OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON OXFORD NEW YORK
[verso]
First published in the Home University Library, 1912
First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1959
This reprint, 1971-2
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
[Public domain (in the USA at least) HTML version completed
February 1996. All copyrights for HTML enhancements are renounced. This is
a freely reproducible text in the USA. In accordance with the
differing copyright laws, in Great Britain (and others using the same
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CONTENTS
I APPEARANCE AND REALITY
II THE EXISTENCE OR MATTER
III THE NATURE OF MATTER
IV IDEALISM
V KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE AND KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION
VI ON INDUCTION
VII ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
VIII HOW A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE
IX THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
X ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
XI ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
XII TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
XIII KNOWLEDGE, ERROR, AND PROBABLE OPINION
XIV THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE
XV THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
INDEX
NOTE TO SEVENTEENTH IMPRESSION
WITH reference to certain statements on pages 44, 75, 131, and
132, it should be remarked that this book was written in the early
part of 1912 when China was still an Empire, and the name of the then
late Prime Minister did begin with the letter B.
1943
PREFACE
IN the following pages I have confined myself in the main to
those problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible
to say something positive and constructive, since merely negative
criticism seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge
occupies a larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and
some topics much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly,
if at all.
I have derived valuable assistance from unpublished writings
of G. E. Moore and J. M. Keynes: from the former, as regards the
relations of sense-data to physical objects, and from the latter as
regards probability and induction. I have also profited greatly by
the criticisms and suggestions of Professor Gilber...
CHAPTER I
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
IS there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that
no reasonable man could doubt it? This question, which at first sight
might not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that
can be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a
straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on
the study of philosophy -- for philosophy is merely the attempt to
answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as
we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically after
exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing
all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.
In daily life, we assume as cer...
CHAPTER II
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
IN this chapter we have to ask ourselves whether, in any
sense at all, there is such a thing as matter. Is there a table which
has a certain intrinsic nature, and continues to exist when I am not
looking, or is the table merely a product of my imagination, a
dream-table in a very prolonged dream? This question is of the
greatest importance. For if we cannot be sure of the independent
existence of objects, we cannot be sure of the independent existence
of other people's bodies, and therefore still less of other people's
minds, since we have no grounds for believing in their minds except
such as are derived from observing their bodies. Thus if we cannot be
sure of the independent existence o...
CHAPTER III
THE NATURE OF MATTER
IN the preceding chapter we agreed, though without being able
to find demonstrative reasons, that it is rational to believe that
our sense-data -- for example, those which we regard as associated
with my table -- are really signs of the existence of something
independent of us and our perceptions. That is to say, over and above
the sensations of color, hardness, noise, and so on, which make up
the appearance of the table to me, I assume that there is something
else, of which these things are appearances. The color
ceases to exist if I shut my eyes, the sensation of hardness ceases
to exist if I remove my arm from contact with the table, the sound
ceases to exist if I cease to rap the table wi...
CHAPTER IV
IDEALISM
THE word 'idealism' is used by different philosophers in
somewhat different senses. We shall understand by it the doctrine
that whatever exists, or at any rate whatever can be known to exist,
must be in some sense mental. This doctrine, which is very widely
held among philosophers, has several forms, and is advocated on
several different grounds. The doctrine is so widely held, and so
interesting in itself, that even the briefest survey of philosophy
must give some account of it.
Those who are unaccustomed to philosophical speculation may be
inclined to dismiss such a doctrine as obviously absurd. There is no
doubt that common sense regards tables and chairs and the sun and
moon and material objects gen...
CHAPTER VI
ON INDUCTION
IN almost all our previous discussions we have been concerned
in the attempt to get clear as to our data in the way of knowledge of
existence. What things are there in the universe whose existence is
known to us owing to our being acquainted with them? So far, our
answer has been that we are acquainted with our sense-data, and,
probably, with ourselves. These we know to exist. And past sense-data
which are remembered are known to have existed in the past. This
knowledge supplies our data.
But if we are to be able to draw inferences from these data --
if we are to know of the existence of matter, of other people, of the
past before our individual memory begins, or of the future, we must
know general ...
CHAPTER VII
ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
WE saw in the preceding chapter that the principle of Induction,
while necessary to the validity of all arguments based on experience,
is itself not capable of being proved by experience, and yet is
unhesitatingly believed by every one, at least in all its concrete
applications. In these characteristics the principle of induction
does not stand alone. There are a number of other principles which
cannot be proved or disproved by experience, but are used in arguments
which start from what is experienced.
Some of these principles have even greater evidence than the
principle of induction, and the knowledge of them has the same degree
of certainty as the knowledge of the existence...
CHAPTER VIII
HOW A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE
IMMANUEL KANT is generally regarded as the greatest of the modern
philosophers. Though he lived through the Seven Years War and the
French Revolution, he never interrupted his teaching of philosophy at
Konigsberg in East Prussia. His most distinctive contribution was the
invention of what he called the 'critical' philosophy, which,
assuming as a datum that there is knowledge of various kinds,
inquired how such knowledge comes to be possible, and deduced, from
the answer to this inquiry, many metaphysical results as to the
nature of the world. Whether these results were valid may well be
doubted. But Kant undoubtedly deserves credit for two things: first,
for having perceived th...
CHAPTER IX
THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
AT the end of the preceding chapter we saw that such entities
as relations appear to have a being which is in some way different
from that of physical objects, and also different from that of minds
and from that of sense-data. In the present chapter we have to
consider what is the nature of this kind of being, and also what
objects there are that have this kind of being. We will begin with
the latter question.
