The Communist Left in the Third International : 
Bordiga at the 6th Enlarged Executive Meeting of the Communist International
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Author : Amadeo Bordiga

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Source: http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/3909/bordiga0.html;HTML Markup: Andy Blunden 2003.



“Since the Russian Revolution is the first great stage of
the world revolution it is also our revolution. Its problems are our
problems, and every militant in the revolutionary International has not
only the right, but also the duty, to collaborate in their
solution.” - Amadeo Bordiga, at the 20th session, 15th March 1926


Seventy years ago the wave of proletarian strife and insurrection
which had brought the 1st World War to a close was all but over.
Instead of being strengthened and supported by the establishment
of a European soviet republic and beyond, the Russian proletariat
had been left high and dry. Today, in the light of historical
hindsight, it is easy to see that what had been salvaged from
the great Russian Revolution was the skeleton of a once heroic
revolutionary party that was now being transformed into the central
arm of a brutal state apparatus. Two years after the death of
Lenin, Stalin was already well on the way to establishing himself
as the sole unquestioned leader in the party and the state. Ever
since the 10th Party Congress in 1921 (at the time of the Kronstadt
uprising and the introduction of NEP) factions had been officially
disavowed inside the Russian Party. By 1926 all genuine political
debate about the key issue of what had happened to the Revolution
and the prospects for the working class had been stifled by appeals
for Party unity supplemented by the intervention of the political
police. Meanwhile, in the upper echelons of the Party there was
an increasingly byzantine but no less vicious struggle for control
over the Party apparatus among Stalin, Trotsky and the other
Old Bolshevik leaders. (At the beginning of 1926 it was Zinoviev's
turn to be muzzled by Stalin's maneuvers and the short-lived
Joint Opposition led by Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky was in the
process of formation.)

This sorry and unsavory progression of the counter-revolution
in Russia was echoed inside the Communist Inter-national where,
from 1924, the policy of 'bolshevisation' of its constituent parties
was a pseudonym for turning them into loyal and unquestioning
clones of the Russian Party. Along with Stalin's theorization
of 'socialism in one country', it was the means by which the Communist
Left was effectively gagged. Moreover it closed off any discussion
on what was happening in Russia itself within what was supposed
to be the Executive body of the party of the international proletariat.
The Communist International was being turned into the Comintern
- a foreign policy arm of the Russian state.

We are taking the occasion of the seventieth anniversary to publish
extracts from the interventions of Amadeo Bordiga, the spokesman
for the Italian Communist Left, during the course of the meetings
of the 6th Enlarged Executive of the Communist International held
between 17th February and 15th March, 1926. During the various
sessions Bordiga eloquently denounced the political degeneration
of the International, focusing in turn on the tactics of the
united front and workers' government, 'bolshevisation' and the
hunting down of factions, as well as touching on the necessity
for the Inter-national as a whole to discuss what was happening
to the Russian Revolution.

However, he was never able to fully develop this last point in
the open sessions — Stalin had already made sure of that. Only
in a closed session between Stalin and the Italian delegates was
he able to astonish Stalin when, after quizzing him about the
relative situations of the Russian proletariat and the peasantry
and the nature of the opposition groupings within the Communist
Party, he directly asked whether "Comrade Stalin thinks the
development of the Russian situation and the internal problems
of the Russian Party are linked to the development of the international
proletarian movement?" (Evoking the profound response from
the Great Man: "Never till now has this question been put
to me. I would never have believed that a communist could put
it to me. May god forgive you for having done so.") There was to
be no World Congress of the whole International in 1927 as Bordiga
proposed in his summing up at the plenary session, Needless to
say, when the 6th Comintern Congress was held (in 1928) neither
was there any discussion of the Russian question.

As it was, however, Bordiga managed not only to put forward the
positions of the Italian Left as they had just been propounded
at the recent Congress of the Italian Party.[1] He also managed
to broach the central issue of whither Russia. When it came to
the "Theses on the Current questions of the International
Communist Movement" Bordiga's voice — on behalf of the Italian
Communist Left — was the only one raised in opposition.

