Chapter 7 : 
The Revolution in Perspective: The Economic Background
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19741974

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Author : Sam Dolgoff

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To arrive at an objective assessment of the character of the Cuban
Revolution, and the validity of the claims made both for and against it, it
is first necessary to examine the economic background. The information here
assembled is meant to dispel widespread misconceptions and establish the
facts.

Cuba, the largest of the Caribbean islands, with an area of 44,218 square
miles, is greater in area than Austria, Hungary, Belgium, Israel, Israel,
Iceland, or Ireland. Its population in 1961 was 6,900,000 with an annual
birth rate of 2.3% as against the U.S. rate of 1.7%. By the 1970s Cuba's
population reached 8,400,000. About 73% of the population is white; 12% black
and 15% mestizo. Density of population was 153 inhabitants per square mile
in the 1960s. The island was densely populated, but because of the high
proportion of arable land, was not overcrowded.

To better understand the social-economic background of the Cuban Revolution
it is necessary to take into account class differences in rural Cuba. In
this connection the views of Ramiro Guerra are well worth quoting:
. . . Cuba was precisely NOT a peasant country. . . to talk of Cuba's
"peasantry" as if the population were an undifferentiated mass of
impoverished peasant landowners is to miss entirely the complexity of rural
Latin America. Peasants who by a swift process of sugar plantation
developments have been transformed into rural
proletarians are no longer PEASANTS...there were, in 1953, 489,000
agricultural wage workers in Cuba and only 67,000 unpaid family laborers who
were the wives and children of the small-scale land owners, the highland
peasantry, Los Guajiros of Cuba. . . the big sugar plantations are an
urbanizing force within which the rural population must concentrate itself
densely. . . by standardizing work practices, the plantations create a
factory situation--albeit a rural one. And factories in the field are urban
in many ways, even though they are not in cities. A rural proletariat
working on modern plantations inevitably become culturally and behaviorally
distinct from the peasantry...its members have no land. Their special
economic and social circumstances lead in another direction. They prefer
standardized wage minimums, adequate medical and educational services,
increased buying power, etc...when it is noted that there were more than
489,000 agricultural laborers in Cuba in 1953...a gross indication of the
difference between peasantry and rural proletariat is provided us. . .
(quoted by Sidney W. Mintz in the anthology Background to Revolution; New
York, 1966, p. 182-183)

These views are confirmed by the fact that the agricultural laborers,
primarily in the sugar plantations, constituted one of the strongest and
most numerous federations affiliated to the Cuban Confederation of Labor
(CTC).
Cuba, the "Pearl of the Antilles," though by no means a paradise, was not,
as many believe, an economically backward country. Castro himself admitted
that while there was poverty, there was no economic crisis and no hunger in
Cuba before the Revolution. (See Maurice Halperin: The Rise and Fall of
Fidel Castro, University of California, 1972, pgs. 24, 25, 37)

Armando Hart, a member of Castro's innermost ruling group, made the
extremely significant observation that:
. . . it is certain that capitalism had attained high levels of
organization, efficiency and production that declined after the Revolution.
. . (Juventud Rebelde, November 2, 1969; quoted by Rene Dumont, Is Cuba
Socialist?, p. 85)

Paul A. Baran, an ardent pro-Castroite in the equally ardent Monthly Review
pamphlet, Reflections on the Cuban Revolution (1961) substantiates what
every economist, as well as amateurs like Castro, has been saying:

...the Cuban Revolution was born with a silver spoon in its mouth. . .the
world renowned French agronomist, Rene Dumont,
has estimated that if properly cultivated as intensively as South China,
Cuba could feed fifty million people. . . the Cuban Revolution is spared the
painful, but ineluctable compulsion that has beset preceding socialist
revolutions: the necessity to force tightening of people's belts in order to
lay the foundations for a better tomorrow. . .(p. 23)

Theodore Draper quotes Anial Escalante, (before he was purged by Castro) one
of the leading communists, who admitted that:

...in reality, Cuba was not one of the countries with the lowest standard of
living of the masses in America, but on the contrary, one of the highest
standards of living, and it was here where the first great . . . democratic
social revolution of the continent burst forth. . . If the historical
development had been dictated by the false axiom [revolutions come first in
poorest countries] the revolution should have been first produced in Haiti,
Colombia or even Chili, countries of greater poverty for the masses than the
Cuba of 1958. . . (quoted in Draper's Castro's Revolution: Myths and
Realities; New York, 1962, p. 22)

The following statistics indicate the rate of production before the
Revolution (Jan. 1,1959). (Sources are two United Nations publications:
Economic Study of Latin America, 1957, and the Statistical Annual, 1961. The
third source is The University of Miami Cuban Studies, reported in the
journal Este y Oeste, Caracas, Jan. 1969)


