Stalin and German Communism
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Author : Paul Mattick

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Review of Stalin and German Communism. A Study in the Origins of the State Party. By Ruth Fischer, Harvard University Press, 1948, 687 pp., $80;Source: Western Socialist, Boston, USA, March-April, 1949;Transcribed: by Adam Buick.

The postwar situation with the new imperialist rivalries brought forth an
American boom in anti-bolshevik literature. The latest of several big volumes,
starting with Trotsky’s Stalin biography is Ruth Fischer’s work on
the relationship between Stalin and the German Communist Party. To deal with
Stalinism in this manner us particularly apt, as the competition between
America and Russia concerns control over other countries. The
“rape” of smaller nations by greater powers is a modern
rallying-cry for war; which is understandable, for what one’s rival
swallows is lost to one’s own appetite. Interest in ways and means of
Russian “aggression” is consequently great and this book hopes to
keep it awake for the approaching new struggles against the expanding
totalitarianism.

Prof. Fay’s introduction

Introducing Ruth Fischer to the American readers, Professor Fay of Harvard
points out that her exposition of Russian policy is of the greatest
significance for the world today, because it shows that Communist parties work
for their “Moscow masters, rather than as honest patriots for the good of
their native land.” Russian efforts to manipulate German Communist policy
regardless of Germany’s own interests, he says, was one important reason
for Ruth Fischer’s break with Moscow. It was, moreover, a deep democratic
concern with Lenin’s “right of national self-determination”
that made her into a Communist in the first place. According to Fay, it was the
refusal on the part of the social-democratic leaders to think in terms of real
autonomy for the various nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian state that drove
Ruth Fischer to the extreme left of her party and made her one of the founders
of Austrian Communism. In this way Ruth Fischer is relegated into the ranks of
the many patriotic martyrs and statesmen who fled the new Russian Empire to
write books in the United States.

Professor Fay’s protective attitude towards his author and himself is
rather superfluous. Sympathy with “German” Communists is bound to
grow with the approaching war against Russia, just as sympathies for
“Russian” Communists assumed forms of brotherly love in the second
world war against the German totalitarians. Although there has been a period of
ardent German nationalism in Ruth Fischer’s political life, her
patriotism must not be taken too seriously. After all, she changed rather
quickly from the “fight for self-determination” in Austria to the
“genuinely international” German Communist Party. And within this
party, in Fay’s words, “as a young woman in her early twenties, and
not even a German citizen,” she rose quickly, “much to her own
surprise,” to the position which enables her today to speak with
authority about communism and German Communism in particular.

Of course it is not possible to make Ruth Fischer responsible for Professor
Fay’s strange and ill-informed preface; it is she who works for Harvard
and not vice versa. It is quite irritating, nevertheless, to see
Professor Fay bewail the disunity of the German working class, which supposedly
prevented the full democratic success of the Weimar Republic, as a
“tragic misfortune for the world.” And this by way of introducing a
book which makes it vividly clear that it was not the disunity in the ranks of
the workers, but the unity between the bourgeoisie and the democratic labor
movement, that hindered the unfolding of a “really democratic
revolution.” The split between “socialists” and
“communists” in 1918 did not cause the collapse of Weimar, but was
an attempt to develop a revolutionary force in Germany able to prevent a
capitalistic restoration and the return of German imperialism.

However, when Professor Fay speaks of a “really democratic
revolution” he does not think in terms of socialism. He merely prefers
Weimar to the Third Reich, and even at this late date he holds on to the
convenient illusion that a united front between “socialists” and
“communists” would have prevented the Hitler regime. But the Weimar
Republic ended into the Third Reich because there has been no socialist
revolution, because, to speak in Fay’s terms, the split in the working
class had not been wide enough. Professor Fay seems to have missed the whole
point of Ruth Fischer’s book, namely, that Stalinism represents a kind of
red fascism. And not only since the conclusion of the second world war, but
many years before the Hitler-Stalin pact. The division of the labor movement in
1933 represented something other than the split in 1918. With Hitler’s
rise to power, the capitalistically minded social-democratic organizations and
trade unions faced the Russian totalitarians in German clothes. Hitler could
destroy the German labor movement so easily not because it was disunited, but
because it was partly not a labor movement and partly not German.

