Untitled >> Anarchism >> Durruti in the Spanish Revolution >> Part 3, Chapter 17
When the four CNT ministers sat down with the rest of Largo Caballero’s government, the rebel columns maneuvering to take Madrid had nearly surrounded the city. Many leading Republicans and Socialists (including Indalecio Prieto) thought that Madrid would fall in a matter of hours or two or three days at the most. Government officials focused more on leaving the city—escaping to Valencia—than on organizing the resistance. Consumed by panic, the ministers pressured Largo Caballero to order a departure and let the “crazies” make Madrid a new Numantia if they wanted to do so. They intended to stay well beyond the line of fire.[669]
Although there was a different sentiment in Barcelona, and shells weren’t landing in the Plaza de Cataluña as they did in Madrid’s Puerta del Sol, there was the same level of turmoil. However, no one there thought to flee and instead concentrated on coming to Madrid’s aid. Everyone knew that if the rebels took the capital, governments around the world would recognize Franco as the leader of Spain and the war would be over. The Generalitat’s Ministry of Defense convened a meeting of all the Column leaders operating in Aragón to discuss the situation. Many of them were already wearing the military uniforms awarded with graduation, which the recent militarization decree compelled. The only ones who hadn’t changed were the CNT Column leaders and Rovira, who represented the POUM’s forces. Díaz Sandino and then Santillán reported on the desperate situation in Madrid and both called for a shipment of troops to the capital. Silence followed their comments and everyone looked to Durruti, who kept quiet like the others. They all knew that it was imperative to help the threatened city immediately, but they hadn’t determined what force to send or the date on which to send it. They suggested that Durruti try to raise the fighters’ morale and inspire the resistance by giving a speech over the radio. He consented. His speech would be broadcast on November 4.
Durruti met with Marcos Alcón after leaving the meeting. The latter was a militant from the 1920s and they decided to have dinner with other longtime comrades from the heroic years. What could be said among that group of revolutionaries who had not given up on the revolution, each of whom was fighting in his own way against the bureaucratism of the committees? Durruti told us that he was alarmed by the rapid progress of the counterrevolution and the havoc that bureaucratism was causing in the ranks of the CNT and FAI. He said that he intended to confront the issue in the speech that they wanted him to give.” Marcos Alcón adds:
I clearly remember the effect that his comments had on many of the “responsible” comrades in the CNT and FAI. I have an even more dramatic memory of the panic felt in Catalan political circles. Durruti made them shake with fear when he told them in no uncertain terms that, whatever they did, they wouldn’t be able to strangle the revolution for the sake of some colorless antifascism. I’m not exaggerating, and there are still witnesses who assert that the text of the speech published in the press, even the confederal press, had been censored. The printed version wasn’t anything near what Durruti said. His sentences were like slaps in the face for the opportunists of the revolution. It was a violent, aggressive, yet reasoned speech.[670]
Here is the transcript of his comments:
Workers! I speak to the Catalan people, to the generous people that four months ago defeated the soldiers who tried to crush them beneath their boots. I send you salutations from your brothers and comrades in Aragón, who are only kilometers from Zaragoza, within sight of the towers of Pilarica. Whatever threat may hover over Madrid, we have to remember that a people have risen and nothing will make them retreat.
We will resist the fascist hordes on the Aragón front and we tell our brothers in Madrid to do the same. The militiamen from Catalonia will know how to carry out their duty, just like they did when they demolished the fascists in the streets of Barcelona.
You can’t forget the workers’ organizations. That’s imperative. There’s only one idea and one goal on the front and in the trenches: we look forward resolutely and focus exclusively on destroying the fascists.
We ask the Catalan people to stop the intrigues and bickering. You must rise to the occasion: stop quarreling and think of the war. The people of Catalonia have the duty to support those fighting on the front. We have to mobilize everyone, but don’t think that it will always be the same people. If Catalan workers have assumed the responsibility of going to the front, it’s now time to demand sacrifices from those who remain in the cities. We have to activate all the workers in the rearguard. Those of us on the front need to know that we can count on the men behind us.