Agricultural Production


 1957-1958
1949-1951 % of increase
 
raw sugar ............ 11
plantains ............ 30
rice ................ 120
leaf tobacco ......... 50
potatoes ............ 28
flour ............... 114


Industrial Production--non-Sugar


 % of increase
 
cement ................ 55.5 
fertilizer ............ 48.8 
cotton ................ 33.6 
sulfuric acid ......... 32.3 
artificial silk ....... 18.1 
rubber goods .......... 65.5 
construction ......... 120.8 
gas and electric ..... 157.5 
manufactures ......... 118.7 

(source, University of Miami Cuban Studies reported in Este y Oeste)

...according to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United
Nations, total agricultural production in 1969, 10 years after the
Revolution, was 7% below that of 1958...(Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the
1970s; University of New Mexico Press, 1974, p. 56)

As for sugar production, Halperin writes that while it is true that:

. . . in 1961, by harvesting uncut sugar cane left over from previous years,
Cuba produced close to seven million metric tons of sugar, the largest crop
in history. Production, however, fell sharply in the following eight years,
averaging well below the yields in the decade preceding the Revolution
[1949-1959]. . .per capita production of sugar in 1945 was about 30% higher
than in 1963. . . In the 1950s, on the average, a labor force of 500,000
working three months produced 500,000,000 tons of sugar, forty tons per man
year. In the 1970 harvest, 500,000 persons working twelve months produce 8.5
million tons of sugar, or only seventeen tons per man year. . . (ibid. p.
62, 241, our emphasis)

Cuba was NOT a one crop country. In 1957, sugar represented only 27% of
total agricultural income. Growing crops were only PARTIALLY listed above.
Cattle raising, (per 100 head) increased from 3884 to 6000 in 1958
(University of Miami Studies)

...before Castro, Cuba was one of the richest underdeveloped countries in
the world, with Gross National Product, per-capita income in the mid 1950s
of $360, Cuba was well ahead of Japan
($254 per-capita) and Spain ($254 per-capita)... (Robert Blackburn, quoted
in the anthology Fidel Castro's Personal Revolution: 1953-1973; New York,
1975, p. 134)

Cuba had one automobile for every 39 inhabitants, compared with Argentina's
one for every 60 and Mexico's one for every 91 people.

Cuba had one radio for every 5 people, second in Latin America only to
Argentina with one for every 3 inhabitants.

the wage rate for industrial workers in Cuba was the highest in Latin
America (as of 1957) and 9th highest in the world.

agricultural wages were the highest in Latin America

Cuba's mortality rate of 7 per thousand was the lowest in Latin America.
Its infant mortality rate was by far the lowest.

Cuba had one doctor for every 1,000 inhabitants, exceeded only by Uruguay
with one for every 800, and Argentina for every 760 people. 

Cuba ranked fifth in Latin American manufacturing.

Though living standards were much lower than in the U.S., Canada and
Western Europe, Cuba's was the third highest in Latin America, and almost as
high as Italy's.

Cuba had more railroads per square mile than any other country in the
world.

Its one telephone for 38 persons was exceeded only by the U.S. with one for
every 3 and Argentina with one for every 13; way ahead of Russia's with one
for every 580 people.
It must be borne in mind; however, that statistics can be misleading and
conditions were by no means as rosy as implied. Favorable comparison with
the already low living standards of Latin America does not mean that the
Cuban unskilled workers (and far less the peasants) enjoyed a SATISFACTORY
standard of living. To be a little better off than the WORST does not
signify that it is the BEST. There is another, darker side to this picture.
Compared to American standards, Cuba's per-capita income was 1/5 of the
average U.S. income: far lower than in any of the Southern states.

The big minus sign of the Cuban economy is that it is not self-sustaining in
the indispensable paraphernalia of modern life. Cuba is totally dependent
for the uninterrupted flow of vital supplies; oil, coal, iron and steel,
trucks and busses, cars, chemicals, sophisticated machinery etc. And it was
precisely this hopeless and impossible attempt to make Cuba a highly
industrialized country without these vital resources, that just about
wrecked the Cuban economy. Cuba has not yet recovered from this
catastrophic, totally unpardonable miscalculation, taken against the advice
of qualified economic experts. Castro and his staff of fumbling amateurs,
were forced to abandon this suicidal policy, but they still persist in
meddling with things the know absolutely nothing about.

These serious drawbacks notwithstanding, Cuba is far from being a totally
undeveloped country with a primitive economy. Given intelligent use of its
natural wealth of resources, the potential for raising the living standards
of its population is almost limitless. On this point there is no doubt. That
the Castro "revolutionary" regime, far from developing these potentials, has
not even equaled the admittedly inadequate standards attained before the
revolution, is unfortunately also true.

