[1] Federico Escofet, De una derrota a una victoria: 6 octobre de 1934 — 19 de julio 1936, Barcelona 1984.

[2] B. Bolloten, The Spanish Revolution, N.C., 1979.

[3] Diego Abad de Santillán (quoted in Durruti: The People Armed, Abel Paz, Canada, 1976).

[4] Juan Gómez Casas, Historia de la FAI, p.217.

[5] Ibid.

[6] García Oliver, Solidaridad Obrera, 19 July 1936.

[7] It is unlikely that García Oliver would have required much convincing, even by the least artful of flatterers. Peirats mentions that García Oliver speaking of ‘taking power’ at a public meeting in the Barcelona Woodworkers Union in ‘January or February 1936’. He had also pressed this case during a restricted meeting of ‘notables’ held just before the CNT regional conference to discuss the February 1936 elections. The ‘restricted’ meeting which took place ‘behind the back of the Organization’ was to forestall an anti-election campaign such as that which had cost the Left the elections in November 1933. As Peirats notes: ‘Out of it undoubtedly came the summoning of the conference which did indeed recommend a low key campaign against the elections. So low key that it was virtually non-existent.’ José Peirats, Presencia, Paris, 1967, p.46.

[8] Noire et Rouge, No. 36, December 1967.

[9] ‘El Comité Central de Milicias Antifascistas de Cataluña’, Solidaridad Obrera, July 18, 1937.

[10] El eco de los pasos, ibid, p.190.

[11] La CNT en la revolución española, Ch. 8.

[12] Information on Zaragoza from ‘Anarchosyndicalism, Libertarian Communism and the State: the CNT in Zaragoza and Aragón 1930–1937’, Graham Kelsey, Phd Thesis, University of Lancaster, 1984.

[13] Homage to Catalonia, George Orwell, London, 1962.

[14] Durruti, The People Armed, Abel Paz, p.254.

[15] Durruti, Ibid., p.225.

[16] Dante A. Ouzo, Spain and the Great Powers, NY, 1962, p. 160 (quoted by Noam Chomsky in Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship [American Power and the New Mandarins, N.Y. 1968] ).

[17] Toronto Daily Star, August 18, 1936.

[18] Durruti’s speech at Bujaraloz Town Hall, reconstructed from the recollections of two eye-witnesses, Liberto Roig and Pablo Ruiz. Quoted in Durruti, ‘The People Armed’, Ibid, p.231.

[19] CNT, Madrid, 6 October 1936.

[20] La CNT en la revolución española, Peirats, Ch. 8

[21] Gaston Leval found only two lawyers among the organizers of the Aragón collectives, but even they, he says, were not strictly intellectuals. ‘It was not by the work of our intellectuals — more literary than sociological, more agitators than practical guides — that the future has been illuminated. And the peasants — libertarian or not — or Aragón, Levante, Castille, Extremadura, Andalusia, the workers of Catalonia, understood this and acted alone.

[22] According to information obtained by Gabriel Jackson ‘the American colonel who headed the Telephone company had placed private lines at the disposal of the Madrid plotters for their conversations with General Mola and Franco.’ Dante A. Puzo, Spain and the Great Powers: 1936–1941, New York, 1962, p.93.

[23] Homage to Catalonia, George Orwell.

[24] See Background Briefs: Libertarian Communism.

[25] La CNT en la revolución española, José Peirats.

[26] Ne Franco, ne Stalin, Milan, 1952, Leval, pp. 343–344.

[27] Leval, ibid, pp. 168–169.

[28] Leval, ibid, p.154

[29] Protesta davanti al libertari del presente e del futuro, sulle capitulazioni del 1937, di un ′incontrolado′ della Colonna di Ferro, Turin, 1981.

[30] PANCR, Turin, 1967, interview with Mika Etchébéhere, pp. 16—17.

[31] Linea del Fuego, 17.11.1936

[32] La Rivoluzione e la guerra di Spagna, Broué and Témime, Milan, 1962, p. 247.

[33] La CNT en la revolución española, Peirats, pp. 306–308.