No one should think of salary increases or reduced working hours now. It’s the duty of all workers, especially CNT workers, to make sacrifices, to work as much as necessary.
To the organizations, stop your rows and stop tripping things up! Those of us who are fighting on the front ask for sincerity, above all from the CNT and FAI. We ask the leaders to be genuine. This is a completely modern war and it’s costing Catalonia a lot. The leadership has to realize that we’ll need to start organizing the Catalan economy if this lasts much longer. Of course we’re fighting for something greater and the militiamen will prove it. They blush when they read about attempts to raise money for them in the press, when they see those posters asking you to make a donation. They blush because fascist planes drop newspapers that also talk about campaigns for their soldiers. We must build a granite wall against the enemy. The men at the front want responsibility and guarantees behind us. And we demand that the organizations look after our women and children. They’re mistaken if they think that the militarization decree will scare us and impose an iron disciple on us. We invite those who instituted the decree to come to the front and see our morale and discipline. Then we’ll compare it to the morale and discipline in the rearguard!
Be calm. There’s no chaos or indiscipline on the front. We’re all responsible and cherish your trust. Sleep peacefully. But remember that we’ve left Catalonia and its economy in your hands. Take responsibility for yourselves, discipline yourselves. We mustn’t provoke another civil war after this one. Anyone who thinks that his party is strong enough to impose its policy is wrong. Against the fascists we must marshal one force, one organization, with a unified discipline.
The fascist tyrants will never cross our lines. That is our slogan on the front. To them we say: “You will not pass!” To you: “They will not pass!”[671]
This speech, like many of Durruti’s speeches, had a dual effect. For the workers, it showed that he was the same revolutionary as always. For the bureaucrats and politicians, it confirmed that he and those he inspired were still a threat. Clearly, the ball was “up in the air.”
Things were also “up in the air” in Madrid. The rebel columns had come extremely close to the city between November 4 and 5. General Varela had captured Leganés, Alcorcón, and Getafe. The Burgos Junta—the rebel’s government—thought that Madrid’s fall was inevitable and had drafted a list of those who would take control of the capital. Martínez Anido, interior minister in the Burgos Junta, stated that they would execute two million “reds” between Valencia, Madrid, and Barcelona.
Although the militias fought valiantly, they had been losing to the rebels’ modern army. So they ran, hoping that something might miraculously come between them and their assailants. They reached Madrid and could run no more. What they saw when they arrived was unthinkable: women, 564 “Viva Madrid without government!youngsters, and old people building barricades, without orders or pre-defined plans, and making it patently obvious that no one had the slightest intention of leaving the city. It was in this context, which seemed like a reproach upon those who had fled, that the retreating forces prepared to fight back. If they had to die, then at least they’d die fighting. The hoped for miracle had occurred.
Panic reigned in the government. Largo Caballero had pathetically proposed an immediate retreat to Valencia at the first Cabinet meeting attended by the CNT ministers. Leaving Madrid in a stampede didn’t seem like an auspicious beginning to any of them. All, even the moderates, were deeply conflicted about accepting their ministerial positions to begin with. Peiró later wrote that “the CNT had other options, before coming to that.” And they knew that their appointments had caused an uproar in the CNT’s ranks, given the dubious way in which they were made. They were also aware that the militants would never forgive them if, added to everything, they fled the city. To justify its entrance into the government, the CNT declared: “We are absolutely certain that the comrades selected to represent the CNT in the government will know how to carry out their duty and the mission entrusted to them. They are not so much people as warriors and revolutionaries in the service of anti-fascist victory.” [672] Warriors and revolutionaries and, in the face of the first attack, they abandon ground and join the fleeing crowd? Impossible!