Despite this courageous stand, on his return to Italy Bordiga
virtually withdrew from political life. During the remainder of
1926 his only political text was a letter he wrote to Karl Korsch
in October. Here he argued there was a "sense of reality"
about the tactics of the current Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition in
Russia and advised a cautious policy towards the Comintern, asserting
that the Left "still needs to receive further blows before
passing to the open offensive". In November he was arrested
and confined on the island of Ustica before being incarcerated
at Ponza until the end of 1929. In vain did the exiled Left Fraction
(or Trotsky for that matter) which had been formed in 1927 try
to persuade him to join them abroad. "Wait and see"
became his personal political stance as he distanced himself completely
from political work both inside Italy and internationally. Thus,
as Onorato Damen put it,

Subsequent political events, at times of historic
importance, passed by this disdainful outsider without receiving any
echo: The Trotsky/Stalin conflict; Stalinism; our Fraction which abroad
- in France and Belgium — continued to develop the politics and
ideology of the Livorno party; the civil war in Spain and the Second
World War; and, finally Russia's line up on the imperialist war front.
Not a word nor a line....

So it fell on the shoulders of others to draw up a balance sheet
of the Russian experience and its worldwide counter-revolutionary
aftermath. But that is another story. If his intervention at the
Comintern in 1926 had been his sole political act he would have
made a lasting contribution to the platform of the Communist Left.[2]

Bordiga's speech at the 5th session: 23rd February 1926

We communists know very well that the historical development of
the working class must lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat,
but this is an action which must influence the broad masses, and
these masses cannot be simply won by our ideological propaganda.
To the full extent to which we can contribute to the formation
of the masses' revolutionary consciousness, we shall do it by
the strength of our position and our stance at each stage of the
unfolding of events. This is why this stance cannot — and must
not — be in contra-diction with our position concerning the final
struggle, in other words the goal for which our party was specifically
formed. Agitation around a slogan like that of workers' government,[3]
for instance, can only sow disarray in the consciousness of the
masses and even of the party and its general staff. We criticized
all this from the beginning, so I shall content myself here with
recalling in its broad outlines the judgment we expressed at
the time.

When it was confronted by the errors which this tactic had provoked,
and above all when the defeat of October 1923 occurred in Germany,
the International recognized that it had been mistaken. It was
not just a secondary accident, it was an error which cost us the
hope of winning another great country beside the first in which
the proletarian revolution had won — something which would have
been of enormous importance for the world revolution.

Unfortunately, all that was said was: there is no question of
radically revising the decisions of the 4th world congress, it
is merely necessary to remove certain comrades who made mistakes
in their application of the united front tactic, it is necessary
to find those responsible. They were found in the right wing of
the German party. Nobody was willing to acknowledge that it was
the International as a whole which bore the responsibility. Nevertheless,
the theses were revised and a quite different formulation given
to the workers' government.

Why did we not agree with the theses of the 5th congress? In our
opinion, the revision was not sufficient, the new formulations
should have been brought out more clearly. But above all we were
opposed to the measures of the 5th congress because they did not
eliminate the serious errors, because we thought it was not right
to restrict the question to proceedings against individuals, and
that a change was necessary in the International itself. But the
majority refused to follow this healthy and courageous path. We
have frequently criticized the fact that among us, in the milieu
in which we work, a parliamentarist and diplomatist state of mind
tends to develop. The theses are very left-wing, even those against
whom they are directed approve them — thinking in that way to
win immunity. But for our part, we looked beyond the words and
foresaw what would happen after the 5th congress, that is why
we could not declare ourselves satisfied.

Bolshevisation

I would like here to establish the following: on more than one
occasion, the comrades have been obliged to recognize the necessity
of a radical change of line. The first time, the question of winning
the masses had not been understood. The second time, it was the
question of the united front tactic, and at the 3rd congress a
complete revision was carried out of the line followed up to that
time. But this is not all. At the 5th congress, and at the Enlarged
Executive meeting of March 1925, it was once again perceived that
everything was going badly. It was said: six years have passed
since the foundation of the International, but none of its parties
have succeeded in making the revolution. To be sure, the situation
had deteriorated and we are now confronted by a certain stabilization
of capitalism. Nevertheless, it was explained that many things
in the activity of the International would have to be changed.
There was still no under-standing of what had to be done, so the
slogan of Bolshevisation was launched. It is incomprehensible.
What, eight years have gone by since the victory of the Russian
bolsheviks, and we are now obliged to acknowledge that the other
parties are not bolshevik? That a profound transformation is necessary
in order to raise them to the level of bolshevik parties? Had
nobody noticed this before?

