough guy, told Azaña right to his face: ‘You won’t remove me from office, and if you try, I will resist, and I will assume the leadership of a mass movement and the army, which supports me.’ It is from you, señor Martínez Barrio, that I heard this deplorable anecdote, and you heard it from Azaña who, it would appear, tolerated this spontaneous outburst, a veritable coup d’état, without ordering the arrest of his insolent subordinate or taking advantage of this opportune moment to resign” (Luis Araquistain, letter to Martínez Barrio, President of the Cortes, April 4, 1939, Paris).
From : TheAnarchistLibrary.org.
Chronology :
January 04, 2021 : Notes -- Added.
January 16, 2022 : Notes -- Updated.
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