Distribution of the national income was not balanced. The lower standard of
living of the agricultural laborers was particularly atrocious, especially
during the "dead season" between sugar harvests:
. . . the standard of living of the privileged classes of the cities [writes
Dumont] was in violent contrast with the misery of the peasants . . . who
were unemployed an average of 138 days a year . . . the unemployed numbered
250,000 even in the middle of the harvest season on the sugar plantations. .
.(Cuba: Socialism and Development, p. 14)

And C. Wright Mills informs us . . . "that only 3% of peasant 'Bohios'
[huts] had indoor toilets. Two thirds of the children were not in any
elementary school and most of those that were, dropped out . . . in 1950,
180,000 children began first grade, less than 5000 reached eighth grade. . ." 
(Listen Yankee!; New York, 1960, p. 44-45)
It is well worth noting, as one observer remarked, " . . . that a
substantial fraction of the town population were [like the rural
proletarians] also very poor. . . squatters were living in shacks, and there
were slum tenements. In 1953, no less than one fifth of families lived in
single rooms and the average size of these families was five. . . taking the
urban and rural population together, 62% of the economically active
population had incomes of less than $75 a month. . . " (Dudley Sears in
Background to Revolution, ibid. p. 213)

The Castro government is directly responsible for the awful economic
situation of the Cuban people. The rising standard of living is a myth. Rene
Dumont, the distinguished agronomist and economist, marshals overwhelming
evidence that Castro and his bumbling amateurs wrecked the economy of Cuba.
There is no serious disagreement on this point:
. . .Cuba's shortages of food and other necessities are to a large extent
due to the dogmatism of its leaders. . . in 1963, the harvests were 25%
lower than in 1960 although the number of days worked had been rising
rapidly. . . The standard of living in Cuba remained stationary in 1961, and
with strict rationing, went down perhaps 15% to 20% in 1962. . . There
are still, as I had seen in Santa Clara in 1960, no recognition of the
difficulties involved in managing an economy . . . they were not trained and
badly prepared. . . professors
at the Institute of Technology did not even know the names of the most
common plants or their requirements...the government is increasingly calling
for more effort and sacrifices as well as the acceptance of increased
authority...despite constant reorganization, it is unable to put its house
in order...(Is Cuba Socialist? pp. 100, 20, 92, 149, 29, 206.)
The economic consequences of transforming reasonably productive cattle and
dairy farms and other agricultural enterprises into notoriously inefficient
"people's" farms was predictably catastrophic...to the thousands of
law-abiding families evicted without warning, it appeared to be an arbitrary
act of brutality. . .

[The peasants retaliated; Halperin writes that:] the impression obtained in
usually well-informed government circles that over a period of several
years, some 50,000 troops were engaged in liquidating peasant
disaffection...a sizable military effort had been under way to put down the
uprising, which was not finally liquidated until well into 1964...Castro
reminisced about "the uprisings that occurred mainly, but not exclusively,
in the Escambray Mountains. . . organized groups existed all over the
island...there were 1,000 bandits in the Escambray Mountains alone."
(Halperin, ibid. p. 283, 284. Halperin credits the Castro quote to Granma,
June 13, 1971)
Maurice Halperin also reports that:

"...food riots occurred in a number of towns in the western provinces,
including Cardenas, a sizable urban center and seaport about 100 miles east
of Havana. Here at a mass meeting, June 17, 1962, President of Cuba Dorticos
had to be protected by tanks during a speech he made to calm the
inhabitants..." (The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro; Univ. of California,
1974, p. 162)

In addition to the Cardenas riots, the Bulletin of the Cuban Libertarian
Movement in Exile (Miami, June 1962) reports that:

. . . in El Cano, a little town in Havana Province, violence was so great
that the authorities did not even try to suppress it. But afterwards, the
authorities took revenge by expropriating furniture and personal belongings
. . . Food riots also occurred in Cienfuegos...[in view of the fact that
these]...sacrifices have been going on since 1961 and have been unbearable
for the Cubans [Dumont asks:] To what extent has a ruling class the right to
impose its single-minded conceptions of the future--and to impose
it in so disorganized a manner--that the results are further aggravated?
(ibid. p. 70-71)

Dumont, we are sure, will agree, in view of his own analysis, that economic
disaster is not the cause, but only a symptom of the inner degeneration of
the Cuban Revolution.


     From : Anarchy Archives

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     Chapter 7 -- Publication : November 30, 1973

     Chapter 7 -- Added : February 05, 2017

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