Why did we not raise a protest against the slogan of bolshevisation
at the time of the 5th congress? Because nobody could be opposed
to the statement that other parties must attain the revolutionary
capability which made the victory of the Bolshevik Party possible.
But now it is not just a question of a mere slogan, a mere watchword.
We are dealing with facts and an experience. Now it is necessary
to draw up the balance-sheet of bolshevisation and see what it
has consisted in. I maintain that this balance-sheet is negative,
from several points of view. There has been no resolution of the
problem which had to be resolved. The method of bolshevisation
applied to all parties has not secured their progress. I must
examine the problem from various standpoints. First of all, from
that of history.

We have only one party which has achieved victory — the Russian
Bolshevik party. The essential thing, for us, is to follow the
same path as that which the Russian party adopted to attain its
victory, quite right, but that is not enough. It is undeniable
that the historical route followed by the Russian party cannot
display all the features of the historical development awaiting
other parties. The Russian party — it is a fact — fought in specific
conditions, in a country in which the feudal autocracy had not
yet been overthrown by the capitalist bourgeoisie. Between the
fall of the feudal autocracy and the conquest of power by the
proletariat, too short a period intervened to be able to compare
this development with that which the proletarian revolution will
have to achieve in other countries.

There was not enough time for a bourgeois state apparatus to be
constructed on the ruins of the Czarist and feudal state apparatus.
The course of events in Russia does not offer us the basic experience
we need, in order to know how the proletariat is to overthrow
the modern, liberal, parliamentary, capitalist state, which has
existed for many years and possesses a great defensive capability.

Once these differences are stated, the fact that the Russian Revolution
has confirmed our doctrine, our program, and our conception
of the role of the working class in the historical process, is
theoretically all the more important insofar as the Russian Revolution
- even in these specific conditions — accomplished the conquest
of power, and the dictatorship of the proletariat realized through
the communist party. The theory of revolutionary marxism found
therein its most grandiose historical confirmation. From the ideological
point of view, this is of decisive historical importance. But
so far as tactics are concerned, it is not enough. It is indispensable
for us to know how to attack the modern bourgeois state, which
defends itself in armed struggle even more effectively than did
the Czarist autocracy, but which in addition defends itself with
the help of ideological mobilization and a defeatist education
of the working class by the bourgeoisie. This problem does not
appear in the history of the Russian Communist Party.

If 'bolshevisation' is understood to mean that one may expect
to find a solution to all the strategic problems of revolutionary
struggle in the revolution achieved by the Russian party, then
this concept of bolshevisation is inadequate. The International
must formulate a broader conception. It must find solutions to
our strategic problems outside the Russian experience. The latter
must be exploited to the full, none of its characteristic features
must be neglected, it must be kept constantly in view, but we
also need complementary elements deriving from the experience
of the working class in the west. This is what must be said about
bolshevisation from a historical point of view. The experience
of tactics in Russia has not shown us how the struggle against
bourgeois democracy must be waged. It has given us no idea of
the difficulties and tasks which the development of the proletarian
struggle holds in store for us. ...

Internal regime of the party and the International.

I shall now move on to another aspect of bolshevisation: the internal
regime of the party and the CI. Here, a new discovery has been
made: what all our sections lack is the iron discipline of the
bolsheviks, as exemplified by the Russian party. An absolute ban
is proclaimed on factions, and it is decreed that all party members
are obliged to participate in common work, whatever their opinion
may be. In this domain too, I think the question of bolshevisation
has been posed in a very demagogic way.

If we put the question like this: does just anyone have the right
to form a faction? — then every communist will answer — no! But
the question cannot be put in this way. There are already results
showing that the methods used have served neither the party nor
the International. This question of internal discipline and factions
must be approached from a marxist viewpoint, in a quite different
and more complex way. We are asked: what do you want? Do you want
the party to resemble a parliament, in which everyone has a democratic
right to bid for power and strive to secure a majority? But this
is the wrong way to pose the question. If it is posed like this,
there is only one possible answer, of course, we would be against
such a ridiculous regime.

