The Law of Intellectual Property : or An Essay on the Right of Authors and Inventors to a Perpetual Property in their Ideas

Part 2, Chapter 6, Section 4
SECTION IV. Review of the Case of Donaldson and another, vs. Becket and another. This case came before the House of Lords, in 1774, on an appeal from an injunction against publishing a book, whose statutory term of copyright had expired. The Lords directed the judges to give their opinions to the House on the following questions, viz.: 1. "Whether at common law, an author of any book or literary composition had the sole right of first printing and publishing the same for sale; and might bring an action against any person who printed, published and sold the same without his consent?" 2. "If the author had such a right originally, did the law take it away, upon his printing and publishing such book or literary composition; and might any person afterwards reprint and sell, for his own benefit, such book or literary composition, against the will of the author?" 3. "If such action wo...

Part 2, Chapter 6, Section 3
SECTION III. Review of the Case of Millar vs. Taylor. The question of an author's copyright at Common Law, first came to a decision by the court of King's Bench in 1769, in the case of Millar vs. Taylor. Three of the Justices, Willes, Aston, and Lord Mansfield, decided in favor of the right; one, Justice Yates, opposed it. Each of the judges gave a written argument on the question. The want of unanimity in the court, and the inconsistency and deficiency of the arguments of the three Justices in favor of the right, have prevented their decision from being received as a settlement of the question; and there has probably been nearly or quite as much doubt on the point, among lawyers, since that decision as before. The Justices argued the question, both on precedent, and as an abstract one of natural, or common law. The precedents were from the court of chancery; and the most of them were en...

Part 2, Chapter 6, Section 2
SECTION II. Why the Common Law Right of Property in Ideas has not been more fully Acknowledged. It will, I think, be hereafter rationally shown, that the nonestablishment, in England, of the right of property in ideas, is to be attributed solely to the overthrow of the ancient, constitutional, Common Law government, and to the establishment of arbitrary power in its stead. But to understand how such a cause has been productive of such an effect, we must attend somewhat to events and dates. The Great Charter—which was at once the embodiment and guarantee of the Common Law form of government, and which, within about two hundred years from the grant of it in 1215, was confirmed more than thirty times, was confirmed for the last time in 1415. It had been much encroached upon before; but from this time the government degenerated rapidly into absolutism. And such has now been its character for some four hundred...

Part 2, Chapter 6, Section 1
PART II THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND. (VOL. I) CHAPTER VI. THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND RELATIVE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. SECTION I. What is the Common Law of England? In order to determine whether the Common Law of England sustains the right of authors and inventors to an absolute and perpetual property in their ideas, it is only necessary to determine what the Common Law of England really is. To many unprofessional readers, the term Common Law will convey no very certain or precise idea; and as I am anxious that they should fully understand this discussion, at every step, I shall define the term more at length than would otherwise be necessary. The Common Law of England, then, with a few exceptions, which are wholly immaterial to the question of intellectual property, consists of, and is identical with, the simple princip...

Part 1, Chapter 5
CHAPTER V. THE POLICY OF PERPETUITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. As a matter of public policy, the expediency of allowing a man a perpetual property in his ideas, is as clear as is that of allowing him a perpetual property in material things. What is the argument of policy against a perpetual property in ideas? Principally this—that the world will get ideas cheaper, if they get them for nothing, than if they pay for them. This argument would be just as good in favor of abolishing the right of property in the material products of men's labor, as it is for abolishing it in intellectual ones. Take wheat, for example. If the right of property in wheat were abolished, the world would get the stock of wheat, that is now on hand, for nothing. But the next crop of wheat would be a small one; and people would then learn, that in the long run, the cheapest mode, and the only mode, of procuring a consta...

SECTION VIII. How is the Right of Property Transferred? From the very nature of the right of property, that right can be transferred, from the proprietor, only by his own consent. What is the right of property? It is, as has before been explained, a right of control, of dominion. If, then, a man's property be taken from him without his consent, his right of control, or dominion over it, is necessarily infringed; in other words, his right of property is necessarily violated. Even to use another's property, without his consent, is to violate his right of property; because it is for the time being, assuming a dominion over wealth, the rightful dominion over which belongs solely to the owner. These are the principles of the law of nature, relat...

PART I THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. CHAPTER I. THE LAW OF NATURE IN REGARD TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. SECTION I. The Right of Property in Ideas to be proved by Analogy. In order to understand the law of nature in regard to intellectual property, it is necessary to understand the principles of that law in regard to property in general. We shall then see that the right of property in ideas, is at least as strong as—and in many cases identical with—the right of property in material things. To understand the law of nature, relative to property in general, it is necessary, in the first place, that we understand the distinction between wealth and property; and, in the second place, that we understand how and when wealth becomes pr...

SECTION II. Objection Second. The second objection, that is urged against the right of property in ideas, is, that, admitting, (what cannot with the least reason be denied,) that a man is the sole proprietor of an idea, so long as he retains it in his exclusive possession, he nevertheless loses all exclusive right of property in it the moment he communicates the idea to another person, because that other person thereby acquires as complete possession of the idea, as the original proprietor. This is a very shallow objection, since it is founded wholly on the assumption, that if a man once entrust his property in another man's keeping, he thereby loses his own right of property in it; whereas men are constantly entrusting their property in ot...

SECTION XII. Objection Twelfth. It is said that a man, by giving his ideas to others, does not thereby part with them himself, nor lose the use of them, as in the case of material property; that he only adds to other men's wealth, without diminishing his own; that his giving knowledge to other men is only lighting their candles by his, thereby giving them the benefit of light, without any loss of light to himself; and that therefore he should not be allowed any exclusive property in his ideas, nor any right to demand a price for that, which it is no loss to him to give to others. This objection is really the same as the next preceding one; and is only stated in a different form. The answers given to that objection, will apply with equal for...

SECTION III. Objection Third. A third objection, that has been urged against a right of property in ideas, any longer than they remain in the exclusive possession of the originator, is, that ideas are of the nature of wild animals, which, being once let loose, fly beyond the control of man; thus interposing an obstacle, in a law of their own nature, to the maintenance of any dominion over them, after they have once been liberated. This objection is utterly fanciful and unfounded. The resemblance between a flying thought, and a flying bird, may be sufficiently striking for purposes of poetry and metaphor, but has none of the elements of a legal analogy. A thought never flies. It goes only as it is carried by man. It never escapes beyond the ...