[34] Courtot, Introduction to the Reading of Benjamin Péert.

[35] L′Autogestion dans l′Espagne révolutionnaire, Mintz, p.90.

[36] Ibid, p.91.

[37] Peirats, op. cit. Ch. 10.

[38] Peirats, op. cit. Ch. 10.

[39] Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit, p.183.

[40] The exact strength of the PCE at the outbreak of the Civil War is uncertain. From a membership of 800 in April 1931 (Claudín) it had risen to between 30,000 (Peirats), 40,000 (Bolloten) and 113,000 (Miguel Maura, ex-Minister of the Interior). Most commentators agree however, that its membership was in excess of 100,000 (Gómez Casas). Compared with nearly two million members of the CNT and a million and a half in the UGT at the outbreak of the Civil War, the Spanish Communist Party was minuscule indeed and had little influence among the workers.

[41] Peirats, Vol. 1, Ch. 11.

[42] Peirats, ibid.

[43] Yesterday, Saturday, the evening papers carried news that comrades Fábregas and Domenech had discussions with the President of the Generalidad, discussions which lasted 20 minutes. It has to be pointed out that the comrades in question talked, not with the President but had an audience with the Councilor for culture. To clarify another point to the press and, may it serve as a warning … no government has been set up but rather a new body congruent with the circumstances in which we find ourselves and which goes by the name of the Council of the Generalidad′. Quoted by Peirats, op. cit., Vol I, Ch. 11.

[44] President/Prime Councilor, José Tarradellas (Esquerra); Finance, Idem (Esquerra); Culture, Ventura Gassol (Esquerra); Internal Security, Artemio Aiguadé (Esquerra); Economy, Juan P. Fábregas (CNT); Supply, Juan J. Doménech (CNT); Health & Social Services, Antonio García Birlán (CNT); Public Services, Juan Comorera (PSUC); Labor & Public Works, Miguel Valdés (PSUC); Agriculture, José Calvet (Rabassaires/Esq); Justice & Law, Andrés Nín (POUM); Defense, Díaz Sandino (expert); Without Portfolio, Rafael Closas (Acción Catalana).

[45] Solidaridad Obrera, 29.9.1936.

[46] Por qué perdimos la guerra, Diego Abad de Santillán.

[47] The term ‘uncontrollables’ was applied to rank and file militants who refused to be seduced by the argument of ‘circumstances’ or to be bullied by the CNT-FAI leadership.

[48] Solidaridad Obrera, 24.10.36.

[49] Consejo Regional de Defensa de Aragón, Boletín, No. 4, 5 November 1936 (quoted by G. Kelsey, ibid).

[50] Les Anarchistes Espagnols et le Pouvoir, C. M. Lorenzo, p. 149.

[51] CNT, 17 September 1936 (quoted by Kelsey, ibid).

[52] C. M. Lorenzo, op cit., 150.

[53] See Background Briefs: ′What Can We Do?′

[54] Guerra di Classe, No. 4, 5.11.1936.

[55] Peirats, op.cit. Vol. I. Ch. 14

[56] Solidaridad Obrera, 5.11.1936

[57] See Background Briefs.

[58] Solidaridad Obrera, Barcelona, 4.11.1936.

[59] Los anarquistas en la crisis politica española.

[60] 3 January 1937.

[61] See Background Briefs: Sébastian Faure for full text.

[62] García Oliver claims that the real reason the CNT was invited to join the Caballero government was to facilitate its flight to Valencia and to preempt any criticism or, presumably, revolutionary initiatives from the anarcho-syndicalist and anarchist rank-and-file. Although claiming to have opposed the move to Valencia, García Oliver, acting on the instructions of Horacio Prieto, National Secretary of the CNT to whom the anarchist ministers appear to have been answerable informed his colleagues that the National Committee’s wish was that they should not provoke a crisis and agree to move to Valencia if it came to a showdown. Prieto was later removed as National Secretary for this decision and his place was taken by Mariano R. Vázquez, (Marianet) ex-Regional Secretary of Catalonia and a man Oliver describes as a puppet of Federica Montseny. El eco de los pasos, Oliver, pp. 303–329.