It is true we must have an absolutely united communist party,
excluding internal differences of opinion and disparate groupings.
But this statement is not a dogma or a priori principle. Rather,
it is a goal to be aimed at during the development of a genuine
communist party. But this is only possible if all ideological,
tactical and organizational questions are correctly posed and
correctly resolved. Within the working class, it is the economic
relations in which the various groups exist which determine the
actions and initiatives of the class struggle. The political party
has the role of gathering together and uniting whatever these
actions have in common, from the point of view of the revolutionary
goals of the working class of the world as a whole. Unity inside
the party, the suppression of internal differences of opinion,
the disappearance of factional struggles, will be a proof that
the party is on the best path for carrying out its tasks correctly.
But if differences of opinion do exist, this will prove that the
party is marred by errors; that the party does not have the capacity
to radically combat the degenerative tendencies of the working
class movement, which normally manifest themselves at certain
crucial moments in the general situation. If one is faced by cases
of indiscipline, this is a symptom showing that this fault still
exists in the party. Discipline, in fact, is a result, not a point
of departure, not some kind of unshakable platform. Moreover,
this corresponds to the voluntary nature of entry into our organization.
This is why a kind of party penal code cannot be a remedy for
frequent episodes of lack of discipline.

In recent times, a regime of terror has been established in our
parties, a kind of sport, which consists in intervening, punishing,
annihilating — and all of this with a special pleasure, as if
this were precisely the ideal of party life. The champions of
this splendid operation even seem to be convinced that it constitutes
a proof of revolutionary capacity and energy.

I think, on the contrary, that the true and good revolutionaries
are generally those comrades who are the object of these extraordinary
measures, and who bear them patiently in order not to destroy
the party. I consider that this squandering of energy, this sport,
this struggle within the party has nothing to do with the revolutionary
work we should be carrying out. The day will come when we shall
have to strike down and destroy capitalism, and in this domain
the party will have to give evidence of its revolutionary energy.
We do not want anarchy in the party, but neither do we want a
regime of continuous reprisals, which is the very negation of
party unity and cohesion.

For the moment, things are presented as follows: the central leadership
will always exist and can do what it wants, for when taking measures
against anybody who speaks against it, or 'annihilating' intrigue
and opposition, it is always in the right. But merit does not
lie in repressing rebellion, the important thing is for there
to be no rebellion. Party unity is to be recognized by the results
obtained, not by a regime of threats and terror. We need sanctions
in our statutes, that is clear. But they must be exceptions, not
a normal and general procedure inside the party. If some elements
flagrantly abandon the common path, measures must be taken against
them. But if recourse to a code of sanctions becomes the rule
in a society, that means the society is not exactly perfect. Sanctions
must only be used exceptionally, they must not constitute a rule,
a sport, or the leadership's ideal. If we wish to form a solid
bloc, in the true sense of the term, this must all change.

The theses proposed here contain a few fine phrases in this respect.
A little more freedom is conceded. But perhaps this comes somewhat
late.

Possibly, it is thought safe to give a little more freedom to
people who have been 'crushed' and can no longer stir hand or
foot. But let us move away from the theses and consider the facts.
It has always been said that our parties should be built on the
principle of democratic centralism. It would perhaps be no bad
thing if we could find another expression instead of democracy
- but the formula was provided by Lenin. How is democratic centralism
to be achieved? Well, of course, through the eligibility of all
leading comrades and consultation of the mass of the party on
certain key questions.

Obviously, there may be exceptions to this rule in a revolutionary
party. It is permissible for the leadership on occasion to say:
comrades, the party would normally be consulting you, but since
the struggle against our enemies has just entered a dangerous
period and there is not a minute to lose, we are acting without
consulting you.

But what is dangerous is to give the impression of a consultation,
when what is really involved is an initiative taken from above.
That is to abuse the leadership's control of the party apparatus
and press. In Italy, we said that we accept dictatorship, but
detest such 'Giolittian' methods. For is bourgeois democracy anything
but a method of trickery? And can this be the kind of democracy
you are granting us within the party? Can this be what you are
striving to achieve? Then we say that a dictatorship would be
better, which at least does not mask itself hypocritically. What
must be introduced is a genuine form of democracy, in other words,
one which allows the leadership to take advantage of the party
apparatus only for good ends.

Otherwise, there cannot fail to be malaise and dissatisfaction,
especially among the working class. We must have a healthy regime
in the party. It is absolutely indispensable that the party should
have the possibility of forming an opinion and expressing it openly.
...