“Leave?” García Oliver asked Largo Caballero in the name of the four Confederals. “We just got here! No! The government should stay in Madrid and the ministers should lead the struggle and even fight on the barricades.” All the ministers, including the Communists, looked in horror at the lunatic telling them to man the barricades. Then they looked at the Prime Minister, who made his irritation clear with his gestures. Largo Caballero urged the CNT ministers to “behave reasonably;” time was of the essence and the decision had to be unanimous. García Oliver reasserted his position and this put the government in a deadlock. What to do? Largo Caballero proposed that the CNT members confer about the issue privately because the vote, he repeated, had to be unanimous. The four CNT ministers left the room to meet alone. They couldn’t change a position that they all shared, but they did have to resolve the situation. They decided to call the CNT National Committee and let it decide. Horacio M. Prieto’s response was “Hold firm, but cede if there’s a risk of crisis.” There was a new affirmation from García Oliver and a new response from Largo Caballero: a dead end. The atmosphere was unbearable. The other ministers lost their patience with those CNT madmen; members of Manuel Azaña’s party reproached Largo Caballero for his zeal to put the anarchists in the government. “You yourself created this situation!”
The Confederal ministers left the room again to meet in private. There was another telephone call to Prieto. This time he responded: “Vote, and then return to Madrid immediately.”
There was a heavy silence when García Oliver rose to communicate the result of their deliberations. He announced that “the CNT votes for the government’s departure.” The other ministers let out a loud sigh of relief. [673] From then on, everything moved at a crazy pace. The obsession was: leave, leave, and leave as soon as possible.
The spirit in the street stood in sharp contrast to the cowardliness found among the ministers. The CNT and UGT released a manifesto that said, in essence, “Liberty or Death!” Radio stations broadcast improvised speeches calling upon the people to fight. Street orators roused the crowds who were demanding weapons. The excitement turned into a collective delirium and the individual dissolved into the group. People breathed collectively because they had visions of a collective death.
The government began its escape as soon as darkness fell and its departure wasn’t organized but rather a frenzied flight. Largo Caballero prepared a series of orders for General Miaja, after putting him in charge of the defense of Madrid. [674] He also made up instructions for General Pozas pertaining to the army of the Center. He placed the commands in envelopes and sealed and marked them with: “Do not open before 6:00 am on November 7.”
The government took off for Valencia on a road that passes through Tarancón, a town that is approximately forty kilometers from the capital. The remains of a unit that had fought in Sigüenza were there, under the command of the anarchist Villanueva. Neither Villanueva nor his men knew what had happened in Madrid, but the CNT Defense Committee of the Center had instructed them to stop anyone from leaving the capital and to disarm whomever came to their checkpoint.
A large caravan of cars left Madrid, carrying the cowards running from the danger. The militiamen stopped the automobiles in Tarancón with rifles in hand. They asked:
“Where are you going?”
“To Valencia.”
“Why?”
“Special mission”
Everyone seems to be on a special mission. All the spineless weaklings are trying to get special missions. The militiamen don’t budge: “You’re cowards! Go back to Madrid!”
Some, ashamed, return. Others insist on passing.
“Ok, leave your arms. You don’t need them in Valencia.”
Pedro Rico arrives in a car. He’s curled up in a ball with panic written all over his face. The militiamen laugh at him:
“So, you want to clear out too, you pushover?!”
Pedro Rico is the Mayor of Madrid and tries to make an excuse for himself, but a militiaman interrupts:
“We should kill you right here!”
He manages to escape. He heads back toward Madrid, followed by laugher and jeers. He’ll seek refuge in a foreign embassy when he gets to the city.
It’s already late at night. José Villanueva is commanding the groups at the checkpoint. He’s thin and determined. He fought at the Mountain barracks, in Guadalajara, and also Sigüenza. At daybreak he and his men will march off to help defend Madrid. He will fight in the Casa de Campo and die in the battle of Teruel.
A caravan of cars arrives. The militiamen hold them. A voice shouts: “Clear the way! There are ministers in the cars!”
But all the occupants are told to get out of the vehicles. One of them approaches Villanueva:
“This is outrageous! I’m the minister of Foreign Affairs and I’m going to Valencia.”
Villanueva responds: “As a minister, it’s your responsibility to be at the people’s side. You demoralize the fighters by fleeing.”
Three or four more ministers turn up (Communists Jesús Hernández and Vicente Uribe and the CNT’s Juan López). Villanueva disarms them and sends them to a room. Frightened, one of them asks: “What are you going to do?”
“To my liking,” he replied, “put you between us and the fascists when we go into battle tomorrow...”