[63] Published in Volontà, 19 July, 1951.

[64] The structure, organization and control of the CNT militias was recorded in the minutes of the same Plenum: “ (1e) The mere fact of being the delegate of a group, centuria or war committee in no way implied special status or privilege: the moment a delegate fails to meet the requirements of his group, centuria or committee, he is to be discharged instantly and replaced by another delegate (…). (2) A propos of the question of discipline, our understanding is that moral self-discipline should be en-forced by the militia member themselves by taking an interest in the struggle and then voicing their opinions concerning the conduct of the war, in the appropriate gatherings. (2f) In specific instances of drunkenness, desertion, suspicious or unjustifiable contacts, etc., etc., (the militian) is to be judged and punished by the centuria of which he is a member. (3) With regard to the control of the militias, the proposal is that once the column’s internal organizational structure has been settled we must move on to liaising with columns of other political or ideological persuasions. This being so, our objectives are as follows: (a) The establishment of Operations Committees comprising two civilian delegates together with one expert military delegate in an advisory capacity for each and every column; these committees will be responsible for directing and orienting the fighting on their respective fronts. (b) At national level, we suggest the establishment of a National Council of Militias consisting of representatives from all columns fighting on the various battlefronts. No campaign instructions will be accepted other than those emanating from the fighting men. (c) To ensure greater harmony between all of the forces fighting on the front or in the rearguard, we want our delegate at the forthcoming Plenum of regional Committees to put the proposal for the necessity of disbanding all of those forces of the state which, not being controlled by the antifascist organizations, do not inspire confidence in our Organization. (d) The aforementioned proposal, which refers to the Guardia de asalto, Guardia Nacional Republicana, Carabineros, Volunteer Army, etc., should be implemented in such a way that the individual members of these corps affiliate with the Militias of whatever political or ideological persuasion which most closely approximates to their particular viewpoints… (…) Moved by: Amalgamated Trades of Segorbe, the Metallurgical Union of Alcoy, the Sanitary Union of Valencia, General Trades of Gandia, General Trades of Moncada, General Trades of Orihuela, the workers of Biar, and the delegation from the Iron Column and the CNT Column 13.’ F. Mintz, op. cit., pp. 287–288.

[65] Frank Mintz, op.cit., pp. 286–287.

[66] The Spanish Revolution, B. Bolloten, N.C., 1979, p315.

[67] The Germans also proposed: “(5) That there be set up a Battalion Council, with each company electing three delegates. (6) That no delegate shall exercise positions of command. (7) The Battalion Council shall summon a general assembly of soldiers should two thirds of the company delegates be so agreed. (8) The soldiers from each unit (regiment) are to elect a delegation of three trustworthy men from the unit. These trustees shall be empowered to convene a general assembly at any time. (9) One of them is to be seconded to the (brigade) staff as an observer. (10) This structure should be continued until the whole of the army has general representation in the Soldiers’ Councils. (11) The general staff should also have a representative from the general Soldiers’ Council. (12) Field courts martial shall comprise exclusively of soldiers. In the event of charges against ranks, the court martial shall have an officer seconded to it.” A. and D. Proudhommeaux, La Catalogne Libre, Ed. Le Combat Syndicaliste, Paris, 1970, p. 24.

[68] Text (censored) published in Solidaridad Obrera, 5.11.1936.

[69] Federica Montseny’s insistence that Durruti and 1,000 of his men should come to Madrid, which already had over 200,000 defenders, prompted García Oliver to ask if she “wanted to kill Durruti.” (El eco de los pasos, Juan García Oliver, Paris 1978, p. 329). It was García Oliver, however, who had originally suggested to Largo Caballero that Durruti could bring a force of 12,000 men from Aragón and that he should be appointed major and given the command of three ‘mixed brigades’ (militiamen and regular troops) on the Madrid front. (ibid. p. 324).

[70] Paz, op.cit. p. 296.

[71] Paz, op.cit. p. 298.