Who’s who of Communism

Disregarding the preface, Ruth Fischer’s first two-hundred pages give
an interestingly written and objective account of the political changes in
Germany after the first world war. They deal with the development of the German
left-wing movement during the war, with the Spartakusbund and similar
organizations, their consolidation into the Communist Party, the frictions
within this party, its early use as an instrument of Russian foreign policy,
the position and relations of the workers and soldiers councils to the
established political organizations and trade unions, the defeat of all
revolutionary aspirations, and the return of German militarism.

The bulk of the book, however, remains interesting mainly as an example of
the professional revolutionist’s view of history. With Ruth
Fischer’s entrance into the political picture her book describes, much of
the objectivity that characterizes the first part of the work makes way to the
subjective wrath of the defeated politician. History is now almost exclusively
seen in the distorted form of inter-and-intra-party struggles; the
party-faction and the party-leader replace the traditional “hero”
or “villain” in explaining historical change. She speaks now of
“the sure instinct of the born power-politician,” who appeals to
“the vanity of the unprocessed raw material of society,” that is,
the workers, and defeats those less favorably endowed for the struggle for
power. This way of writing history requires a large amount of “inside
information” and turns her book into a real “Who’s Who of
Communism” as her publisher happily points out. That much of this
information appears in footnotes does not reduce its importance. It is thus
easily available to those who like to match Stalin’s famous Kremlin files
with similar but democratic office appliances in this country.

“Betrayal”

Even the quality of the first parts of the book is somewhat impaired by an
attempt to make the Stalinist betrayal of “German” Communism the
more abhorrent by granting to the German Left a larger credit than its due.
Even if in the wake of the first world war a minority of the German labor
movement went farther in its revolutionary aspirations than other minority
groups in other countries, their inability to overcome their social-democratic
past transcended their subjective readiness to take the revolution seriously.
The lack of definite ideas of procedure, the substitution of slogans for
concrete plans, the incapacity to adjudge the world situation realistically,
accounted for both the demand for leadership, and the indecisiveness of the
leaders heading the movement. All the efforts made, all the heroism shown, all
the sacrifices suffered, amounted in the end to no more than a feeble gesture
in the right direction, unable to affect the bulk of the labor movement, busy
as it was with the restoration of the war-torn world by way of capitalistic
reforms.

Russian domination

There was not very much to be “betrayed.” Furthermore, if the
radical wing of the German labor movement could be brought under Russian
domination within the span of a few years, there must have been tendencies
within this movement itself favoring bolshevik rule. In fact, it was again a
minority within a minority which seriously tried to break with the tradition of
reform to which both the socialists and the bolsheviks adhered. The differences
between these latter groups were merely of a tactical nature, or rather related
to tactical issues at a particular historical moment. On the question as to
what constitutes socialism both agreed on the nationalization of capitalist
property and its administration by the state. One party was out to capture
governmental power by revolution, the other by reform. Most of the German
Communists accepted the bolshevik leadership so readily because it corresponded
to their own ideas of revolutionary rule.

There were, however, groups of communists who tried to actualize the
propaganda slogan “All Power to the Soviets.” They advocated
actions and proposed goals beyond the understanding and interests of
revolutionists out for governmental positions in a state-controlled society.
They, too, had their day in the political convulsions between 1918 ad 1921.
Against them, however, there always operated an informal united front of
“socialists” and bolsheviks. Russian intervention set in with
Lenin’s attack upon the so-called “ultra-left” in Germany.
Against their “infantile radicalism,” hr urged the return to
parliamentarism, to trade-union activity, to opportunism in general. His German
disciples did not hesitate to split the young Communist Party to suit the great
Russian leader’s tastes and needs. At this time Ruth Fischer was not yet
in leading position, but supported Zinoviev and Radek, the executors of the
Moscow program.

Russian domination of German Communism did not have to avail of
Stalin’s coming to power; it was instituted quite early by Lenin himself
with the artificial creation of the Third International, the twenty-one points
of admission subordinating the international movement to the decisions of the
Russian leaders, the splitting of the originally anti-reformist Communist Party
and the merging of its Leninist right wing with the reformist Independent
Socialists. If Ruth Fischer speaks persistently of herself as representing a
“left” opposition, it must be pointed out, that this left
factionalism had nothing whatever to do with the actual attempts of the German
radicals to oppose the totalitarian rule of bolshevism. Her work went on within
the bolshevik party and relates merely to the manipulatory needs of the Russian
overseers in the early stages of their developing totalitarianism. With a
“left” and a “right” faction, maneuvering was made
easy. Now they could blow hot and cold, move in one direction or another, or
not move at all. They could advance and retreat, take in reformism or
revolution, be national or international, just as the shifting needs of the
Russian state required. Neither the “left” nor the
“right” had an independent policy, but represented different sets
of politicians, emphasizing one or another aspect of bolshevism, in order to
make secure at all times the control of the Russian manipulators.