The problem with which we are now concerned is a very old one,
since it was brought into philosophy by Plato. Plato's 'theory of
ideas' is an attempt to solve this very problem, and in my opinion it
is one of the most successful attempts hitherto made. The theory to
be advocated in ...
CHAPTER X
ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
IN regard to one man's knowledge at a given time, universals,
like particulars, may be divided into those known by acquaintance,
those known only by description, and those not known either by
acquaintance or by description.
Let us consider first the knowledge of universals by
acquaintance. It is obvious, to begin with, that we are acquainted
with such universals as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard,
etc., i.e. with qualities which are exemplified in sense-data. When
we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, with
the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily
learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in
lear...
CHAPTER XI
ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
THERE is a common impression that everything that we believe
ought to be capable of proof, or at least of being shown to be highly
probable. It is felt by many that a belief for which no reason can be
given is an unreasonable belief. In the main, this view is just.
Almost all our common beliefs are either inferred, or capable of
being inferred, from other beliefs which may be regarded as giving
the reason for them. As a rule, the reason has been forgotten, or has
even never been consciously present to our minds. Few of us ever ask
ourselves, for example, what reason there is to suppose the food we
are just going to eat will not turn out to be poison. Yet we feel,
when challenged, that a per...
CHAPTER XII
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
OUR knowledge of truths, unlike our knowledge of things, has
an opposite, namely error. So far as things are concerned,
we may know them or not know them, but there is no positive state of
mind which can be described as erroneous knowledge of things, so
long, at any rate, as we confine ourselves to knowledge by
acquaintance. Whatever we are acquainted with must be something; we
may draw wrong inferences from our acquaintance, but the acquaintance
itself cannot be deceptive. Thus there is no dualism as regards
acquaintance. But as regards knowledge of truths, there is a dualism.
We may believe what is false as well as what is true. We know that on
very many subjects different people hold diffe...
CHAPTER XIII
KNOWLEDGE, ERROR, AND PROBABLE OPINION
THE question as to what we mean by truth and falsehood, which
we considered in the preceding chapter, is of much less interest than
the question as to how we can know what is true and what is false.
This question will occupy us in the present chapter. There can be no
doubt that some of our beliefs are erroneous; thus we are
led to inquire what certainty we can ever have that such and such a
belief is not erroneous. In other words, can we ever know
anything at all, or do we merely sometimes by good luck believe what
is true? Before we can attack this question, we must, however, first
decide what we mean by 'knowing', and this question is not so easy as
might be supposed.
At...
CHAPTER XIV
THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE
IN all that we have said hitherto concerning philosophy, we
have scarcely touched on many matters that occupy a great space in
the writings of most philosophers. Most philosophers -- or, at any
rate, very many -- profess to be able to prove, by a priori
metaphysical reasoning, such things as the fundamental dogmas of
religion, the essential rationality of the universe, the illusoriness
of matter, the unreality of all evil, and so on. There can be no
doubt that the hope of finding reason to believe such theses as these
has been the chief inspiration of many lifelong students of
philosophy. This hope, I believe, is vain. It would seem that
knowledge concerning the universe as a...
CHAPTER XV
THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
HAVING now come to the end of our brief and very incomplete
review of the problems of philosophy, it will be well to consider, in
conclusion, what is the value of philosophy and why it ought to be
studied. It is the more necessary to consider this question, in view
of the fact that many men, under the influence of science or of
practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is
anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hairsplitting
distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge
is impossible.
This view of philosophy appears to result, partly from a wrong
conception of the ends of life, partly from a wrong conception of the
kind of goods which p...
CHAPTER V
KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE AND KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION
IN the preceding chapter we saw that there are two sorts of
knowledge: knowledge of things, and knowledge of truths. In this
chapter we shall be concerned exclusively with knowledge of things,
of which in turn we shall have to distinguish two kinds. Knowledge of
things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by
acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of
truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths, though it
would be rash to assume that human beings ever, in fact, have
acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some truth
about them. Knowledge of things by description, on the
contrary, always involves, as we shall f...
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The student who wishes to acquire an elementary knowledge of
philosophy will find it both easier and more profitable to read some
of the works of the great philosophers than to attempt to derive an
all-round view from handbooks. The following are specially
recommended:
PLATO: Republic, especially Books VI and VII.
DESCARTES: Meditations.
SPINOZA: Ethics.
LEIBNIZ: The Monadology.
BERKELEY: Three Dialogues between Hylas and
Philonous.
HUME: Inquiry concerning Human Understanding.
KANT: Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic.
INDEX
The interrogations indicate places where a view is discussed, not
asserted [To use this index divide the sought page number by the
number of pages in the book, 160, and scroll down that fraction.
Example: "Phenomenon" is on page 86. 86/160=53%. Scroll down 53% into
the file and there you are. (Or just use the search function.)]
Absolute idea, 142
Acquaintance, 43 ff., 60, 108, 109, 119, 136 with Self? 50
Act, mental, 41
Analytic, 82
Appearance, 9, 16
A priori, 74-7, 80, 82 ff., 103 ff. mental? 88
Arithmetic, 84
Association, 62 63 65
Being, 100
Belief, 119 ff., instinctive, 24 25
Berkeley, George (Bishop), 12, 13, 15, 16, 36, 38 ff., 73, 95, 97
Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 54-8
Bradley, Francis Herbert, 95
Cantor,...