[72] The episode was later blamed on a unit from the Iron Column who, since their spectacular reentry into Valencia in October to break the re-birth of bourgeois power in the rearguard, had been the object of a massive campaign of slander and disinformation. Had the unit been from the Iron Column it is unlikely they would have had the slightest hesitation ‘unmaking’ the government; perhaps, thereby salvaging the social revolution.

[73] Peirats, op.cit., Vol. I. Chapter 1

[74] Peirats, op.cit., Vol. I. Chapter 13.

[75] Peirats, Ibid.

[76] Guerra di Classe, No. 7, 1937.

[77] Solidaridad Obrera, 3.12.1936.

[78] Peirats, op.cit., Vol. I. Chapter 13.

[79] Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement, Part 1, p.224.

[80] The POUM had denounced Soviet foreign policy in the 15 November issue of La Batalla: “To what was this change [in Stalin’s attitude] due? Did Stalin perhaps realize the mistake he had made after two and a half months and seek to set it right? That there was an error is proved by the simple fact that it has been corrected, there has been a change. But the most important real factor that dictated the change is Stalin’s realization that Franco, with the undisguised support of Hitler and Mussolini, might snatch victory in the civil war. This would bolster the political and strategic positions of Hitlerite fascism which Stalin considers his mortal enemy. The correction of the error has not sprung from the desire to be of service to the interests of the Spanish revolution — Lenin would not for a single moment have declared himself neutral towards it — but rather from a pre-occupation with foreign policy, and instinct of self-preservation in the international balance of power. In short: what really interests Stalin is not the fate of the Spanish or international proletariat, but the defense, of the Soviet government in accordance with the policy of alliances established by same states against others.”

[81] Peirats, op.cit., Vol. I. Chapter 14.

[82] For full text of speech see Background Briefs: Address by Federica Montseny

[83] For fuller text see Background Briefs: Protest before the libertarians of present and future. Also known as ‘A day mournful and overcast′.

[84] Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit, p.184.

[85] Translated from L′Espagne Nouvelle, February 1937.

[86] For fuller text see Background Briefs: Protest before the libertarians of present and future. Also known as ‘A day mournful and overcast′.

[87] Cipriano Mera, Guerra, Exilio y Carcel, Paris 1976, p.112.

[88] Borkenau, op. Cit., p.212.

[89] Borkenau, ibid., p.228.

[90] See Background Briefs.

[91] Solidaridad 0brera, 5.3.1937,

[92] Jordi Arquer, typescript history of the ‘Amigos de Durruti’, quoted in The Alarm, San Francisco, 1983.

[93] FAI ′Informe que este comite de relaciones de grupos anarquistas de Cataluna presenta a los compañeros de la region′, Barcelona, March 1937.

[94] Claude Courtot, Introduction à la lecture de Benjamin Péert, Paris, 1965.

[95] The Spanish Revolution, No. 6, Vol. II, 31.3.1937.

[96] See Background Briefs: An Open Letter to Federica Montseny.

[97] See Background Briefs.

[98] See Background Briefs: Confidential letter from an agent of Negrín.

[99] Mintz and Peciña.

[100] Combats pour la liberte: Moscou-Madrid-Paris, Pavel and Clara Thalmann, Paris, 1983.

[101] La Noche, 30 April 1937.

[102] In an interview with Solidaridad Obrera published on 13 May, Diego Abad de Santillán stated: ‘There is no doubt that the recent events were the result of a deliberate plot, such has never been seen before in the history of the social movement. This is plain from the fact that two weeks before they happened, people were talking about them in foreign diplomatic circles and were prepared for their occurrence. It was discussed there quite openly ‘that now the CNT-FAI had been forced out of the leading positions in Madrid and Valencia the anarchists in Catalonia were to be given a fight. The same statements were being made in Paris by persons very close to the Catalan government. And how else can one explain the sudden arrival of foreign warships in our harbor just a few hours before the outbreak of hostilities? Is not another proof that we are here dealing with a plan determined in advance? Long before the first shot was discharged in Barcelona, English and French cruisers were hurrying toward the port as if they had a prophetic presentiment of the things to come. If one takes all this into consideration, one asks oneself how much faith in the triumph of the anti-Fascist cause still exists, among those people who invoke foreign protection against the workers of their own country?’