The birth of a faction shows that something is wrong. To remedy
the ill, it is necessary to seek out the historical causes which
gave birth to the anomaly, and which determined the formulation
or tendency to form the faction in question. The causes lie in
the ideological and political errors of the party. The factions
are not the sickness, but merely the symptom, and if one wishes
to treat the sick organism, one must not combat the symptoms but
try to discover the causes of the sickness. Besides, in most cases
what was involved was groups of comrades who were making no attempt
to create an organization or anything of the kind. What was involved
were currents of opinion, tendencies, which sought to express
themselves in the normal, regular and collective activity of the
party. The method of faction-hunting, scandal campaigns, police
surveillance and mistrust of comrades — methods which, in reality,
represents the worst factionalism developing in the higher levels
of the party — can only result in worsening the situation of our
movement and pushing all objective criticism onto the path of
factionalism. Such methods cannot ensure the inner unity of the
party, they only paralyze it and render it impotent. A radical
transformation of such methods of work is absolutely indispensable.

If we do not put an end to all this, the consequences will be
very serious. ...

The intervention of the International center in the affairs of
national sections has thus in several cases been less than fortunate.
I blame the International's methods of work for this, its relations
with the national sections and its way of forming their leading
bodies. I already criticized our methods of work at the last congress.
There is no genuine collective collaboration in our leading bodies
and congresses. The International center appears quite alien to
our sections, managing discussion within them and choosing in
each a faction to support.

This center is backed on every question by all the other sections,
who hope in this way to assure themselves of better treatment
when their own turn comes. The various leadership groupings are
formed on the basis of such 'horsedealing'. People tell us: the
international leadership derives from the hegemony of the Russian
party, which is justified by the fact that it made the revolution
and harbors the International's headquarters. That is why it
is necessary to accord especial importance to decisions prompted
by the Russian party, which is our leader. But then the problem
arises of how the Russian party resolves international questions.
This is a question we have every right to pose.

Since the most recent events, since the last discussion, this
fulcrum of the whole system is no longer sufficiently stable.
In the latest discussion in the Russian party, we have seen comrades
who claim to have an identical knowledge of Leninism, and who
unquestionably have an identical right to speak in the name of
the Bolshevik revolutionary tradition, each using quotations from
Lenin against the other in argument and each interpreting Russian
experience in his own favor. Without going into the substance
of the discussion, it is just this undeniable fact which I want
to establish here. Who, in this situation, will decide in the
last instance on international problems. One can no longer answer:
the bolshevik Old Guard, for this reply leads in practice to conflicting
solutions. Thus the fulcrum of the entire system resists objective
investigation.

But this means it is clearly necessary to seek a different solution.
We may compare our international organization to a pyramid. This
pyramid must have an apex and sides which mount towards that apex.
This is how we may represent our unity and necessary centralization.
But today, as a result of our tactics, the pyramid is standing
dangerously on its apex.

It must therefore be reversed and stood back on its base, so that
it is stable again. Hence, our conclusion on the question of bolshevisation
is that we must not be satisfied with mere modifications of a
secondary nature, but the whole system must be modified from top
to bottom. The left government ... What are our tasks for the
future? This assembly cannot concern itself seriously with this
problem without confronting, in its full dimensions and all its
gravity, the fundamental question of the historical relations
between Soviet Russia and the capitalist world. Alongside the
problem of the revolutionary strategy of the proletariat, the
problem of the international peasant movement, and the problem
of colonial and oppressed peoples, the question of the Russian
Communist Party's state policy is today the most important of
all for us. The Russian party must assess he interplay of class
relations inside Russia, take the necessary steps to check the
influence of the peasants and the bourgeoning petty bourgeois
strata, and defend itself from external pressures including of
a military kind. Since a revolutionary overturn has not yet occurred
in other countries, it is necessary to coordinate policy in Russia
as closely as possible with the overall revolutionary policy of
the proletariat.

I do not intend to go fully into this question here, but I maintain
that in this struggle, yes, we must certainly base ourselves first
and foremost upon the Russian working class and its communist
party, but it is of fundamental importance that we also base ourselves
upon the proletariat of the capitalist states, whose class sense
is determined by direct contiguity with its capitalist adversary.
The problem of Russian policy cannot be resolved within the narrow
limits of the Russian movement alone, the direct collaboration
of the whole CI is absolutely essential. Without such collaboration,
not only revolutionary strategy in Russia, but also our policies
in the capitalist states will be seriously threatened. A tendency
may emerge to water down the character and role of the communist
parties. We are already in fact under attack in this sense, not
from within our own ranks, but from social democrat and opportunist
circles. Related to this is the question of our campaign for international
trade union unity and our attitude to the 2nd International. We
are all agreed here that the communist parties must unconditionally
maintain their revolutionary independence. All the same, it is
necessary to warn of the possible emergence of a tendency to replace
communist parties with organisms of a less explicit kind, which
would not have strict class aims but be politically more neutral.
In the present situation, it is our unquestionable duty to defend
the international and communist character of our party organization
against any liquidationist tendency.