“This is unbelievable!”
“Executing you would be even better, which is exactly what you deserve.”[675]
While traveling to Madrid, Cipriano Mera stopped in Tarancón to speak with Feliciano Benito, whose command post was in the town. He found out that Feliciano wasn’t there, because had left for Madrid after Eduardo Val had summoned him. He spoke with José Villanueva to find out what was new: Villanueva told me that he had detained the following individuals for fleeing Madrid: General Asensio, the Sub-Secretary of War [676] ; Socialist Alvarez del Vayo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; our comrade Juan López, the Minister of Trade; General Pozas, who claimed he’d been ordered to establish his command post in Tarancón, [677] and a few others.... I called Val in Madrid ... and told him about the people detained and asked him what we should do with them ... Val told me that he was leaving for Tarancón immediately.
It was 2:00 am when comrade Val and Horacio M. Prieto, the CNT’s General Secretary, reached Tarancón. Prieto was also leaving.... Val told us that given the circumstances, particularly in Madrid, everyone should occupy their place: that is, let the detainees go to Valencia, where the government now resides. Likewise, he reiterated that the comrades representing us in the government had opposed the abandonment of Madrid but, since the majority opted to do so, it was best to accept the decision. He said: “So, comrades, once again we’re going to cede. Let them go.” [678] The above story is important because it sets the context for two acts of indiscipline that enabled Madrid to be saved. Clearly men have to live as thinking beings, not automatons...
Miaja’s instructions were to keep his envelope sealed until 6:00 in the morning on November 7. Obviously that was an absurd order, given the situation in Madrid and that he had to assume his post right away. But he hesitated, and turned the envelope over and over in his hands. While trying to decide what to do, he made Vicente Rojo Lluch chief of his General Staff and realized how extraordinarily chaotic things were: nobody knew anything about anything, not even the exact location of those who were supposed to defend the capital. Everything had to be organized from scratch. So, considering all this, Miaja decided to stop waiting and opened the envelope at 11:00 pm. And wouldn’t he be surprised when he found out that the contents of the envelope were not for him but for General Pozas! Therefore Pozas must also have the wrong envelope! Where was he?
Pozas was in Tarancón, detained by Villanueva, which Miaja didn’t know. It was only after Cipriano Mera called Eduardo Val to tell him that Villanueva had detained General Asensio and Pozas that Val contacted Miaja and informed him that Pozas was in Tarancón. Thanks to this, Miaja was able exchange his envelope with the one in Pozas’s possession.[679] There was a heavy battle that night, but the militias fought firmly and without retreating. Radio stations encouraged the fighters with speeches declaring that “Madrid will be the fascists’ tomb!” The CNT’s Local Federation of Unions disseminated a call by radio:
Madrid, free of the ministers, commissioners, and “tourists” feels more confident in its struggle.... The people of Madrid don’t need all those tourists who have gone to Valencia and Catalonia. Madrid, free of ministers, will bury the fascists! Onward, militiamen! Viva Madrid without government! Viva the social revolution!
In Valencia, the CNT and FAI released an even more militant statement:
We offer our homes and our bread to Madrid’s women, children, elderly, and injured. But we have only disdain for the cowards and deserters running from the capital: comrades, make their lives impossible![680]
The CNT’s reaction in Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona embodied the revolutionary spirit of the people. As always, during key historical moments, the people are more radical than their leaders. It was in the midst of this turbulence that Durruti gave the speech cited above. His stance coincided with that of the working masses and would only enhance their radicalization. Durruti’s popularity shot up in a few hours and he became the voice of the people’s will. Durruti said out loud what the workers felt:
We’re fighting to crush the enemy on the front. But is that the only thing? No! There is also an enemy among us that undermines our revolutionary conquests. We’ll crush it as well.
Many others spoke in the same terms as Durruti, but there was a difference and the people knew it. Durruti combined theory and practice. He said no to militarism and didn’t dress up like a general. He said no to privileges and lived among the militiamen. He fought for a classless society and the daily practice in the Column came as close to it as possible. Durruti’s prestige emerged from his revolutionary coherence.
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