[103] C. and P. Thalmann, op. cit.

[104] Umanità Nova, 20 December 1964.

[105] Interviú, Barcelona, 6 June 1984.

[106] André Prudhommeaux, ‘L′Espagne Nouvelle’, 18 February 1938.

[107] Paul and Clara Thalmann, op. cit.

[108] Carlos Rama has suggested that Mussolini’s OVRA agents, were responsible for these murders. The CNT, for its part, accused Aiguadé. Personally, I am more inclined to accept Frank Mintz’s view that the order was given by Palmiro Togliatti, the Italian communist party leader, because of Berneri’s outstanding intellectual influence within the Italian left.

[109] Treball, 13 May 1937.

[110] See Background papers.

[111] See Background papers.

[112] Quoted in Manuel Azaretto, Las pendientes Resbalizadas, Montevideo, 1939, pp. 151–152.

[113] Cuadernos para una enciclopaedia histórica del anarquismo español, No. 22, May 1984, Vitoria.

[114] Quoted in Interviú, 27 June, 1984.

[115] Manuel Azaña, Obras Completas, Mexico City, 1966–68, Vol. IV, p. 614.

[116] This conflicts with what Lister states in his book, Nuestra Guerra (Paris, 1966), where he claims Prieto briefed him five days before his forces went into action. The Minister told him that “…I should act unhesitatingly, without bureaucratic or legal formalities, in whatever way seemed to me the best because I had the government behind me unanimously.” (p.152)

[117] Leval, Collectives in the Spanish Revolution, p. 336.

[118] Interviú, 27 June 1984.

[119] G. Kelsey, Civil War and Civil Peace: Libertarian Aragón 1936–37, unpublished ms.

[120] Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain, p. 391.

[121] G. Munis, Jalones de derrota. Promesa de victoria, Barcelona, 1977, p. 430.

[122] G. Kelsey, ibid.

[123] Cataluña en la guerra civil, Memorias de la guerra civil española 1936–1939, Ediciones Gregorio del Toro, Madrid 1975.

[124] ¿Por qué perdimos la guerra? Memorias la guerra civil española 1936–1939, Ediciones Gregorio del Toro, Madrid 1975.

[125] Collectives in the Spanish Revolution, Gaston Leval, London 1975.

[126] Statement of Victor Blanco, quoted by Souchy, With the Peasants of Aragón, Orkney, 1982.

[127] The Conquest of Bread, Peter Kropotkin, London, 1906, p.226.

[128] Money and wage differentials are justified by Marx: “Thus, this labor value which materializes during the same periods of time as comparatively higher values. A higher than normal value is, logically, represented by superior work.” (Capital, Vol. 1, p.158, Havana, 1965). The Marxist Leninists also retain money and wage differentials: “It is intolerable that a locomotive driver should receive the same pay as a copyist. Marx and Engels say that the difference between skilled and unskilled labor will still exist under the socialist system and even after classes have been abolished.” Stalin, 1931, published in Questions of Leninism, Moscow, 1947, p.420–421).

[129] Como implantamos el comunismo libertario en Mas de las Matas, Macario Royo, Barcelona, 1934, p.19.

[130] Comunismo Libertario, F. Mintz, Isaac Puente.

[131] La autogestión en la revolucion espanola, F. Mintz, p.184.

[132] Op. cit., p.315.

[133] Anarchism, Daniel Guérin, New York, 1970, p.135.

[134] The Question of Money and Spanish Self-Management, Frank Mintz, (unpublished article).

[135] La Crisis del Movimiento Communista, F. Claudin, Paris 1970, p. xi (preface by Jorge Semprun).

[136] Escritos sobre España, Trotsky, p.159.

[137] La Batalla, Barcelona, 26 April 1937.

[138] Le guépéou [GPU] dans le mouvement Trotskiste, George Vereecken, Paris, 1975.