Purges

The need for this largely indirect form of control ceased to exist with the
stabilization of world capitalism and the completion of the authoritarian rule
in Russia. Factionalism became first an unnecessary luxury and soon an
annoyance, as it slowed down the execution of orders from above. When it became
clear that neither the mood of the masses, nor the opinions of the
party-members carried weight any longer, immobilized as they were by the
relatively settled world conditions, more direct methods of control were
introduced. The “purge” displaced the empty chatter about
“right” and “left” turns, and all decisions made by the
Central Committee represented as unquestionable the “correct line.”
Those who did not grasp the change of situation fell quickly by the
wayside.

Not anti-totalitarian

Ruth Fischer’s rise and fall, too, is not explained by any kind of
anti-totalitarianism on her part, but by some tactical changes forced upon the
Russian leadership and by a struggle for control raging within the Russian
party. Comintern policy, shifting back and forth from reformism to putschism,
in a steady search for a greater support of Russian state policies, led to the
defeat of the abortive October uprising in 1923. In an attempt to shift
responsibility from the higher to the lower levels of the Comintern hierarchy,
the Russian-sponsored leadership of the German Communist Party was forced to
make room for their untried “left” competitors, Maslow and Fischer.
Within the Russian party the fight for Lenin’s place was already in full
swing. Trotsky, too, played a “left” tune. However, Maslow and
Fischer thought of a different melody, and by supporting Stalin and Zinoviev in
Russia, secured to themselves the German leadership. Once in power, the
“left” orientation proved to mean a further decline in
party-democracy, more discipline, more authoritarianism. But if the support of
Stalin and Zinoviev gained Maslow and Fischer the German leadership, it was
soon lost again on account of Stalin’s fight against Zinoviev for the
control of the Russian party. A general turn to the “right”
discredited Zinoviev and supported Stalin. It forced the former to denounce and
destroy his own “left” following to strengthen his position
vis-à-vis the Stalin clique. But Stalin won the fight and with
the question of leadership thus definitely settled, all anti-Stalinists, Maslow
and Fischer included, were thrown out of the party.

If the intra-party struggles forced Ruth Fischer into an actual oppositional
position, her “leftist” orientation became now merely an
anti-Stalinist point of view. Like all the other expelled opposition groups,
her own persisted in regarding itself as the only “true” bolshevist
movement as against the Stalinist “counter-revolution.” They set up
new organizations that did not differ in form or spirit from those of the
Stalinists, and spent the rest of their pseudo-political existence in the
illusory hope of regaining their “rightful” place in the
international bolshevik movement.

However, their lips were no longer sealed as far as Stalin was concerned.
They could now criticize, defame, and ridicule to their heart’s content.
Ruth Fischer holds nothing back, not even her own weird imagination, to prove
the utter debasement of her political enemies and friends of yesterday. Even
the failings, mistakes, and shady deals of pre-Stalin bolshevism are now
exposed, though partly excused. They were of course known to her while still in
power, but as long as silence was golden, she kept silent, as becomes a good
bolshevik.

To speak of a Stalinist counter-revolution, Ruth Fischer must defend
Lenin’s policies, thereby simultaneously justifying her own political
past. Almost masochistically she tries to exonerate Lenin of his own
interventions in German politics. It was not really Lenin, she says, but
others, who “got Lenin to recommend Maslow’s elimination from the
German Party.” This is, no doubt, the extreme in self-denial, as Maslow
is the real hero of her book; an all-round genius, as if sprung from the cover
of Time magazine. At all crucial points, she writes,
“Lenin’s intervention in German Communist affairs, presents an
attitude directly opposed to that of Stalin.” And this because of
“a contrast in character” and a “different political
climate.” Although “Lenin fought for the centralized power of the
party,” she says, it was “always with a full consciousness of the
dangers to the original concept of soviet democracy in the use of compulsory
measures"!