After the criticisms we have made, can we consider the International,
such as it exists today, adequately armed for this double task
- of working out a correct strategy both for Russia and for the
other countries? Can we demand, for instance, immediate discussion
of all Russian problems by this assembly? To this question we
must, alas, reply in the negative. It is absolutely essential
to carry out a serious revision of the internal regime of our
parties, and to include on their immediate agenda the problems
of tactics on a world scale and state policy in the USSR. But
tackling these questions requires a new course, with completely
different methods. In the report and the theses which have been
proposed, we find no adequate basis for resolving these matters.
What we need is not official optimism. We have to understand that
it is not little correctives — of the kind we have more than once
seen introduced into the internal regimes of our parties — which
can equip us to carry out the grandiose tasks which confront the
general staff of the world revolution.

Speech to the 9th session, 25th February ... I am finishing, comrades.
As regards our internal regime and reversing the 'pyramid', and
on the question of factions, I cannot reply here to what comrade
Bukharin said. But I ask the following, will there be a change
in future in our internal relations? Does this session of the
plenum show that a new path is being taken? At the very moment
when we are being assured here that internal terror will behalted,
we hear statements from the French and Italian delegates which
fill us with doubt. We shall wait to see you at work.

I think, for my part, that the hunt for so-called factionalism
will continue, and will produce the same results as it has up
to now. We can see this from the method adopted to settle the
German question and others. I must say that, in my view, this
method of personal humiliation is a deplorable one, even when
it is utilized against political elements who have to be combated
vigorously. I do not consider it to be revolutionary, and I think
that the majority which today proves its orthodoxy by scoffing
at persecuted and broken sinners may very well be made up of former
disgraced opportunists. We know that these methods have been applied
- and will be again — to comrades who not only have a revolutionary
past, but remain precious elements for our future struggles. This
mania for self-destruction must cease, if we truly aspire to the
leadership of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle.

That is why the spectacle of this session of the plenum has filled
me with dark forebodings, so far as the impending changes within
the International are concerned. I shall, therefore, vote against
the draft resolution which has been presented.

Motion proposed at the 20th session I wish to put my position
on the discussion of Russian matters in written form. It is legitimate
to note that this plenum has not discussed Russian questions,
and has neither the possibility nor the requisite preparation
to do so. This gives me every right to conclude that this is one
result of the International's incorrect general policy, with its
rightist deviations.

This is exactly what I observed in my first speech, during the
general political discussion.

Concretely, I propose that the World Congress should be convened
next summer, and that its agenda should be precisely the question
or relations between, on the one hand, the revolutionary struggle
of the world proletariat and, on the other, the policy of the
Russian state and the Soviet Communist Party. It goes without
saying that the discussion of these problems must be properly
prepared, in all sections of the International.


(The above motion was unanimously referred to the Presidium).

Footnotes.

 1.This had been held in the French town of
Lyons in January. The Lyons Theses of the Left had been rejected by the
Italian Party leadership of Togliatti and Gramsci, now thoroughly
'bolshevized' in its political positions and method of work.

 2. Our introduction is partly drawn from the
work of the PCInt. whose collection of documents and extracts from
previous texts, entitled Per una analisi critica del tardo
bordighismo e dei suoi epigoni, we recommend to anyone who is able
to read Italian.

 3. For more on the Italian Left's attitude to
the workers' government slogan (and their general political framework)
see The Rome Theses which were adopted by the CPd'I in 1922 and
reprinted in Revolutionary Perspectives 22 (Series 2).

 4. The implications of bolshevisation for the
Italian Party and the response of the Left is dealt with in the CWO's
pamphlet, Platform of the Committee of Intesa, 1925. The
Platform is also available in Italian in Onorato Damen, Gramsci tra
Marxismo e Idealismo, available from the PCInt.'s address.


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