Though conscious of the dangers involved, Lenin decided nevertheless to live
dangerously. It must be a great comfort to the massacred Krondstadt
revolutionists to know, if they could, that Lenin worried about democracy while
applying martial law. And also for the dead hostages, democratically butchered
at the ratio of two-hundred to one. Who knows, the ratio might have been less
favorable to the victims had it not been for Lenin’s original concept of
soviet-democracy? However, the Dzerzhinsky-pattern was evolved not only as a
weapon against the white-guardists, but also for the struggle against soviet
democracy. The latter was the revolution itself, not yet brought under party
control. It was the enemy, which Lenin fought, and over which Stalin finally
triumphed.

The whole of Lenin’s theory and practice speaks against Ruth
Fischer’s interpretation. All she has to offer in support of her thesis
is the promise behind the power. Of course, all rulers and ruling groups,
declare their dictatorship a necessary, if unpleasant medium to a better life
for all. If they are still struggling for power, their promises are quite
specific; as soon as they are in power, the promises become rather vague and
their fulfillment is relegated into the distant future. Lenin’s promises
are still on Stalin’s lips. And what Lenin intended to do in Russia has
been fulfilled in her state-economy. The Russian state does not differ from
Lenin’s party concept, developed long before the revolution. If his
principles of organization and control appear to differ from the Russian
reality, it is because it involves no longer a few thousand people, but more
than 160 millions, no longer a selected group of revolutionists, but all the
social layers of Russia and beyond.

What, in any case, is all this talk about the leader’s character
structure anyway? What sort of “social” movement is represented by
organizations depending in their destination on the character of the leader?
Certainly not a communist movement trying to break the monopolization of power
and to end the social class structure. In Ruth Fischer’s story the whole
of Stalinism and modern Russian imperialism seems to result from Lenin’s
untimely death. “After Lenin’s second stroke,” she writes,
“Stalin tightened the screws.” And as “Lenin became weaker,
Stalin became bolder.” Zinoviev’s position “became more and
more difficult between Lenin’s second and third stroke,” and so
forth, until all is lost with Lenin’s last breath.

State Party — State Capitalism

Ruth Fischer’s attempt to reveal the “origins of the State
party,” succeeds only In showing some of its manifestations, as she is
unable to escape her own bolshevik ideology. She writes about the revolutionary
movement as Eisenhower writes about the war. It is all a question of leadership
and strategy, and the rest is just logistics. Apparently, the
“origin” of the State Party coincides with Stalin’s becoming
General Secretary in 1921, for, from page 232 of her book onward, she decides
“to capitalize the word Party when referring to the Russian
institution, in order to indicate that it has become the sole instrument of
power in the state.” As the capitalizing of a word cannot serve as
explanation, the whole of her book must serve to explain the capitalizing. In
that case, the history of bolshevism is the story of the coming of the State
Party, and against this there stood nothing but Lenin’s character
qualities and, of course, the revolutionary sincerity of Maslow, Fischer, and
their unnamed following. How it is possible, however, to fight for absolute
state power and yet not become the State Party, remains unexplained.

The origins of the State Party, Russian or otherwise, are not secret; they
are identical with those that gave impetus to the accumulation and expansion of
world capitalism. Russian state-capitalism, like German fascism, is a national
reaction to the shifts in international power constellations brought on by
large-scale competition. There is nothing specifically Russian, Bolshevistic or
Stalinistic in the development of state-capitalism, which implies the State
Party. To single out the Stalinist Party as originator and carrier of
totalitarianism is to obscure the nature of present-day capitalism, whose
general trend is towards totalitarian rule. An anti-totalitarianism that is
merely anti-Stalinism can lead to no other end than did the anti-totalitarian
“crusade” against Hitler.

To be sure, the refusal to see in Russian totalitarianism the only —
the present, — or the main enemy, is not to excuse any of the bolshevik
actions, nor any of their leaders. The evil machinations of Stalin and the
Stalinists in Russia, Germany, and elsewhere, as related by Ruth Fischer and by
a growing host of displaced Communists, are just as much a requirement for
understanding political trends as literature devoted to “socialist
reconstruction” in England, or to the power and capital concentration in
the United States. In this respect, however, Ruth Fischer relates only in
greater detail what has been said before by other confessors, more or less
afflicted by amnesia as regards their own past. It is no more than the struggle
for power within the bolshevik regime and its repercussions within the German
branch, both interwoven with the past and current imperialistic power games.
The story ends with Ruth Fischer’s declaration that “she is no
longer able to identify herself with any of the groups” once involved in
the fights her book relates.


     From : Marxists.org

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     Stalin and German Communism -- Added : March 02, 2021

     Stalin and German Communism -- Updated : January 08, 2022

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